

JPRS-TND-94-016

19 August 1994



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JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

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PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-94-016

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19 August 1994

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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Spokesman 'Welcomes' U.S., DPRK Talks

*OW1308102194 Beijing XINHUA in English
1009 GMT 13 Aug 94*

[Text] Beijing, August 13 (XINHUA)—The Chinese Government welcomes the positive results from the talks between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

The statement was made here today by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman in response to a question asking him to comment on the agreement reached by the two countries in Geneva.

The spokesman said that the Chinese Government hopes that the relevant parties will continue to make constructive efforts to settle the Korean nuclear issue as soon as possible.

'Commentary' Views 'Positive Results' of DPRK-U.S. Talks

*OW1408084094 Beijing XINHUA in English
0826 GMT 14 Aug 94*

[Commentary by Gao Haorong and Ji Xinlong:
"Positive Results For DPRK-U.S. Talks"]

[Text] Pyongyang, August 14 (XINHUA)—The third round of talks between senior officials of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States on August 5-12 have resulted in agreement on a number of important issues.

A joint statement issued by the two sides after the talks says the DPRK has agreed to replace its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light water

reactors (lwr) and the U.S. Will make arrangements for interim energy alternatives to the DPRK.

Meanwhile, the DPRK will freeze the graphite-moderated reactors under construction, forgo reprocessing, and seal the radiochemical laboratory to be monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Public opinions believe the agreement has solved a "most important fundamental question" in the DPRK's nuclear issue, providing favorable conditions for an eventual peaceful settlement to the nuclear issue.

What's more, in the talks the U.S. expressed willingness to provide the DPRK with assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, and the DPRK is ready to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This is of important significance to maintaining peace and stability as well as easing tension in the Korean peninsula.

The DPRK and the United States have been hostile to each other for decades, and this has placed the peninsula in tension from time to time.

Now, the two sides have agreed in their talks to establish diplomatic representation in each other's capital and to lower barriers to trade and investment, as a move to full normalization in political and economic relations. The agreement not only means a significant step toward normal DPRK-U.S. relations, but will produce positive effect on better relations between the DPRK and Japan, other Western countries and South Korea.

The DPRK and the U.S. have agreed to resume their talks on September 23. People would like to see that the two sides will settle their remaining differences and make new progress in the talks.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Seoul To Support \$4 Billion for DPRK Light-Water Reactors*SK1408052994 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean
0300 GMT 14 Aug 94*

[Report by correspondent Yi Chong-su from Washington]

[Text] In a congratulatory speech to be delivered on the 49th anniversary of national liberation on 15 August, ROK President Kim Yong-sam will put forward a concrete plan to allocate approximately \$4 billion to support construction of North Korea's light-water reactors in order to back the agreement made between the United States and North Korea in Geneva. This has been reported by diplomatic sources in the United States.

It has been learned that the ROK plan to be revealed by President Kim Yong-sam stipulates that South Korea will take the initiative in supporting this project for 10 years.

In the meantime, in an interview today with THE WASHINGTON POST, Robert Gallucci, U.S. assistant secretary of state and their side's delegate to the talks in Geneva, pointed out that the United States will refuse delivery of parts to North Korea for construction of light-water reactors until a special inspection of two unregistered nuclear facilities in North Korea is completed.

ROK Officials Speculate on Defectors' Claims of DPRK Nukes**Three-Four Warheads 'Highly Likely'***SK0708050294 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean
7 Aug 94 p 1*

[Report by Kyong Yong-won: "Possibility of North Korea's Extraction of Plutonium—As Revealed by Government Source"]

[Text] On 6 August, a high-ranking government official stated it is highly likely North Korea has extracted a sufficient amount of plutonium to manufacture three or four warheads, more than the one or two officially estimated by the ROK and the United States up to now.

The official revealed that North Korea suspended operation of its five-megawatt atomic reactor at Yongbyon for 71 days in 1989, for 30-odd days in 1990, and again for 50-odd days in 1991. Judging from this, it is estimated North Korea has extracted a total of 22 to 27 kilograms of plutonium (an amount equivalent to three or four atomic bombs such as those dropped on Hiroshima).

The operation of the five-megawatt nuclear reactor in Yongbyon was known to have been suspended only in

1989, making this the first disclosure of its suspension of operations in 1990 and 1991.

Another high-ranking government official stated: "The suspension of operations of its five-megawatt atomic reactor three times during 1989-1991 has been revealed by a U.S. intelligence satellite. However, U.S. intelligence authorities assess that the possibility of North Korea having replaced nuclear fuel rods and extracted plutonium when the operation of the reactor was suspended in 1990 and 1991 is very slim. Thus, there are differences in opinion between U.S. intelligence authorities and relevant ROK authorities."

DPRK Possession of Five Nuclear Warheads Denied*SK0708060594 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean
2200 GMT 6 Aug 94*

[KYODO/YONHAP from Kuala Lumpur]

[Text] National Assemblyman Pak Chong-un of the Democratic Liberal Party, who is attending an East Asian youth leaders conference in Malaysia, stated that Kim Tae-chong, deputy director of the International Department of the North Korean Workers' Party, totally denied the allegation made by a North Korean defector claiming that North Korea has five nuclear weapons.

Deputy Director Kim Tae-chong said that defector Kang was divorced a long time ago, and thus his claim is not trustworthy; he also rejected the assumption that Kang's defection to South Korea would threaten the position of North Korean Premier Kang Song-san.

ROK Foreign Minister Stresses Transparency of DPRK Nuclear Past*SK1408085994 Seoul YONHAP in English
0849 GMT 14 Aug 94*

[Text] Seoul, Aug. 14 (YONHAP)—South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu made clear Sunday that North Korea will not be given light-water nuclear reactors without it first making its past nuclear activities transparent.

Meeting reporters before his visit to Nordic countries, he said the implementation of the principles agreed over the weekend between North Korea and the United States depends entirely on the results of future working-level and high-level dialogue.

Pyongyang, suspected of covert nuclear development, and Washington issued a statement at the end of serial talks in Geneva that North Korea would freeze its nuclear activities in exchange for light-water reactors and better diplomatic ties with the United States.

The two sides resume high-level dialogue from Sept. 23.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci, chief nuclear negotiator at the talks, is expected in Seoul sometime next month to coordinate positions before those talks.

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Asked whether North Korea is likely to accept special inspections on its nuclear material storage sites, the foreign minister said Pyongyang's commitment to implement International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards accord means it will allow the inspections.

"The very fact that the two sides agreed to announce the statement means there is improvement in their mutual trust," said Han.

ROK To Urge Mutual North-South Nuclear Inspections

SK1408070094 Seoul KYONGHYANG SINMUN
in Korean 14 Aug 94 p 2

[Report by Kim Chung-il: "Government To Urge the United States To Guarantee 'Mutual North-South Nuclear Inspections.'"]

[Text] During discussions with the United States following the settling of the nuclear issue during the third round of DPRK-U.S. talks that ended in Geneva on 13 August, the government intends to strongly propose concrete measures for improving North-South relations and for ensuring North-South mutual inspections in order to resolve the problem of North Korea's past nuclear activities.

A relevant government official stated: "During the third round of DPRK-U.S. talks, the transparency of North Korea's present and future nuclear activities has been insured to a certain extent. However, its past activities have not been resolved satisfactorily. North Korea explicitly mentioned 'implementation of a North-South joint declaration for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula' in Article 3 of the agreed statement jointly announced by North Korea and the United States. Accordingly, our government will call on the United States to guarantee the implementation of mutual inspections at an early date."

Regarding the mutual establishment of diplomatic representations between North Korea and the United States, the official pointed out: "A basic agreement has been reached between the ROK and the United States to advance improved DPRK-U.S. relations in conformity with improved relations between North and South Korea. Therefore, it is our government's position that representation should be established in the North and South by advancing North-South dialogue in keeping with issue of establishing diplomatic representation between North Korea and the United States."

This official stated: "Our government intends to participate in the construction of light-water nuclear power plants as agreed upon between North Korea and the United States, and to actively support the project. However, it is our basic policy to offer such support as part of common projects for national development. Therefore, it is desirable that our support should be accepted not only for light-water reactors, but also for the overall North-South economic cooperation." He thus stressed the need for overall resumption of dialogue to improve North-South relations.

It has been learned that the government will hold a security policy coordination committee meeting early this week to analyze the result of North Korea-U.S. talks, and will inform the United States of our government's position in this regard.

HONG KONG

Former Soviet Agent Questioned on Nuclear Weapon Components

HK0208071494 Hong Kong EASTERN EXPRESS
in English 2 Aug 94 p 2

[Article by Billy Adams]

[Text] A former Soviet secret service agent suspected of smuggling materials to make nuclear bombs has been questioned by Special Branch detectives in Hong Kong.

Igor Deordienko was interviewed after he arrived in the territory from Macao last month.

It is believed to be the first time the authorities have taken action inside the territory to counter a nuclear threat.

Officers are understood to have pressed Deordienko on illegal arm dealing, including the transport of components thought to be used in nuclear weapons.

Deordienko, who is alleged to run part of the growing prostitution trade in Macao, was also questioned on his vice involvement.

He was neither arrested nor charged and is believed to have left Hong Kong.

Deordienko is suspected of being one of several former Russian agents who are involved in smuggling weapons and other materials in the wake of the break-up of the Soviet Union.

It is estimated that up to 3,000 tonnes of weapons grade plutonium has gone missing since the end of the Cold War.

It is believed Special Branch's prime aim was to show Deordienko they were aware of his activities.

They also asked Deordienko about the murders of the Hong Kong lawyer Gary Alderdice, and his girlfriend, Natalie Samofalova, in Vladivostok on June 24.

Samofalova worked as a prostitute in the enclave before falling in love with the Queen's Counsel and spending a month with him at a luxury resort hotel on Coloane Island.

They were both shot once in the back of the head in Samofalova's flat.

Macao police investigating Russian-organised crime syndicates, said to run the enclave's vice rings, recently asked their Hong Kong counterparts for a dossier on Deordienko and a former KGB officer, Vladimir Rippin.

"They were investigating the prostitution side," a source said.

Macao police called reports that Deordienko transferred a nuclear component to a Hong Kong ship a "product of the imagination".

The component, red mercury, has been claimed by some scientists to be a sophisticated material which can be incorporated in nuclear devices to produce a small bomb capable of devastating results.

The majority of international opinion has dismissed the claims. Sellers of red mercury have been making millions by duping businessmen and terrorists into buying the substance.

The FBI and CIA in America have pinpointed the stockpiling and selling off of nuclear components as one of the biggest threats to world security.

One British military expert, who refused to be named, said controls on the deactivation and dismantling of warheads in the former Eastern bloc were tight.

He said the main threat came from the missing plutonium.

An amount the size of two oranges is enough to produce a nuclear bomb

Much of the substance is thought to have been smuggled through Switzerland, he said.

The expert said it was "highly possible" plutonium was already in the wrong hands.

"Forget the red mercury, that is most likely to be a load of rubbish," he said.

"Much of the plutonium may have been taken during the processing where there was a weakness in the control.

"All this stuff is drifting around the world.

"But it is the trigger for a nuclear device which is incredibly complex.

"Red mercury, whatever it is, is not a trigger."

The assistant police commissioner, David Hodson, said that Hong Kong would have to face up to the potential problem of nuclear components, or laundered money from their sale, coming through the territory.

But he said he was unaware of any incidents that had occurred so far.

Investigation of East European Gangs Smuggling WMD Materials

*HK0208072394 Hong Kong SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST in English 2 Aug 94 p 3*

[Article by Darren Goodsir and Hedley Thomas]

[Text] Police are set to launch a special intelligence investigation into East European gangs amid concerns that an increase in international travel has led to a surge in crime.

It is understood the Crime Wing wants to examine dealings of "businessmen" linked to former Soviet bloc nations.

Police sources say the freeing of entry restrictions between Eastern Europe and Hong Kong in 1992 may have brought with it a number of gangs eager to launder funds by establishing criminal links with territory gangsters.

Last year, there was a 52 per cent rise in the number of travellers to Hong Kong from Eastern Europe.

The investigation follows police warnings that the collapse of security at nuclear installations in former communist regimes could see the territory being targeted as a possible clearing-house for dealings in weapons of mass destruction.

It signals the speed by which criminals, especially those linked to Russian organised crime syndicates, have expanded operations.

One officer, who confirmed the intelligence exercise, said: "Although we have not yet decided how we will go about it, there are no shortages of places where we can get information."

It was reported yesterday that intelligence agencies had information pointing to the involvement of Russian criminals in the smuggling of materials for use in nuclear arms.

The South China Morning Post quoted Macao authorities as suggesting a nuclear trigger, red mercury, had recently been loaded on to a Hong Kong ship in international waters. Macao police yesterday denied the claim.

Acting Director of the Judiciary Police, Albano Cabral, described the reports as a "product of (the) imagination".

The Russian Consul-General, Kivill Ivanor, said yesterday he was concerned by his nation's crime plague.

Mr Ivanor said Russian authorities were focusing on cracking economic crime fraud and smuggling—as well as drug trafficking and offences with an international character.

When asked about the problems posed by Russian organised crime, Mr Ivanor replied: "We are taking this quite seriously as a threat to the economic and social development of Russia."

He said measures had been introduced to allow police and other state bodies to fight the increase in crime.

"At the same time, we are increasing co-operation with Interpol and other relevant bodies," Mr Ivanor said.

Mr Ivanor said Russia hoped to soon set up an official mission in Macao.

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—Macao's Second Commander of the Public Security Police, Lieutenant-Colonel Jose Manuel Viana, yesterday denied a Post report that there had been an inquiry launched into the murders in Vladivostok of Hong Kong lawyer Gary Alderdice QC, and his Russian girlfriend, Natalie Samofalova.

Customs To Monitor Trade in Nuclear, Strategic Commodities

HK0808051894 Hong Kong SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST in English 8 Aug 94 p 2

[Article by Darren Goodsir]

[Text] A special intelligence unit will soon be established to monitor trade in military, nuclear and strategic commodities.

It is understood the Customs and Excise Department will set up the 20-strong team in the next few months.

The role was previously performed by Special Branch, but its recent restructuring has provoked a re-appraisal of intelligence gathering capabilities.

Last week, the South China Morning Post revealed the Russian Mafia had been smuggling materials for nuclear arms using ties with Hong Kong and Macao.

A quantity of red mercury, thought to be a trigger for a nuclear bomb, is believed to have been transferred to a Hong Kong ship in international waters by a former Russian special services operative Igor Deordienko. Classified intelligence reports in Macao name Deordienko and suspected partner Vladimir Rippin as top figures in the Portuguese enclave's prostitution racket.

The new unit will monitor military and nuclear material, chemicals, computers and other items which are not allowed to be shipped through the territory or onto countries not deemed proper recipients. Four Customs officers have just returned from England after receiving training and will set up the team.

Commissioner of Customs and Excise, Don Watson, said the move would enhance the department's new intelligence-driven profile.

"It has been decided that it is wise for Customs to have an intelligence capacity," Mr Watson said. "It is not going to be an intelligence operation in the classic sense.

"It will be more along the lines of a criminal intelligence system. It will mean that, at the moment, where we react to information provided by the Government onto a suspicious licence application, we should be able to take a much more pro-active approach.

"This gives us a little more teeth. But, despite all the speculation that Hong Kong is a vast, thriving arms port, there is no evidence to suggest that.

"Improving intelligence in the department is my No. 1 priority."

It is believed the intelligence group will inherit some sensitive material from the Special Branch. But, it will have to forge its own contacts and modes of operation. In the past, the Security Branch, police and other government agencies gave intelligence to the department.

The 4,000-strong department roughly operates in two sections—half performing control point duties; the other half dedicated to investigations, consumer protection provisions, ensuring compliance with international obligations and administering excise duties.

On Friday, two traders of military equipment were fined a total of \$13,200 [Hong Kong dollars] for importing helmets without a licence.

Last year, Hawker Pacific and Jetpower Industrial pleaded guilty to smuggling strategic components to Iran.

INDONESIA

Official Stresses Nuclear Program for Peaceful Purposes

BK0508045394 Jakarta Radio Republik Indonesia Network in Indonesian 0000 GMT 5 Aug 94

[Text] Jali Ahimsa, director general of the National Atomic Energy Agency, says that no foreign country has exerted pressure on Indonesia over the country's research and development of nuclear technology. No party has exerted pressure on Indonesia to refrain from developing the technology because the ongoing program is for peaceful purposes.

The director general of the National Atomic Energy Agency told reporters in Jakarta yesterday that the development of nuclear technology is being conducted openly to serve all mankind. Therefore, it does not threaten any foreign country, including Australia, which the Western media say is opposed to Indonesia's nuclear program.

JAPAN

Foreign Ministry 'Cautious' Over U.S.-DPRK Agreement

OW1308042394 Tokyo NHK General Television Network in Japanese 0300 GMT 13 Aug 94

[Announcer-read report; from "NHK News" program]

[Text] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MOFA], in a statement announced by Terusuke Terada, director-general for public information and cultural affairs, welcomed the U.S.-DPRK agreement, calling it a step toward resolution [of the issues], but added it will once again ask the DPRK to remove the international community's concerns by resolving the remaining issues.

Since no final conclusion has been reached on the suspected development of nuclear arms in the past, the

MOFA is taking the basic stand of being cautious about the agreement, and views the agreement as a transition process. The ministry wants to continue talks with the United States and the ROK toward resolving the issues.

Saito Says DPRK's Past Nuclear Development Must Be Verified

OW1508124494 Tokyo NHK General Television Network in Japanese 1022 GMT 15 Aug 94

[Announcer-read report; from the "NHK News 7" program]

[Text] Administrative Vice Foreign Minister Kunihiro Saito told a news conference today that if Japan is to provide assistance for North Korea's shift to a light-water reactor in the future, the verification of North Korea's past nuclear development will be a prerequisite for the assistance.

Referring to a basic agreement reached between the United States and North Korea at the news conference, Administrative Vice Foreign Minister Saito said: The U.S. Administration has explained to the Japanese Government that North Korea's past nuclear development will be verified in accordance with the basic agreement, but North Korea has not yet clearly indicated whether its past nuclear development will be verified in accordance with the basic agreement.

Commenting on remarks made today by South Korean President Kim Yong-sam that South Korea is willing to provide the capital and technology needed to build a light-water reactor in North Korea if North Korea guarantees the full disclosure of its nuclear development, Administrative Vice Foreign Minister Saito said: "The Japanese Government takes the same view as the South Korean president. I believe that the South Korean president asked for a complete dispelling of suspicions about North Korea's development of nuclear weapons."

In this way, he indicated that if Japan is to provide assistance for North Korea's switch to a light-water reactor, the verification of North Korea's past nuclear development will be a precondition for the assistance.

Nation's First 'Massive' Land Shipment of Uranium Completed

OW0508031094 Tokyo KYODO in English 0146 GMT 5 Aug 94

[Text] Tokyo, Aug. 5 KYODO—The government-run Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp. (Donen) early Friday [5 August] transported about 7 tons of uranium by land from its central Japan reprocessing plant to another in western Japan for recycling, informed sources said.

It was the first massive transport in Japan of uranium separated from spent nuclear fuel.

The uranium, collected from the Donen plant in Tokaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture, about 100 kilometers northeast of Tokyo, was sent to its prototype plant for uranium enrichment in Ningyo-toge, Okayama Prefecture, the sources said.

The Okayama plant is situated about 500 km west of Tokyo.

The uranium will be enriched and recycled at the Ningyo-toge plant, they said.

Donen officials confirmed that the uranium has been transported. Details were kept secret until the transportation was completed for safety reasons, the sources said.

Antinuclear activist groups strongly oppose land transport of radioactive materials.

The truck carrying the uranium in 25 containers arrived at the plant in Okayama around 2:30 A.M. Friday.

Work to convert the uranium at the Ningyo-toge plant into nuclear fuel is scheduled to start later this month, the officials said.

NORTH KOREA

Pyongyang Radio Reports on Results of 5 Aug Talks With U.S.

SK0608070094 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0604 GMT 6 Aug 94

[Text] The third round of DPRK-U.S. talks resumed in Geneva on 5 August. Following the talks, the heads of both delegations held separate news conferences.

First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-chu, head of the DPRK delegation, stated as follows during his news conference: Today, through sincere talks held for eight hours, both sides revealed each other's positions in connection with resolving the nuclear issue, and discussed in detail ways to implement their positions. Today's talks were very beneficial [yuikhago] and practical [silmaujogin]. Since many practical issues [silmaujok munje] were presented, all of which were necessary to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, it was decided to further study and examine each other's proposals. Therefore, both sides agreed to adjourn the talks for two days, and hold them again on 8 August. The 8 August talks will be held at the DPRK mission in Geneva.

While answering reporters' questions, First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-chu said that since the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is complicated, there were common points as well as differences of opinion during the discussions, but as of now the concrete content of the talks cannot be revealed.

In his news conference, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci, head of the U.S. delegation, stated that during the talks comprehensive opinions were

exchanged regarding issues of mutual interest, including pending issues. He added that it was decided the talks would be held again on 8 August after both sides studied and examined each other's proposals and contacted their own countries.

While answering reporters' questions, Gallucci said the issue of introducing a light water reactor had been discussed since July 1993, and was again discussed in detail during the talks. He added that he will not offer concrete remarks concerning the common points and differences that emerged during the talks under the condition that the talks continue.

KCNA Carries Text of DPRK-U.S. Agreement

SK1308110694 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
1057 GMT 13 Aug 94

["Agreed Statement Between DPRK and USA"—KCNA headline]

[Text] *Pyongyang, August 13 (KCNA)*—An agreed statement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America was published at the third round of DPRK-USA talks in Geneva on August 12.

The statement reads:

Agreed statement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America:

The delegations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States of America (USA) met in Geneva from August 5-12, 1994, to resume the third round of talks.

Both sides reaffirmed the principles of the June 11, 1993, DPRK-USA joint statement and reached agreement that the following elements should be part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue:

1. The DPRK is prepared to replace its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light water reactor (LWR) power plants, and the USA is prepared to make arrangements for the provision of LWRs of approximately 2,000 mw(e) to the DPRK as early as possible and to make arrangements for interim energy alternatives to the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors. Upon receipt of USA assurances for the provision of LWRs and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze construction of the 50 mw(e) and 200 mw(e) reactors, forego reprocessing, and seal the radiochemical laboratory, to be monitored by the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency].
2. The DPRK and the USA are prepared to establish diplomatic representation in each other's capitals and to reduce barriers to trade and investment, as a move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.

3. To help achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, the USA is prepared to provide the DPRK with assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the USA, and the DPRK remains prepared to implement the North-South joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

4. The DPRK is prepared to remain a party to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the treaty.

Important issues raised during the talks remain to be resolved. Both sides agree that expert-level discussions are necessary to advance the replacement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated program with LWR technology, the safe storage and disposition of the spent fuel, provision of alternate energy, and the establishment of liaison offices. Accordingly, expert-level talks will be held in the DPRK and USA or elsewhere as agreed. The DPRK and USA agreed to recess their talks and resume in Geneva on September 23, 1994.

In the meantime, the USA will pursue arrangements necessary to provide assurances for the LWR project to the DPRK as part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue, and the DPRK will observe the freeze on nuclear activities and maintain the continuity of safeguards, as agreed in the June 20-22, 1994, exchange of messages between First Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok-chu and Assistant Secretary of State Robert L. Gallucci.

[Issued] Geneva, August 12, 1994.

Kang Sok-chu Remarks on DPRK-U.S. Statement

SK1308144494 *Pyongyang Korean Central*
Broadcasting Network in Korean 1304 GMT 13 Aug 94

[Text] In connection with the fact that the DPRK and the United States of America had adopted an agreed statement [habui songmong] at the third round of DPRK-U.S. talks, Kang Sok-chu, first vice foreign minister and head of the DPRK delegation, gave a news conference in Geneva.

In the news conference, he said: The sides reached agreement on important issues and released a statement after making sincere and powerful efforts for a long time.

This statement is a very profound and meaningful [maeu muge ikko uiui innun] historic document.

As revealed in the statement, the most important issue is that the sides made clear the final destinations [choejong chongchakchomdurul hwakkohuihago] that we and the United States, which are in abnormal [pijongsangjok] relations at present, must reach an agreement on them.

The statement is a mere one or two pages long. However, it contains many very significant and profound contents [aju uiui ikko muge innun].

One of the important issues on which agreement was reached this time is that we expressed our will to freeze the graphite-moderated reactors, the basis of our self-reliant nuclear power industry, and that the United States, corresponding to this, promised to assure the supply of light-water reactors.

Also, agreement was reached that the United States would make compensation for our freezing the graphite-moderated reactors. Such compensation is our just and reasonable [chongdanghago jadanghan] demand, and such compensation should be made as a matter of course [ungdang kuroke toeyahanda]. In other words, in return for our freezing the graphite-moderated reactors, we intend to receive light-water reactors and compensation, as well. This is the most important and basic problem in resolving the nuclear issue.

Measures to normalize relations between the DPRK and the United States will follow to make legal assurances for supplying light-water reactors and making compensation and to provide legal and systematic mechanisms necessary for implementing those assurances.

The fact that, as mentioned in the statement, we and the United States, which are in very abnormal relations, agreed to open a diplomatic representative office [oegyo taepyobu] in each other's capital is of very great significance. Because agreement was reached on such an issue, I called the statement a very profound document.

Agreement was reached on other important issues, as well, and agreement was reached to continue discussions on other issues.

What is important at present is that the two sides will implement the agreement well.

As it promised, the United States must definitely [hwakko hui] assure the supply of light-water reactors and make compensation for our freezing the graphite-moderated reactors. We are of the position that, at such a time, we will take corresponding measures. In other words, we intend to take measures on a step-by-step basis to freeze the graphite-moderated reactors depending on the United States assuring the clear-cut and definite supply of light-water reactors and making practical compensation for our freezing the graphite-moderated reactors until we receive light-water reactors [tasi malhamyon, migugi myongbaek hago hwakkohan kyongsuro chegongul tambohago uriga kyongsurorul padulttaekkaji hugyonno tonggyore taehan silchonjogin posangjochirul chwihanunde ttara urido tonggyol chochirul tangyejoguro chwihae nagajanungosida].

For this, many complicated practical problems [pokchapan silmujok munjedul] will be raised. Both sides intend to solve them through mutual agreements. Although there is a long way to go and there are many complicated and sensitive problems, I am sure that the problems will certainly be solved when both sides make

sincere efforts [ssangbangi chinsimuro noryokhamyon olmadunji haegyolhal su ittanun hwaksinul kajige toenda].

Then, he answered a series of questions posed by reporters. He said:

The United States has agreed with us that it will provide us with light-water reactors on its own responsibility [chaegim chigo]. It is the responsibility of the United States with which countries it will discuss the supply of light-water reactors and how it will be realized.

Further discussions on the issue of whether we choose the [word indistinct] power plant and oil as compensation for the loss derived from freezing our graphite-moderated reactor must be held. Therefore, the sides have decided to handle this issue in expert-level negotiations, as noted in the statement.

We have never admitted [injong haebonjokto opkko] special inspections, nor can we receive [choltaero chop-suhul su optta] them. The special inspections have been created by some insidious groups [ilbu pulsun kyechnungduri kkumyonaen kosigo] of the International Atomic Energy Agency and are a result of the agency's unfairness [kigu pulgonjongsongui sanmul].

The issue of guaranteeing the transparency of nuclear activities [haek hwaltongui tumyongsong pojang munje] is utterly influenced [chonjoguro chwaudoenda] by whether the agency's unfairness will be completely removed [haeso].

The used fuel rods removed from the five-megawatt reactor are safely kept in storage tanks. The sides intend to resolve the issue of dealing with the fuel rods through working-level negotiations.

It is important that in the recent negotiations it was agreed not to reprocess the used fuel rods under the condition of keeping them dry for the long term, and to close [pongin] the radiochemical laboratory and guarantee the agency's supervision of it under the condition of not reprocessing the fuel rods. This shows our will to freeze our nuclear activities.

The sides have decided to discuss the issues of whether the diplomatic missions to be established will be liaison offices or liaison missions and when the missions will be established in working-level negotiations.

We will decide when to return [pokkwi] to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty when the agency's unfairness is completely removed and when DPRK-U.S. relations are normalized.

He said that today's talks were useful [yuik], sincere [chinji], businesslike [silmujok], and productive [saensanjok].

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IAEA Welcomes DPRK's Agreement To Replace Nuclear Reactors

*OW1008035694 Beijing XINHUA in English
0207 GMT 10 Aug 94*

[Text] Vienna, August 9 (XINHUA)—The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) today welcomes the agreement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to use the nuclear reactors which are less threatening.

On Monday [8 August], a DPRK official announced in Geneva that his country might replace its graphite-moderated reactors with light-water reactors as part of "important proposals with regard to resolving the nuclear issue."

The IAEA said that the spent nuclear fuel rods at DPRK's atomic complex at Yongbyon is the biggest danger and pose the most pressing issue.

Replacing the reactor, some IAEA experts say, will be time-consuming and the danger posed by the spent fuel rods will still remain.

Therefore, they urged the U.S. and DPRK, whose delegations had held talks in Geneva, to reach an agreement over the spent fuel rods as soon as possible.

Daily Reports Japanese 'Document' Proves Nuclear Ambition

*SK0708084194 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0823 GMT 7 Aug 94*

["Deep-Rooted Ambition for Nuclear Armament"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, August 7 (KCNA)—The Japanese MAINICHI SHIMBUN reported that the Japan Foreign Ministry worked out already in 1969 a secret document calling for Japan's possession of the capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons.

Commenting on this, NODONG SINMUN today says the secret document proves the Japanese Government has long since promoted nuclear armament, setting the possession of nuclear weapons as the objective of its policy.

The analyst continues:

It is importantly stressed in the document that Japan should in no case give up the "possibility of possessing nuclear weapons." in other words, Japan should possess nuclear weapons at any cost.

Japan's nuclear armament has been rapidly promoted since then. Japan has stockpiled a huge amount of plutonium, reached the A-class level of the world in nuclear technology and development of carriage means and developed a long-range nuclear vehicle.

Japan is justifying the use of nuclear weapons. The Japanese Government is overtly supporting the use of

nuclear weapons. In an official document submitted recently to the International Court of Justice, it denied that the use of nuclear weapons is a violation of the international law.

Facts show Japan is not reluctant to plunge mankind into the scourge of mass-destruction weapons in a bid to realise its dominationist ambition.

This notwithstanding, Japan is charging the DPRK with "suspected nuclear development program" like the guilty party filing the suit first. This is a shameless and ridiculous act. The Japanese authorities are persistently propagandising "nuclear suspicion" of the DPRK, with a view to diverting elsewhere the public attention critical of them and finding a pretext for justifying Japan's nuclear armament.

Japan must discard the bad habit of taking issue with others and stop nuclear armament.

KCNA Denounces Japan's 'Schemes' To Become Nuclear Power

*SK1006050394 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0455 GMT 10 Jun 94*

["Undisguised Nuclear Ambition"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, June 10 (KCNA)—The Japanese Government recently decided to submit to the International Court of Justice a statement saying that "the use of nuclear weapons is not necessarily a violation of international law", according to a report from Tokyo.

This decision of the Japanese Government is a crude breach of the international law that prohibits the use of nuclear weapons. It is the biggest challenge to world peace and security and an unpardonable archcriminal act of bringing a nuclear holocaust to the globe.

This is an open manifestation of the Japanese reactionaries' criminal schemes to turn Japan into a nuclear power and thereby establish domination over Asia.

Now, the plausible mask of "three non-nuclear principles" much advertised by Japan hitherto has been thrown off, and it has become clear that its clamor about the DPRK's "suspected nuclear arms development" was to find an excuse for justifying its moves to become a nuclear power.

From the open talk of the Japanese Government that "the use of nuclear weapons is not necessarily a violation of international law", one can see clearly once again that the recently disclosed Japan's large plutonium concealment case was by no means accidental.

It is only too natural that the unbiased public opinion is now lifting up voices opposing and denouncing Japan's moves to become a nuclear power.

Japan must look squarely at the trend of the times and promptly give up the design for its conversion into a nuclear power, a move that would spell catastrophic consequences upon it.

Foreign Ministry Demands Nuclear States Revise Policies

SK1208111994 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1110 GMT 12 Aug 94

["Nuclear Weapon States Must Revise Policies on Use of Nuclear Weapons, Foreign Ministry Spokesman"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, August 12 (KCNA)—A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea today answered a question put by KCNA on the failure of the nuclear weapon states to revise their policies concerning the use of nuclear weapons still today when the Cold War has come to an end.

He said:

The world people have desired from long ago to live in peace in a world free from nuclear weapons and war. That is why they are demanding the complete abolition of the nuclear weapons.

The states possessed of nuclear weapons, however, refuse to renounce their anachronistic scheme to perpetuate their monopoly of nuclear weapons till today when the Cold War has ended. They continue to try to legalize the possession of nuclear weapons, claiming that the nuclear weapons are "a means of preemptive attack and retaliation" and "war deterrent."

Among the nuclear weapon states there are now countries which do not rule out the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons under the pretext of "flexible response," countries which contend that both the nuclear and conventional wars must be countered with nuclear weapons and countries which have formally abandoned the "principle of non-use of nuclear weapons in a preemptive attack" which they had maintained for scores of years. Such acts of the nuclear weapon states are giving rise to a nuclear arms race and obstructing the progress of the discussion of the question of overall nuclear disarmament by fostering distrust among them.

Facts show the danger of nuclear war and nuclear proliferation will increase unless the nuclear weapon states take significant measures for a total abolition of nuclear weapons.

For the present, the nuclear weapon states must commit themselves to the unconditional non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states and quickly accede to the signing of a treaty on the non-use of nuclear weapons in a preemptive attack and a total ban on the use of nuclear weapons. This will be the first process in making the existence of nuclear weapons meaningless on our planet.

The issues of reduction of nuclear weapons, conclusion of a treaty on the total nuclear test ban and extension of the validity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which are

under international debate, must be led to a total abolition of nuclear weapons and must be premised on it. It is self-evident that if this basic question is neglected and the monopoly of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapon states continues, nuclear disarmament will not be realized at all.

The DPRK-USA talks must make a substantial contribution to a fundamental solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula and preservation of peace and security in this region. If both the DPRK and the United States make joint efforts to solve the problem on the principle of impartiality and equality with mutual confidence, they will bear a good fruit.

Minister on Special Inspections, Succession Issue

SK1408051894 Seoul YONHAP in English
0505 GMT 14 Aug 94

[Text] Tokyo, Aug. 14 (YONHAP)—North Korea's top nuclear negotiator indicated his country will accept special inspections on its undeclared facilities, saying it depends on trust between North Korea and the United States, Japanese press reported Saturday [13 August].

Power transfer to Kim Chong-il, son of deceased President Kim Il-sung, is only a matter of time and is being delayed because of deep public grief, Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-chu was quoted as saying in interviews with YOMIURI SHIMBUN and NHK-TV from Geneva.

Future experts' meetings between Pyongyang and Washington will deal with four key points, said Kang—assistance with light-water reactors, opening of liaison offices, treatment of spent fuel rods, supply of alternative energy.

He said North Korea will for now freeze activities on the 5mw [megawatt] reactor, the fuel rods and the radiochemical laboratory, but the construction of two other larger reactors will stop only after the United States assures light-water reactor assistance on paper.

Asked about North Korea's willingness to allow special inspections on its two suspected nuclear material storage sites, he answered the problem can be resolved once North Korea and the United States build mutual trust.

Asked about why Kim Chong-il has not yet been elected president, the vice foreign minister said it is a custom in North Korea to mourn the death of the parent for three years.

"People's grief is too immense, and the mood is just not ripe to elect the new leader," said Kang, "Our supreme commander Kim Chong-il has commanded the party, the country and the military for over 20 years, and the only thing that remains to be done is to officially make him the heir, which is a matter of time."

He said compensation for the past is the core to North Korea-Japan diplomatic normalization talks.

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SOUTH KOREA

Foreign Ministry 'Positively' Rates DPRK-U.S. Summit

SK1308013194 Seoul YONHAP in English
0121 GMT 13 Aug 94

[Text] Seoul, Aug. 13 (YONHAP)—South Korea rated positively Friday [as received] the results of North Korea-U.S. nuclear talks, saying they made clear the future direction for resolution of the nuclear problem.

The agreed statement between North Korea and the United States provides the basis for future negotiations and clarifies the principle for both sides aimed at final resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Chang Ki-ho said in his commentary.

"The government judges it is a positive development that North Korea promised to stay within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), implement the safeguards agreement of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the inter-Korean declaration for denuclearization as guarantee of transparency in North Korea's past, present and future nuclear activities," Chang said.

"The government will exert all its efforts for complete resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue through close cooperation between South Korea and the United States," he said.

Officials React to DPRK-U.S. Talks

SK1408081994 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean
14 Aug 94 p 5

[Report by Song Yong-on and Kim Chang-hyok: "Reaction of Political Quarters to North Korean-U.S. Talks"]

[Text] Political quarters reacted to the agreement between the United States and North Korea to freeze North Korean nuclear development and to establish mutual diplomatic representations by saying "it is surprising, although it was anticipated." While making an affirmative assessment, Chongwadae [presidential offices] noted that it will carefully watch future developments.

The Democratic Party [DP] positively evaluated the result of the talks as a "historic event." On the other hand, while stating that it assesses the talks affirmatively, the Democratic Liberal Party [DLP] expressed concern over the possibility of past nuclear activities being ignored by freezing the nuclear program. In addition, the DLP assessed that the result of the North Korean-U.S. talks were prompted by our government's efforts for dialogue. On the contrary, in a "special statement" announced that day, Kim Tae-chung, chairman of Asian-Pacific Foundation, commented that the result was a product of "Kim Il-song-Carter talks," thus showing a delicate contrast to the DLP opinion.

Chongwadae made an affirmative assessment of the results of the talks for the moment, stating that "a breakthrough was established in resolving the North Korean nuclear problem." Chongwadae will carefully watch the influence of North Korean-U.S. relations on North-South relations as North Korean-U.S. relations, demonstrated by the agreement on the establishment of mutual diplomatic representations, are advancing more rapidly than North-South relations.

On 13 August, a high-ranking Chongwadae official stated: "The results of the talks can be regarded as progress in resolving the North Korean nuclear problem in the long run. North Korea's return to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] may be considered an event to ensure transparency of present and future nuclear activities."

DLP spokesman Pak Pom-chin commented that "the agreed statement on North Korean-U.S. talks not only laid a foundation for a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem, but also clarified the principle and goal to be pushed for in the future." He meant that North Korea's manifestation to implement the North-South "joint denuclearization declaration" and to remain a member state of the NPT will play an affirmative role for peace on the Korean peninsula. However, all this is merely establishing a foundation. Future concrete implementation in the future is what is important.

Yi Se-ki, DLP chief policy maker, showed a somewhat passive reaction, stating that generally speaking, he regards the talk results as progress in solving the overall North Korean nuclear problem for the moment.

It seems that the DLP attitude of refraining from positive assessment of the talks is due to the fact that no agreement was reached on "transparency" of North Korea's past nuclear activities, which the government has constantly emphasized.

Unlike the DLP, the DP positively assessed the talks, stating that "as a result of North Korean-U.S. talks, not only will North Korea's nuclear development be blocked, but its opening up will be expedited." Assemblyman Cho Se-hyong, DP cochairman, pointed out that "the agreement on freezing nuclear activities and on establishing mutual diplomatic representations is an historic event that will exert great influence on national reunification and on the situation of the Korean peninsula."

The DP called on the government and the ruling party to positively accept the results of the North Korean-U.S. talks as the trend of the time for reconciliation and opening, to end the so-called "security-oriented rule" at home, and to eliminate the policy of confrontation with North Korea. Comparing the results of the North Korean-U.S. talks held overseas with "security-oriented rule" at home, DP spokesman Pak Chi-won stated: "While the government and ruling party were wasting the nation's strength by evoking an ideological dispute—

a remnant of an outdated era—progress was made in the North Korean nuclear problem in a desirable direction.” He then stressed that “now is the time to put forward before fellow countrymen a policy on North Korea based on national reconciliation.”

13 August Papers Review U.S.-DPRK Talks, Agreement

SK1308124994

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of articles published in ROK vernacular dailies on 13 August on the third round of U.S.-North Korean high-level talks recently held in Geneva and the U.S.-North Korean statement issued in Geneva on 12 August.

The conservative CHOSON ILBO carries on page 3 a 2,000-word article by Geneva-based correspondent Cho Yong-taek. The article reports the third round of U.S.-North Korean talks was significant because the two sides “have agreed in principle to bring a comprehensive solution to the North Korean nuclear problem” and because the talks “have provided, above all, the grounds for dialogue between the sides,” based on North Korea’s “practical demands—leaving behind its former practice of engaging exclusively in political propaganda—such as assistance for a light-water reactor system, improvement in diplomatic relations, and economic support.”

The article, however, anticipates that the United States and North Korea will have difficulties along the path to “the goal of solution of the nuclear issue,” noting “they have yet to narrow differences in opinions on various issues, and a great deal of disputes are expected in further negotiations on what has already been agreed upon between the two sides.”

Pointing out “North Korea’s understanding of the inevitability of its allowance of special inspections” as “the most interesting result of the recent talks,” the article reports: “North Korea seems to have recognized the reality that it would be difficult to receive assistance for its light-water reactor system or to improve relations with the United States unless it guarantees its past, present, and future nuclear transparency.”

Regarding the expression “full scope of safeguards,” instead of “special inspections,” used by both sides in the talks, the article reports that this was due to North Korea’s “negative reaction” to the latter. The article continues: “They used this evasive expression since North Korea never gave up its position on the issue of special inspections, with the assumption that it can no longer use the nuclear card if it permits special inspections.” The article concludes: “To clarify this issue will be the largest obstacle in the next talks to be held in September.”

CHOSON ILBO also carries on page 3 a 1,000-word article by reporter Hong Sok-chun on the government’s reaction to the third round of U.S.-North Korean talks. The article points out that the ROK asked the United

States to deal with the issues of North Korea adopting a ROK-type light-water reactor, of holding special nuclear inspections, and of implementing the joint declaration on denuclearizing the Korean peninsula in nuclear negotiations with North Korea. The article reports that ROK Government officials believe that the United States “fully agreed to the ROK position and sincerely conveyed the ROK’s demands to North Korea in the recent talks.” The article continues: “However, the government is not sitting easy over the prospects for future U.S.-North Korean talks due to the situation following the rupture of the South-North summit talks, in which the ROK Government’s only role in the U.S.-North Korean talks was as a third party.”

The article reports: “While generally positively assessing the result of the recent talks, the government is concerned about the possibility that the United States will hurriedly conclude the talks with North Korea.” The article adds: “The government hopes the United States and North Korea will implement a package solution of specific problems in a progressive and phased [chomjin-jogimyonso do tangyejoguro] manner, observing if North Korea implements agreements.”

The article continues: “The government is going to concentrate on strengthening the ROK-U.S. cooperation system, believing that the principle of direct dialogue between the South and the North will be abided by only when a ROK-U.S. cooperation system is firm.”

The moderate CHUNGANG ILBO carries on page 8 a 3,000-word article summarizing opinions of ROK business leaders on the recent U.S.-North Korean talks. The article reports Kim Kwang-ho, chief of the Kolon Company Development Center, notes: “ROK companies are greatly concerned about the possibility that the United States will take the initiative away from the ROK in rushing into the North Korean market. The government’s inflexible attitude toward North Korea has driven ROK companies, whose position was the most advantageous, to an unfavorable position. The government must prepare measures to activate South-North exchanges as soon as possible.”

The article reports Chon Pyong-ho, researcher of the North Korean Economy Research Center of the Korea Development Institute, expects: “Western companies that want to advance into North Korea will prefer joint ventures with ROK companies to minimize the danger in investments in North Korea. North Korea will also come to recognize that ROK companies must lead the advancement into North Korea to induce Western companies’ investments in North Korea.”

The article also reports Hwang Yong-sung, researcher of the Samsung Economic Research Center, notes: “Whether the U.S. diplomatic mission to be established in North Korea will be a simple diplomatic mission or a kind of trade mission will influence the direction of economic exchange between North Korea and Western countries, including the United States and Japan.”

Hwang also points out: "The direction of South-North economic cooperation will be decided upon when the government announces its position or policy on North Korea on the anniversary of National Liberation Day, 15 August."

14 August Dailies Appraise U.S.-DPRK Statement

SK1408130594

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of editorials published by ROK vernacular newspapers on 14 August regarding the joint statement issued by the United States and North Korean delegates in Geneva on 12 August.

The conservative CHOSON ILBO carries on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled "After the U.S.-North Korean Agreement." The editorial points out two tasks for implementing the agreement. First, the editorial notes the ensuing negotiations by experts on each of the four points agreed upon, particularly the question of providing the ROK-model light-water reactors. The editorial is not optimistic because "North Korea would not want to be technically subjugated to the South."

The editorial writes that the signing of a peace agreement between the United States and North Korea is another vital task, "which would require North Korea to make a difficult policy change to exchange its past nuclear development for a guarantee of existence from the United States."

The editorial also urges the ROK Government to seek improved North-South relations in the process of implementing the agreed statement.

The moderate TONG-A ILBO carries on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled "Principal Agreement on North Korean Nuclear Issue." The editorial appraises the preliminary agreement as an "agreement of preparedness" with many hidden traps because the agreement can only be implemented when mutual conditions are fulfilled. The editorial states that "it is fortunate that the new North Korean Government maintained the agreement between Kim Il-song and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter." The editorial views that the agreement on the opening of liaison offices and the supply of

light-water reactors mean "indirect U.S. support to Kim Chong-il's succession of power" under the condition the nuclear transparency is guaranteed.

Noting that North Korea broke the basic agreement between the South and the North, the editorial questions who would guarantee the agreement if a new leader is not formally announced. The editorial concludes that the "agreement of preparedness" should be developed into an "agreement of implementation."

The pro-government SEOUL SINMUN carries on page 3 a 900-word editorial entitled "Do Not Be Optimistic Over the U.S.-North Korean Agreement." The editorial appraises the agreement as "positive and fortunate" because it proves that the Kim Chong-il system follows the line of dialogue. However, the editorial warns against optimism stating that "many important issues remain undecided." Noting that it is not the time for North Korea to cause another nuclear dispute with the United States, or a situation of sanctions, the editorial suspects that North Korea may have strategically agreed to the statement to solidify the Kim Chong-il system.

The editorial lists past examples of North Korea's broken agreements and promises, and stresses that "the principle of reciprocity should be applied to future negotiations, unnecessary delay should not be allowed, the transparency of North Korea's past nuclear activities should not be sacrificed, and ROK's opinion should be reflected regarding the support of light-water reactors." The editorial urges North Korea to resume dialogue with the South and stop taking issue with expressing condolences.

The left-leaning HANGYORE SINMUN carries on page 3 a 900-word editorial entitled "Waves of Change on Korean Peninsula." The editorial appraises the significance and effect of the agreed statement as "important and profound." The editorial states that North Korea showed a very different attitude this time, noting that North Korea led the negotiations while examining gains and losses, and even showed an attitude to accept ROK-model reactors. The editorial denounces the opinions that distrust North Korea's commitment and states that the Geneva agreement marks the beginning of a new change in the power balance of Northeast Asia. Noting that blindly rejecting North Korea would block such a new change, the editorial stresses that North Korea's changes should be appraised honestly.

SLOVAKIA

Minister Pittner on Plutonium Smuggling*AU1208185694 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 8 Aug 94 p 2*

[Interview with Slovak Interior Minister Ladislav Pittner by Jan Skoda on 5 August; place not given: "Partnership With the FBI; Interior Minister Ladislav Pittner Has Left for the United States"]

[Text] Early last week, the British REUTER agency published information that was based on statements made to it by Slovak Interior Minister Ladislav Pittner. On Friday [5 August], two days prior to his departure for a working visit to the United States, we asked him to explain some of the formulations he used.

Skoda: One part of the [REUTER] report is connected with Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn's visit [to Bratislava on 5 August]; you supposedly said that the readmission agreement with Hungary "can be signed only after the elections." Yet the readmission agreement is being signed right now....

Pittner: The readmission agreement is of great importance to Slovakia. As such an agreement did not exist, we have been unable to return to the Hungarian side those illegal migrants from third countries who had come here from Hungarian territory. The readmission agreement that has been subject of talks between Slovak and Hungarian experts has not been prepared on the same scale as similar agreements that we have concluded with other countries, in which there is a deadline of 90 days for returning third country nationals. In the agreement now being signed, the Hungarian side proposes a deadline of only 48 hours, but even that marks considerable progress and it is possible to give consent to such an agreement. By its signing, a highly desirable situation will arise for us, which will allow the Slovak side to meet obligations that we have toward other states.

Skoda: Could you specify what kind of assistance the U.S. FBI has requested from Slovakia? According to the REUTER agency, we already cooperate with the FBI on two criminal cases....

Pittner: The British agency's report concerned only one aspect of these relations. As regards the June visit to Slovakia by FBI Director Louis Freeh and my present invitation to the United States, they are based on mutual cooperation. Within the framework of this cooperation, we are interested in the training of our specialists in the sphere of struggle against organized crime, be it drug trafficking, terrorism, or other forms. On the other hand, the FBI is interested in cooperation with our security bodies. That was also the motive for Mr. Freeh's visit to Slovakia and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe—to exchange information that would serve to guarantee U.S. security. It is becoming apparent that mafias from the countries of the former Soviet Union are teaming up with mafias in the West. It is therefore very important for our partners that all the information that

we have about these mafias should get from Slovakia into the FBI's data base and archives. In other words, we are talking about mutual cooperation and not about a one-way street. The two specific operations mentioned concern one of the forms of organized crime.

Skoda: In the interview for REUTER, you also said that Slovakia was being used as a thoroughway for a great number of weapons and plutonium. What is the origin of this plutonium, who is transporting it, and what is its point of destination?

Pittner: Certain illegal groups of citizens of the former Soviet Union have established themselves in Slovakia. We are learning about them sporadically—from intelligence sources, during random security operations against various forms of blackmail (racketeering), or when suppressing drug trafficking. We do not know the destination of the smuggled weapons and plutonium. Everything suggests that it is Western Europe, from where, however, this cargo could be shipped to countries that cannot gain access to such weapons by legal means....

Skoda: Are you also referring to the alleged presence of Slovak weapons in the former Yugoslavia?

Pittner: Yes, they could get there precisely through such channels. As regards plutonium, the point of destination need not be any Western country but, possibly, some other country that is interested in obtaining this strategic commodity in conjunction with its secret building of a nuclear arsenal.

YUGOSLAVIA

Article Views State of Nuclear Arms Industry*AU1208111894 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 5 Aug 94 pp 9-10*

[Article by Eduard Popovic and Karlo Jeger: "The Serbian Military Industry Is Concentrating on a Uranium Penetrator Project for Tank Guns"]

[Excerpts] Well-informed sources close to the state leadership have told us that Serbian scientists at the Boris Kidric Institute in Vinca started extracting uranium-238 and plutonium-239 from radioactive waste from the nuclear reactor accumulated over a number of years. Apart from highly radioactive waste from Vinca, it is suspected that additional supplies of radioactive waste have been brought by sea and through Montenegro and stored in underground reservoirs at the Boris Kidric Institute. The information specifies that since 1976, when the reactor at Vinca was overhauled, Yugoslavia has been intensively gathering radioactive materials, and Serbian scientists have managed to extract radioactive material enough for three "small and dirty" bombs.

At the same time, according to information released through AFP on 24 July this year, police of the so called

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FRY prevented, in Nis, "an attempt to smuggle radioactive materials with possible military uses." AFP's information is that the police allegedly confiscated 1,600 grams of red mercury, which is used in the production of nuclear bombs, and arrested five people. The red mercury was smuggled out of Bulgaria and is worth about \$120,000.

This could mean one of the following: Serbia is processing nuclear waste for its own use, i.e. for the production of weapons; it is processing nuclear waste for the needs of Iraq or some other country, or Serbia has become a transient nuclear-waste dump in an international network of illegal trade, which is a dirty but extremely lucrative business.

So, can Serbia produce its own nuclear weapons?

In former Yugoslavia, three institutes dealt with knowledge of nuclear science—"Joze Stefan" in Ljubljana, "Rudjer Boskovic" in Zagreb, and "Boris Kidric" in Vinca, near Belgrade. For the institute in Vinca, a nuclear reactor was purchased from the USSR in the 1950s and it is still working. [passages omitted]

In spite of all the time and money invested in the project and the fact that in 1989 there were 1,200 employees at the Boris Kidric Institute, 160 of whom were PhD's and 120 MSc's in their 40's, the Yugoslav scientific potential and technological level did not indicate that it was capable of grappling with the problem of producing nuclear weapons.

Experts with whom we have spoken doubt that anything has changed, i.e. that Serbia is now capable of producing nuclear weapons. Serbia's far less than state-of-the-art technology, as opposed to the former Yugoslavia, and the shortage of nuclear experts are the most commonly used arguments. A military expert says that, even if by some miracle they managed to produce a nuclear warhead, in order to use it they would have to have a delivery system.

We know that the Serbs have two types of weapons that are potential deliverers of nuclear warheads at their disposal: the Frog-7 surface-to-surface missile (Russian name Luna-M) and the MiG- 29 fighter-bomber. [passages omitted]

Cannot Do Without Help From a Foreign Partner

Serbian MiG's, however, do not have the necessary installations for carrying a nuclear payload or the protective equipment for pilots. Russian instructors have not trained Yugoslav (Serbian) pilots to perform complicated aiming maneuvers appropriate for atomic bombs. If the Serbs solved previously mentioned problems and produced a nuclear bomb, they could endanger their neighbors to a distance of 500km from the take-off location. [passage omitted]

Therefore, the news that plutonium-239 (Pu239) is being processed in Vinca is particularly disturbing. It is used in

small low-yield nuclear missiles that can be launched in the form of artillery shells. The power of such weapons can be compared to classical bombs from World War II. They are tactical nuclear weapons that have a relatively weak mechanical and thermal effect on people, but very powerful nuclear effect, i.e. neutron radiation. The shock-wave radius of such a weapon is 240 meters, the radius for second-degree burns 300 meters, the gamma-radiation radius 435 meters, and the neutron-radiation radius 700 meters. Data on the degree of neutron radiation further characterize the weapon. At 240 meters from point zero of the explosion the radiation reaches 22,000 rad; at 300 meters it is 10,000 rad; at 435 meters it is 2,200 rad. An absolutely lethal dose of neutron radiation is about 600 rad. Consequently, with ideal thermal and mechanical protection from such a small nuclear weapon, there would be 100-percent casualties in the radius of lethal dosage of neutrons, but there would be no damage to military equipment or the surrounding buildings.

Serbia has enough potential delivery systems for such nuclear bombs, but the nuclear reactions still remains their main insurmountable problem.

The most that the Serbs can produce in this field, according to one expert, is a kind of "dirty" bomb, a classic artillery shell which, in the process of casting, would have some uranium dust added to it. Separating uranium from waste is a technical process that can be done in any cement works. Mills grind the yellow "cake" to dust and then, by means of repeated fraction settling, where heavier particles reach the bottom first, uranium is separated from the waste. Another step toward an atomic bomb is the separating of uranium into isotopes, a problem which the Serbs cannot solve. All they can do is to produce this "dirty" bomb in a simple casting process.

The area affected by such a bomb would be contaminated and the radiation would linger on for a long time. Such "warfare," however, would be quite useless from the Serbs' point of view, for if the Serbs fired such a bomb somewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina or in Croatia, winds, rain, underground waters, and rivers would carry nuclear particles to areas that they occupy.

All things considered, the conclusion is that the Serbs need uranium to produce low-caliber ammunition for tank and anti-aircraft guns, and perhaps even for small arms ammunition. In the past decade in the world, processed uranium has been used in the production of low-caliber shells, which some experts consider the most efficient way to destroy tanks.

This ammunition is usually made up of three basic components: a shell case with the firing charge, a penetrator, and a clamp. The spear-shaped penetrator was initially made of steel and then of tungsten, whereas today most countries make the core of the penetrator out of low-grade uranium.

Given the same impact speed, low-caliber shells with cores of low-grade uranium have greater penetrability

than those with tungsten cores. Considering the potential radiation danger and the harmful influence of uranium on the environment, designers and manufacturers of low-caliber ammunition do not agree on uranium cores. British, French, and Russian scientists favor low-grade uranium, while Germans and the Israelis still prefer tungsten.

For more reasons than one, the Serbs find Russian technology most interesting. This is principally due to the identical caliber (125-mm) of the shells for the Russian T-72 tank and its Yugoslav version, the T-84. With the same caliber, the Russian firm Masinostroitel also manufactures a low-caliber shell, the 3BM32, whose penetrator is made of seven kg of low-grade uranium, which, at a distance of two km at a 60-degree angle, can penetrate 260 mm of armor!

Experience From Socialism

Therefore, it is probably not very likely that Serbia is today capable of producing nuclear weapons, for it could not do so when they were helped by the Slovene, Croatian, and Bosnia-Herzegovina economies and experts. Furthermore, according to the Serbian media, over 200,000 educated young people have left Serbia, mostly technical specialists.

What is particularly worrying is that nuclear weapons can be bought. That likelihood has increased since the disintegration of the USSR. Since then, a considerable number of nuclear scientists, technology, weapons, and radioactive materials have left the country. [passage omitted]

Allegations that Soviet experts are also working on extracting uranium and plutonium in Vinca and that some Soviet technology has been brought to the institute have not been confirmed yet.

Finally, one expert claims that it is not very likely that the country that organized a conference to celebrate the complete overhaul of the T-55 tank would soon be in a position to solve the problem of nuclear fusion and be producing its own nuclear weapons.

It is more likely that Serbia has become a nuclear waste dump for countries who do not want to store their own nuclear waste. The waste is stored in geologically stable areas. Abandoned salt mines are the most ideal locations. For that purpose, the old, unprofitable mines in Kosovo are the most ideal for that!

The shock-wave radius of such a weapon is 240 meters, the radius for second-degree burns 300 meters, the gamma-radiation radius 435 meters, and the neutron-radiation radius 700 meters. Data on the degree of neutron radiation further characterize the weapon. At 240 meters from point zero of the explosion the radiation reaches 22,000 rad; at 300 meters it is 10,000 rad; at 435 meters it is 2,200 rad. An absolutely lethal dose of neutron radiation is about 600 rad. Consequently, with ideal thermal and mechanical protection from such a

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Red Mercury Smuggling, 'Elipton' Viewed

AU0408180394 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
2 Aug 94 pp 18,19

[Boris Komadina article: "Red Mercury or Serb Red Hoax?"]

[Text] AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, referring to Belgrade agency BETA, revealed something to the world that has been the subject of a lot of speculation. According to their source, Serb police confiscated 1,600 grams of red mercury which is used in the production of nuclear bombs and arrested five persons on that occasion. The same source reports that red mercury was smuggled out of Bulgaria to the "FRY," and that it was supposed to be sold to an unknown buyer in Nis. The value of confiscated mercury is estimated at \$120,000. If there is any truth in this brief news item, then it should be a warning for Croatia. Red mercury is the most sought-after and most mysterious commodity, the value of which holds top position on the ramified black market. The possibility that Serbia might be in possession of red mercury is cause enough for concern. The

four-year war has turned the territory of former Yugoslavia into a user of existing warehouses containing mostly antiquated conventional weapons, mostly made in Russia and other countries of former USSR, and it is just a step apart from becoming a test site for weapons whose efficiency has hitherto never been tested in combat.

The statement made by "Crazy Vlado"—journalists' nickname for Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the ultra-nationalist Russian Liberal Democratic Party—that he gave his Serb friends, led by Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan, a special-effect bomb called "Elipton" to test, is just a propaganda hoax, but certainly not a naive one. Arkan, of course, could not wait to boast about having already tested the bomb in the area of Brcko, no less.

"Absolute Elimination of the Muslims"

He claimed the result was "the quiet and absolute elimination of thirteen Muslims." The statement he gave to Belgrade POLITIKA was embellished with statements that, already in mid-1995, they will begin mass producing "Elipton" bombs in the "Elektron" plant in Sabac. This corresponds to the announcement Zhirinovskiy made during his visit to Serbia regarding "the imminent production of 'Elipton' in a town some 50 km away from Belgrade." Sabac is indeed 50 km away from Belgrade and the owner of "Elektron" plant is Tomislav Simic, local head of the Party of Serbian Unity, with Arkan as its president. However, the command of Brcko units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army issued the best denial of the entire show regarding "Elipton," stating that at the time Arkan was talking about, not only did they not have 13 casualties, but that of all the men killed so far, there were no unusual causes of death. Therefore, this is obviously a "Hitler syndrome" of a secret and destructive weapon in the heads of his mental successors.

Arkan's "Elipton"

The phenomenon of red mercury is of an altogether different nature than Arkan's "Elipton." It has for months been the main task of leading international scientific research centers. The increase in red mercury smuggling out of Russia has not diminished. Red mercury (Rm-2020) is a crystal polymer that appears to be harmless; it was first discovered more than 20 years ago by Du Pont researchers. Presently, the largest quantities of red mercury are produced by "Promekologhia" in Siberia and it is legally sold. What is it, then, that makes it so dangerous? Red mercury, if treated in a particular manner, acquires a jelly-like density and enables high reproduction of plutonium mass necessary for the production of atomic bombs and, instead of the usual eight kg, the nuclear weapon can be made with as little as several grams of plutonium. Therefore, mercury is not dangerous in itself, but it is a crucial element in the production of new weapons devised by the Russians, so that it amplifies efficiency while at the same time reducing its size tenfold. The new nuclear weapon, the

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production of which requires red mercury, does not destroy buildings and houses, but can destroy every living being within a two km radius. It therefore kills by strong radiation. A nuclear bomb of this type is the size of a tennis ball or a coffee cup. Apart from its small size, these lethal devices are 10-20 times lighter than traditional models, which enables easy handling. A Russian scientist said in London that the KGB prepared a report on red mercury for Russian President Yeltsin, who is thought to oppose the production of such bombs. The danger of such a bomb is best illustrated by the words of Sam Cohen, inventor of the United States' neutron bomb. He said he was convinced that red mercury existed and that he had never been so afraid of the possibility of it being used in terrorist attacks. Russia officially denies having made a bomb using red mercury, but many scientists in the world claim the opposite. They say that first experiments were made in a particle accelerator in Dubna, Siberia. The first (successful) experimental explosion was allegedly carried out in Novaya Zemlya. Today, accelerators are replaced by a small nuclear reactor. This is where the harmless red mercury remains 50- 60 days until sufficient amount of free radicals (i.e. unstable molecules) are created in its core. Then it acquires a jelly-like quality and is ready to be used. This "ready-for-use" red mercury is sold by Russian smugglers at a price of \$200,000-500,000 per kilogram. Iraq, Libya, Israel, and South Africa are said to be the best market for red mercury. Much media fallout, even panic in the United States and in Europe, was caused by the fact that Libya once purchased 200 kg of red mercury for \$60 million. The information that was being uncovered concerning large quantities of red mercury, by representatives of the International Agency for Atomic Energy when they were controlling Iranian documents, was also alarming.

Dramatic Statements

Interpol established a special branch in charge of coordinating the police departments of various countries, in an effort to break up the increasingly flourishing smuggling gangs involved in the trade of red mercury. They

have caught 10 red mercury smugglers so far, in Bulgaria, Italy, Switzerland, and Austria. Arrested smugglers were citizens of Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Austria, and the territory of former Yugoslavia. One of them was Marijan Sokolovic, a Serb from Nova Gradiska, as divulged by the Austrian magazine BUCHT. Sokolovic lives in Austria and, according to the magazine, is a known smuggler of weapons; he allegedly delivered weapons to Chetniks in Croatia.

Croatian experts do not want to comment on the red mercury phenomenon until they have learned more about it. One of them (he wishes to remain anonymous) claims that red mercury is a smugglers' term for a compound that does not necessarily contain mercury and which has certainly never been scientifically verified by that name. The Serbs, according to him, although they have an institute for nuclear physics in Vinca, do not have the technology nor the large group of scientists necessary for creating such a bomb. Consequently, the abovementioned smuggling group from Serbia did not intend their "commodity" for production in the country, but for further distribution in some other country.

However, this does not mean that there is no danger from the east. We should remember the words of Aleksandar Veberovski, Zhirinovskiy's closest associate, during his recent visit to Belgrade. In the manner of his president, he then said: "I see that what you lack most is gasoline. Well, my Serb brothers, we will bring you large quantities of gasoline, in the reservoirs of tanks that we will deploy along your borders." Obviously, it is possible that such dramatic statements conceal a real possibility of influencing illegal shipments of not only gasoline but also of various weapons, especially when we know that Vangerovski holds a high position in the Russian parliament and that his party is in the majority. Croatian diplomatic and military services are surely aware of that, just as they can interpret the visit of Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev to Belgrade and to the occupied areas of Croatia in Erdut, the location of the "training center" for the rebel Serb army, and his embrace with Milan Martić.

BRAZIL

IAEA Team Inspects Ipero Uranium Hexafluoride Plant

PY0108203594 Sao Paulo AGENCIA ESTADO
in Portuguese 1954 GMT 29 Jul 94

[By Jose Maria Tomazela]

[Text] Ipero, Sao Paulo, 29 Jul (AE)—The Navy Aramar Research Center (CEA), which is based in Ipero, was inspected today for the second time by a team of experts from the Geneva-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). IAEA scientists visited the CEA with experts of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control (of Nuclear Materials) (ABACC), which is based in Rio de Janeiro. The inspection lasted a little over two hours. The team went by taxi from the Coordinating Center for Special Projects (COPESP), a Navy facility based in Sao Paulo, to Ipero.

A member of the team reported that the inspection focused on facilities of what is called the Blue Group; that is, those in which uranium is processed, like the enrichment units that are equipped with ultracentrifuges. Industrial units of the Red Group, including the factories of mechanical and electronic components, will not be inspected. An agreement signed in March this year by Brazil with Argentina, ABACC, and the IAEA paved the way for the IAEA monitoring of the CEA.

The IAEA inspection this time included the conversion laboratory, which converts already enriched uranium gas into uranium dioxide pills. This laboratory, which is the newest facility at Aramar, was commissioned early this month following the first inspection by the IAEA team. In the past the enriched uranium was taken in its gaseous form to Sao Paulo to be converted at the facilities of the Institute for Nuclear and Energy Research (IPEN). The Navy is building at Ipero a plant to produce uranium hexafluoride from enriched uranium paste, which is also called "yellow cake."

Ruy de Goes, the coordinator of the Greenpeace anti-nuclear campaign in Brazil, has announced that his organization will monitor the safety conditions under which uranium hexafluoride is transported from Aramar. Goes said the gas is highly toxic and radioactive. He said Greenpeace will mobilize to demand that the Navy conduct a study on the impact the Aramar uranium hexafluoride plant will have on the environment before it begins operations. He gave no details as to the type of mobilizations planned. Goes added that fluor, which is used in large quantities to produce uranium gas, is extremely dangerous and represents an additional risk within the Navy nuclear activities in Ipero.

Navy Confirms Project For Hexafluoride Conversion

PY0508145494 Sao Paulo AGENCIA ESTADO
in Portuguese 2105 GMT 4 Aug 94

[Report by Tania Malheiros]

[Text] Rio de Janeiro, 4 Aug (AE)—The Navy today confirmed in an official note that it is constructing a plant

at the Aramar Experimental Center in Ipero (Sao Paulo State) to convert hexafluoride (uranium in gas form). The note asserts that the plant's capacity will be evaluated when "construction is resumed." Hexafluoride is necessary to produce enriched uranium, which is used for atomic submarines, nuclear artifacts, and reactors.

Navy Captain Cleber Luciano de Assis, Navy Public Relations Service director, states in the note that construction of the plant has been "postponed." O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO reported on 2 August that construction was underway. The Navy confirmed that it is using hexafluoride produced at the Institute for Nuclear and Energy Research (Ipem) facilities in Sao Paulo "which is why construction of the conversion plant was postponed."

Capt. Assis said he "cannot precisely estimate the cost of the construction" because the project has been postponed. According to an O ESTADO report, beside beginning the construction of the plant—a building that will initially be three-stories high—the Navy is already designing a water tank in which to test all the pressure equipment that will be used in the atomic submarine.

The Navy states that it has contracted a specialized company to draft an Environmental Impact Report (Rima) for the hexafluoride plant. It did not name the company or say how much the work will cost. Under the 1988 Constitution, all projects that handle nuclear material need a Rima before being started. This was the case, for example, in the construction of the dump site for the radioactive waste that resulted from the accident that occurred in 1987 over a Cesium-137 capsule in Goiania. The Rima for this dumping site is being drafted by a Sao Paulo company so that the construction can begin next year.

The Navy also asserted in the note that the hexafluoride plant production capacity "will be evaluated at some time when the construction is resumed." When the plant is finished, the Navy asserts it will be "self-sufficient in uranium hexafluoride." Rear Admiral Othon Luiz Pinheiro, president of the Navy Coordinating Center for Special Projects and one of the Navy nuclear program sponsors, will retire in the next few days. Pinheiro was one of the main sponsors of the Aramar Experimental Center. He will be replaced by an admiral who is an expert in nuclear submarines. The Navy wants hexafluoride produced at Aramar to provide fuel for the atomic submarine project.

Space, Nuclear, S&T Notes

94P21019

[Editorial Report]

Sino-Brazilian Satellite Project Funded

The National Space Research Institute (INPE) will receive \$6.5 million for the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) program beginning the week of 20 June, the Sao Paulo daily GAZETA MERCANTIL reported in its 16 June issue. Another \$2.5

million will be allocated to completing the construction of the Weather Forecast and Research Center (CPTEC) building in Cachoeira Paulista, Sao Paulo. According to INPE Director General Marcio Nogueira Barbosa, the allocation will come from the government's privatization program, and the Bank of Brazil (BB) will advance the funds to the Ministry of Science and Technology (MST). The funds are to be released as part of an agreement signed in November 1993 between the MST, BB, and the Funding Authority for Studies and Projects (FINEP). The agreement guaranteed the release of \$21 million for the CBERS and CPTEC projects and the Brazilian Complete Space Mission (MECB) satellites. By the end of 1994, INPE intends to negotiate the release of an additional \$10 million for its satellites projects.

GAZETA went on to quote Barbosa as saying that the \$6.5 million that INPE will receive for the Chinese-Brazilian satellite program will be used to bring new industries under contract for the CBERS project and maintain existing contracts. Barbosa added that seven supplier firms of electronic and mechanical equipment for the satellites are involved in the project: Automation and Control Systems Engineering (ESCA), Aeroelectronics, Brazilian Electronics (Elebra), Digicon, Mectron, Brazilian Aeronautics Company (Embraer), and Tecnasa.

The CBERS program involves the manufacture and launch of two high resolution remote sensing satellites to perform services such as surveying fires and deforestation, and meteorological forecasting, GAZETA continued. The total cost of the project is budgeted at \$150 million, 30 percent of which will be paid by the Brazilian Government and 70 percent by the Chinese. According to the agreement signed with China, the integration and testing of the second satellite in the series will be done in Brazil at the INPE Integration and Testing Laboratory in Sao Jose dos Campos. It has also been agreed that Brazil will have operational control over the satellite consistent with its share of participation in the program.

Barbosa further remarked that within 60 days, Brazil will present a proposal to China for marketing the data and images from the CBERS satellites. He said that the idea is to create a binational firm to exploit that information, and that the user market for those satellites worldwide is estimated at \$6 billion. He added: "Brazil and China should get at least \$1 billion."

Aeronautics Ministry To Open Alcantara Launch Site to Bids

The Aeronautics Ministry will hold an international bid sometime during the remainder of 1994 to decide what domestic and foreign firms qualify to use the Alcantara Space Center (CLA). The CLA, reported the 17 June Rio de Janeiro daily O GLOBO, is considered the best site in the world from which to launch satellites into geostationary orbit due to its location two degrees from the equator. Major General Jose Marconi, deputy director of the Research and Development Department of the Aeronautics Ministry, indicated that the government plans to

take advantage of CLA's site location to obtain funds to develop it. The base is located on a 62,000-hectares site in Alcantara, Maranhao State, and has only a 2,600-meter runway.

With a \$9.52 million budget for 1994, a tenth of the sum requested, the CLA will depend on funds from foreign firms associated with domestic firms to construct a runway capable of accommodating "vehicles of the spacebus type" and areas for large foreign or domestic launchers. Russian and American firms have already presented proposals that are being studied by the Aeronautics Ministry.

Firm To Do Viability Study on Cuban Nuclear Plant Completion

On 25 May, Inepar Systems, a branch of the Inepar Industry and Constructions "holding" company in Curitiba, signed a protocol with the Governments of Cuba and Russia and the Italian public company Ansaldo, to do a viability study on completing Cuba's Juragua nuclear plant, GAZETA MERCANTIL reported on 20 June. Construction began on the plant located in Cienfuegos province in October 1983, and was suspended in 1992. Rodolfo Andriani, director general of Inepar Trading, Inc., opined that the plant must be reevaluated and adapted to new conditions, adding that construction methods and equipment must be "westernized" to complete it. He said that 75 percent of the plant's construction is completed.

The contract for the viability study was being prepared in Moscow and was expected to be signed in the beginning of July in Genoa, Italy. The study must be completed in six months; however, Ivan Sabatella, head of Inepar's Directorate of Business Development, was absolutely certain of the plant's viability. The Cuban Government's contacts with Inepar, according to Sabatella, began some years ago, and intensified in January 1994 after Inepar's potential opportunities in Cuba were examined. Sabatella remarked: "We are aware of the need to restore that country's economic activities. For them, nuclear energy is fundamental." He anticipated that the Brazilian Foreign Affairs Ministry would not impede the transactions. "From Inepar's point of view," Sabatella said, "it is a private undertaking. Furthermore, the embargo against Cuba comes from the United States and not the United Nations."

According to Inepar Trading Director Andriani, the viability study seeks to make the plant technically acceptable to international organizations and attractive to investors. "It is a way of making it transparent to the western world," he said, and added that "the plant can be immediately subject to international verification and certification legislation regarding the generation of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."

The Juragua project, according to the Inepar directors, provides for a containment vessel for the reactor and other Western equipment. Andriani said: "Up until now,

the technology, in both construction and equipment, has been Russian. The idea, in this new stage, is to conduct open bids and use what is best in the world, independent of the country of origin."

New Commander for Aramar May Be Named

The Aramar Experimental Center (CEA), a Navy Ministry organization that develops the Brazilian nuclear program, may have a new commander as of August, the Sao Paulo daily O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO reported on 6 July. Admiral Othon Luis Pinheiro da Silva, one of the mentors of the nuclear program and president of the Coordinating Center for Special Projects (Copesp), may move to a compulsory reserve status upon completing his eighth year of Admiralty on 31 July. Immediately thereafter, it is probable that an active duty Navy officer will be selected for the position, O ESTADO speculated.

Planning Minister Urges Continued Angra II Construction

In remarks made in Sao Paulo on 8 July, Mines and Energy Minister Alexis Stepanenko defended the conclusion of the construction of the Angra II nuclear power plant, a project which has been sharply criticized, particularly by environmental groups. The 11 July GAZETA MERCANTIL reported Stepanenko's argument that "Angra II's construction was approved by the National Congress" and that "the \$4.5 billion already invested in its construction cannot be ignored." He added that half of the \$1.5 billion necessary to conclude the project will come from German financing at favorable interest rates. The minister disputed the preliminary audit by the National Accounting Office (TCU), which indicated that nearly \$2.5 billion will be needed to complete the plant, pointing out that there was a discrepancy in the numbers provided by the government regarding investments.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Pakistan's Air Chief Says India Reportedly Deploying Missiles on Border

BK0808155494 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network in Urdu 1500 GMT 8 Aug 94

[Text] Air Marshal Farooq Feroze Khan, chief of the Air Staff, said that India is reported to have started deploying medium-range missiles along the border with Pakistan, thereby posing a serious threat to regional peace. He said this while addressing faculty members and under-training officers of the Command and Staff College in Quetta today. He said India is already a nuclear threat in the region because it is aggressively pursuing a nuclear program and has produced a substantial number of nuclear weapons and medium and long-range missiles. The air chief said that Pakistan is actively striving to end the nuclear tension in the region, adding that it has made an offer to India to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty on a bilateral and regional basis, but India has been refusing to sign it.

INDIA

Delhi Denies Scuttling Nuclear Talks

94WP0123A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 9 Jul 94 p 1

[Text] The Times of India News Service, New Delhi, July 8—The government today denied that it had scuttled talks on nuclear non-proliferation as suggested by a leading American newspaper.

Commenting on THE WASHINGTON POST story, an official spokesman said there "is no question of scuttling these talks." India, he said, had held a dialogue with the U.S. on the issue and presented its point of view.

In the regional context, he said New Delhi had placed several constructive proposals before Islamabad but Pakistan was not prepared to discuss them.

He reiterated India's commitment to global disarmament and referred to New Delhi's initiative in getting convened a conference to discuss this matter in a post-Cold War world.

Even the recently concluded Non-Aligned Movement Foreign Ministers conference held at Cairo had endorsed the initiative to convene the 4th session to discuss disarmament.

Indigenous Surface-to-Air Missile Test Fired 1 August

BK0208030494 Delhi All India Radio Network in English 0245 GMT 2 Aug 94

[Text] India's indigenously-developed surface-to-air missile Trishul [Trident] was test-fired from the Interim Test Range at Chandipur-on-Sea, 14 km from Balasore

in Orissa, yesterday. The missile was fired from a mobile launcher. Two more test firings of the missile are likely this week.

Designed and developed by the Defense Research and Development Organization, Trishul has a range of 500 meters to 9 km. The solid fuel motor missile, with a capacity to carry 15 kg of warhead, has a triple battlefield role for the Army, Air Force, and Navy.

Trishul Missile Test Seen as 'Signal' to United States

BK1008141294 Delhi THE PIONEER in English 6 Aug 94 pp 1, 5

[Text] New Delhi—By announcing the test trial of Trishul surface-to-air missile at the Interim Test Range, Chandipore in Orissa, on Monday when the U.S. Ambassador to India Frank G. Wisner presented his credentials to the President, the Government seems to have sent an unmistakable signal to the U.S. that it would not succumb to any pressure to end its missile programme.

Though Trishul is a defensive missile and does not come under the ambit of the nonproliferation regime of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the holding of the tests on the eve of Mr Wisner's presenting credentials appears to have been a well-thought out exercise.

The continuing tests of the missile, which will have radar-assisted homing and will carry a 5.5-kg warhead, is part of a series of developmental launches for flight test and evaluation of the missile system in the user configuration.

In other words, the development of Trishul has reached a stage, where it is being tested for induction into the air defence system, both in static batteries and as part of the air defence cover for mobile armour columns. The Defence Ministry, making the announcement, had said the missile would make six more flights.

This is significant since Mr Wisner, who specialises in nonproliferation and disarmament issues, has in the past told U.S. House and Senate Committees that he considered the missile race in the sub-continent to have adverse possibilities for stability and security in the region.

But the test flights of the quick-reaction Trishul missile, which has a range of between 500 metres and nine km, on the eve of Mr Wisner presenting his credentials may have given the Indian establishment an opportunity to send a firm signal.

If the U.S. Government was unhappy, the Indian Government could argue that after all Trishul was an air defence system and did not violate MTCR regime. At the same time, the U.S. would also get the signal that arm-twisting would not work with a country, which had legitimate security concerns, bordered as it is by two nuclear-weapon owning countries, one of whom, Pakistan, is openly hostile.

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But more than that, the Indian Government seems to have timed the tests deliberately. Only three weeks ago the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) of the Pakistani Government decided to revive the Hatf-II missile programme, which had been put on hold two years ago under pressure from the U.S. Administration.

The Hatf-II, which is nothing but put-together Chinese "M" series of surface-to-surface missile, is Pakistan's professed answer to the Indian Prithvi missile, the testing of which had so annoyed the U.S.

The Indian Government has also taken note of the fact that the U.S. has not reacted to the Pakistani decision to revive the Hatf programme, while it has tied itself into knots with its protests against Prithvi.

The Indian Government has also expressed its unhappiness to the U.S. over the latter's lukewarm reaction to the Chinese supply of M-11 missile kits to Pakistan, while the U.S. Administration, the Senate the House and the think tanks were constantly demonishing the Indian missile programme.

The Indian argument is very clear. There is a missile race on in the subcontinent and the US is closing its eyes to the Pakistani part of it. The Trishul trials, and further probable trials of the Prithvi next month may thus serve more than just the purpose of trying out their capabilities.

Plan To Develop Submarine-Launched Missile

BK0408135794 Delhi NAVBHARAT TIMES in Hindi
2 Aug 94 p 1

[Report by Ranjit Kumar]

[Text] New Delhi, 1 August. After the successful development and deployment of 'Prithvi' [short range surface-to-surface missile], Indian defense scientists are now working on the submarine launched missile 'Sagarika.' The missile is being developed by the Defense Research and Development Organization [DRDO]. According to DRDO sources, tests are now being run on its prototype.

According to Aeronautics Development Organization, the 'Sagarkia' missile's capacity will match that of 'Prithvi.' It will have a range of 300 km. After acquiring the capability to launch missiles from submarines, Indian Navy's strike capability will vastly improve. It might take some years for the development and deployment of the missile, but the sources say that if enough funds are provided, the goal can be achieved. The sources say that India has already acquired the capability to design missiles. India has also gained expertise on metals used in missiles. Other than this, India has developed systems needed to guide the missiles. Now the only need is to develop the technique to launch missiles from beneath the sea. Indian defense scientists are now focussing attention on this aspect. DRDO scientists have been working on this project for last two years.

The defense scientists say that it is more difficult to launch short-range ballistic missiles from beneath the sea than it is from the surface. The induction of such a missile system in the Indian Navy will add a new strategic dimension in South Asia.

Presently India has eight Russian 'Kilo' type submarines that have provisions for launching ballistic missiles from sea. Only Russia, the United States and a few Western countries have the capability to develop 'Sagarika'-type missiles. These countries can launch ICBM's from their submarines. The United States and Western countries have taken all possible steps under the Missile Technology Control regime to prevent Third World countries from developing such missiles. In this perspective, India's attempts will draw the attention of the entire world.

It is worth mentioning that the United States and the Western countries had expressed considerable anger at India's development of 250 km range 'Prithvi' missile and 2,500 km range 'Agni' missile. They say that this will start a new missile race in South Asia that will vitiate the atmosphere in the region. However, the Indian defense observers say that in view of the movement of foreign submarines, especially the Chinese submarines, in the Indian Ocean, it is legitimate for the Indian defense planners to think in the direction of developing sea-based missiles.

Space Center Indigenizes Liquid Engine Component

94WP0118A Madras THE HINDU in English
1 Jul 94 p 13

[Text] Bangalore, June 30—The Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre in Thiruvananthapuram has achieved a major breakthrough by successfully indigenising a high technology item which India was not being allowed to import.

The silica phenolic throat insert, with the trade name Sephen, is a crucial component of the Vikas liquid engine used in the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) and the next generation Geostationary Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV). The Sephen insert protects the throat region of the engine from the high temperature gases gushing out from the thrust chamber.

ISRO [Indian Space Research Organization] has hitherto had to rely on imports from the French company, Societe Europeenne de Propulsion (SEP), which provided the Vikas engine technology. In recent years, however, the U.S. has refused to permit SEP to sell Sephen throats to India, according to ISRO sources.

Fast Breeder Test Reactor Achieves Breakthrough

94WP0119A Madras THE HINDU in English 2 Jul 94 p 3

[Text] Madras, July 1—The sodium cooled fast breeder test reactor (FBTR) at Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research, Kalpakkam, has achieved an important breakthrough.

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The reactor achieved a fuel burnup of 10,500 megawatt days per tonne on June 29, which means approximately one per cent of the Pu atoms in the reactor have undergone fission. The burnup of the fuel indicates the amount of energy taken out from the fuel per unit weight. This is about 40 per cent of the burnup of 25,000 megawatt days per tonne targetted to be achieved by early 1995 for the FBTR Mark I core. The fuel used in FBTR is a mixture of uranium and plutonium carbides and is the first of its kind in the world. The physics and engineering design of the fuel was done at Kalpakkam and the measurement of properties, development of fabrication process sheet and actual fabrication of fuel were carried out at the BARC [Bhabha Atomic Research Center], Bombay.

During May and June this year, the scientists and engineers of the Centre carried out high power physics and engineering tests relating to plant dynamics in the reactor. The tests were carried out at the rated power of the Mark I carbide core of 10.5 megawatt thermal and included reactor kinetic measurements, power coefficient of reactivity, flux tilting, natural convection in sodium circuits, lowering of all the control rods (slow shut downs), scram (fast shut down), tripping of main boiler feed water pump, tripping of one of the two secondary sodium pumps, tripping of one of the two primary sodium pumps, and offsite power failure. All the tests have been successfully completed and the calculations and experimental results match well. After the tests, the reactor was operated continuously for 11 days from June 20 to 30.

The campaign was very successful and the reactor was shut down on June 30 for carrying out the fuel handling operations. During this week experimental fuel pins will be loaded in the reactor; the thermal performance of the fuel would be evaluated from post-irradiation examination of the experimental pins.

IAEA Monitors Tarapur, Rajasthan Plants

94WP0124A Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 4 Jul 94 p 9

[Text] A hitherto unknown aspects of India's atomic energy programme is that the Tarapur and Rajasthan atomic power plants have been under the surveillance of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the last several years.

The IAEA has installed cameras to ensure that fuel from both these plants is not "diverted" for any other purpose other than peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Basically, this means that the IAEA wants to make sure that the fuel is not used for making atomic bombs, according to atomic energy officials.

The Tarapur atomic plant was built with the help of Americans and the Rajasthan plant with the assistance of Canadians. It is for this reason that they both fall under international safeguards.

Similar IAEA monitoring is, however, not allowed in any of the other nuclear power plants—Kakrapar, Narora, Madras and Kaiga (when it becomes operational).

By chance, if the government of India buckles under international pressure and signs the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, then all nuclear power plants would be placed under IAEA surveillance.

Correspondent Writes on U.S. Nuclear Strategy

Pressure on India

94WP0122A Madras *THE HINDU* in English 7 Jul 94 p 13

[Article by C. Raja Mohan: "Making World Safe for American Missiles"]

[Text] Washington, July 6—The Clinton administration is in the process of developing a pincer attack against ballistic missile proliferation in the developing world and China. On the one hand, the administration is pressing ahead with plans to develop a whole range of technologies and weapons systems to neutralise the incipient missile capabilities of a number of emerging powers and on the other it is also promoting "innovative" arms control ideas that could remove the threatening missiles in China and the developing world, without a shot being fired. The essence of the strategy is to make the world safe for American missile dominance.

While the Pentagon is developing anti-missile weapons as part of the first track of this policy, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) is crafting a diplomatic initiative to ban medium range missiles worldwide. The ban could be modelled after the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987. Such a proposal would appear to be global and non-discriminatory and target a large number of missiles currently under development in the developing world, including India's "Agni" missile.

In an interview to the U.S. journal *DEFENSE NEWS*, Mr. John Holum, director of ACDA, said that his organisation is exploring options for a possible American initiative to draft a global version of the INF Treaty that called for the dismantlement of all Soviet and American missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km.

Mr. Holum believes that Washington should consider opening up the basic obligations of the INF Treaty to other countries in the world. "This would invite, encourage, and press all countries to forego the threat of intermediate range missiles" and develop a global non-proliferation norm against the spread of ballistic missiles, according to Mr. Holum.

Once the ACDA proposal on medium range missiles is developed, it will be subjected to intense inter-agency scrutiny, before the President, Mr. Bill Clinton formally adopts it. It could be months, before a formal initiative

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to ban medium range missiles is unveiled by the Clinton administration. The final proposal could either open up the INF Treaty for global signatures or draft a completely new treaty. But the effort reveals the overall diplomatic thrust of the U.S. policy on missile proliferation.

Combating the spread of ballistic missiles has been a major foreign policy priority of the Clinton administration. This has involved intensive diplomatic efforts to prevent developing countries from deploying ballistic missiles, as well as proposing their elimination where they currently exist. According to Mr. James Woolsey, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Washington faces at least 25 countries, some of them hostile, that are bent on developing mass destruction weapons and missiles to deliver them.

The U.S. has proposed the elimination of all surface-to-surface ballistic missiles in the Middle East, as part of its arms control package for the region announced in 1991. It has also brought to bear enormous diplomatic pressure on India and Pakistan over the last few years to stop the development and deployment of their missiles.

A universal INF Treaty is not really non-discriminatory. Such a treaty would indeed eliminate a whole class of missiles, with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km. But it leaves those countries with the possession of inter-continental missiles with ranges above 5,500 km free to threaten the rest of the world. It also leaves the advanced countries with the option of continuing to build advanced cruise missiles, that have emerged as a powerful weapons system, as seen during the Gulf War. A global INF Treaty also leaves the U.S. to press ahead with the development of a new generation of missiles that can shoot down other missiles. In short, a global INF Treaty will be little more than a partial arrangement that leaves all strategic advantages with the U.S. while enforcing missile disarmament on the emerging powers.

Until New Delhi acquires the ability to deploy intercontinental missiles and cruise missiles, any international arrangement to abolish medium range missiles such as the Agni must be viewed with caution as it could have the effect of unilaterally disarming India.

Weapons Labs' Activity

94WP0122B Madras THE HINDU in English 9 Jul 94 p 13

[Article by C. Raja Mohan: "U.S. Labs Prepare To Beat the Nuclear Test Ban"]

[Text] Washington, July 8—Even as the Clinton Administration is promoting the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT) at Geneva, the weapons labs in the United States are actively seeking to develop alternative ways of testing atomic weapons. The three nuclear weapons labs—Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia—are pressing for new atomic testing facilities, worth 2,000 million dollars, that can compensate for traditional full blown testing of nuclear

weapons, according to an article in the prestigious American journal, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (July-August 1994). Mr. Tom Zamorra Collina and Mr. Ray E. Kidder, the authors of the article, assert that the plans of the U.S. labs will "increase their ability to design new nuclear weapons, even though bringing an end to new weapon development is one of the objects of a comprehensive test ban." Mr. Collina is the director of policy and research at the Institute of Science and International Security in Washington D.C. and Mr. Kidder is a nuclear weapon physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California.

Ms. Hazel O'Leary, the Secretary of U.S. Department of Energy, who has the administrative control over the three U.S. nuclear weapons labs and is visiting India this week, may have interesting things to say about the alternative plans for nuclear testing in the United States, and its implications for a nuclear test ban that is being so eagerly, and perhaps blindly, supported by the Government of India.

Ms. O'Leary has been an atomic rebel of sorts, bring a new "glasnost" to the secretive nuclear establishment in the United States. Even a reformist like O'Leary cannot, however, fully neutralise the power of the nuclear weapons labs that have been so committed to nuclear testing, by any means.

The new testing facilities are being sought under stockpile stewardship programme designed to assure American military confidence in the effectiveness of its nuclear arsenal. Nuclear weapons in the United States are produced and maintained by the three nuclear weapons labs.

The three national nuclear laboratories had historically been the strongest opponents of a nuclear test ban. Nuclear testing, the labs argued, was necessary to maintain the safety and reliability of the existing nuclear weapons as well as design new ones. As a price for winning their support for a nuclear test ban, the Clinton Administration apparently had no alternative but to agree to the wide-ranging new technical programme demanded by the labs to continue nuclear testing by other means.

Mr. Collina and Mr. Kidder regret that the champions of a nuclear test ban in the United States have not opposed the plans of the nuclear weapons labs that could undermine the essence of the CTBT. If the CTBT is to be notified by the U.S. senate, the Administration will have to please the conservatives in the American establishment who have been the strongest supporters of the nuclear weapons labs. In short, for a CTBT to get real the nuclear weapons labs in the U.S. must be granted the power to circumvent it.

The nuclear weapons labs are said to be planning four different types of tests as alternatives to full-scale testing. Among the four, "hydro-nuclear" testing comes closest to violating the spirit of a comprehensive nuclear test

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ban. Hydro-nuclear tests generate a mini nuclear explosion, but they are called "zero-yield" if the size of the nuclear yield is smaller than the high-explosive charge that triggers the nuclear detonation.

Mr. Collina and Mr. Kidder report that the United States had conducted hydro-nuclear tests during the period of 1958-61, when Washington and Moscow were "observing" a formal moratorium on nuclear testing. The largest hydro-nuclear test at that time yielded a nuclear energy equal to that of four-tenths of a pound of explosives. Hydro-nuclear tests are seen as valuable in checking the reliability and safety of existing nuclear weapons and weapons that may be remanufactured in the future.

According to the authors, the Clinton Administration wants to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test ban at Geneva that will permit hydro-nuclear tests. If the current CTBT negotiations in Geneva "do not specifically prohibit hydro-nuclear tests, the United States will probably reinstitute their use," say Mr. Collina and Mr. Kidder.

In another type of experimentation, called "weapons-effects testing", the labs simulate the effects of nuclear explosions on other weapons and military hardware. These tests are used to determine how the components and subsystems perform in a hostile nuclear burst environment.

In high-energy density tests, the weapons labs use high powered laser beams to simulate the extreme heat and density of a nuclear explosion and investigate their effects on a variety of materials. The object is to understand how these materials respond during a thermo nuclear explosion.

Hydro-dynamic tests examine the functioning of the high explosive charge that triggers the nuclear explosion. Monitoring the behaviour of this primary stage in the nuclear explosions is reportedly the most important task in "maintaining confidence in existing warheads."

According to Mr. Collina and Mr. Kidder, "If the United States is seen as expanding its weapons-development capability at the same time that it asks other to extend the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty] and agree to a test ban, more charges of discrimination can be expected."

IRAN

Tehran Disputes U.S. 'Allegations' on CBW Production

NC1308072094 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian
0330 GMT 13 Aug 94

[Text] The Islamic Republic of Iran has refuted allegations by U.S. officials regarding Iran's efforts to manufacture chemical arms and has said that these allegations are part of Washington's hostile policy against Tehran.

The Iranian delegation at the United Nations issued a statement yesterday which says: The Islamic Republic of Iran, as one of the major victims of chemical arms during past decades, was among the first countries to sign the convention banning the manufacture and stockpiling of chemical arms.

Two U.S. senators had alleged on Thursday [11 August] that Iran is trying to manufacture chemical weapons.

U.N. Mission Statement Denies Chemical Weapons Charges

LD1308065994 Tehran IRNA in English
0628 GMT 13 Aug 94

[Text] United Nations, New York, Aug. 13, (IRNA)—Iran Friday categorically denied the unfounded allegations made by some U.S. officials on Iran's efforts to produce chemical weapons.

The Iranian Mission to the United Nations in a press release said that the statements by two American senators who claimed Iran was not a signatory to the chemical weapons convention (CWC) were in line with the hostile policies of the U.S. towards Iran.

During the meeting of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday in the presence of Deputy Secretary of Defence John Deutch and Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili, two American senators, Thurmond and Dohen [name as received], claimed that certain countries including Iran had not signed the agreement.

"What action should be taken against non-signatory countries, those who do not sign on to this particular agreement? Do we take potentially military action if Libya, Iraq, Iran, were to go forward and develop these," argued Senator Dohen.

The press release further added that it is very unfortunate and indeed ironic that Senator Thurmond and Senator Dohen have not taken upon themselves the burden of consulting the list of CWC signatories or even recalling the names of countries that have contributed to the negotiations of this convention.

"It is more surprising that Mr. John Deutch, the deputy defense secretary who was to brief the senators did not care to correct the misrepresentation by the senators of Iran on factual grounds," it added.

The mission stressed that Iran actively and constructively participated in the completion of the chemical weapons convention and signed it when it was opened for signature as a treaty in January 1993.

It said that throughout the negotiations in Geneva, Iran was strongly supportive of the intention to ban the development and stockpiling of these weapons to buttress the ineffectual 1925 Geneva protocol on no-use.

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The press release added that Iran continues to contribute to the ongoing negotiations in The Hague to work out the implementation modalities of chemical weapons convention and looks forward to positive attitude of other signatories.

Stressing that Iran has been the victim of the most extensive use of chemical weapons against any state this century in which it suffered some 10,000 casualties or fatalities as a result of the illegal use of these weapons, it said that Iran has renounced these weapons on the grounds of morality despite the fact that its experience as a victim might justify it.

"Nevertheless, the United States, which was remarkably mute about Iraq's use of these horrendous weapons, continues to accuse Iran of harboring an intention to develop a caldestine chemical weapons program," it concluded.

Saudi Nuclear Plans, U.S. 'Double Standards' Discussed

NC1108090594 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian
0345 GMT 11 Aug 94

[Commentary by the News Research and Commentaries Group]

[Text] A former Saudi diplomat who requested political asylum from the United States some time ago has revealed fresh efforts by the Riyadh government to manufacture nuclear arms. He said that Riyadh is trying to purchase nuclear reactors as part of a confidential plan to research and manufacture nuclear arms. The former Saudi diplomat, the second ranking Saudi official in the United Nations before he sought political asylum, has placed documents at the disposal of correspondents on Saudi officials' efforts to acquire nuclear technology. These documents include part of the correspondence between Chinese and Saudi officials on the sale of nuclear reactors.

Despite extensive reaction by world media to the news on Saudi Arabia's effort to gain access to nuclear technology and arms, U.S. officials, who claim to lead the efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear arms, most notably in the Middle East, have not been prepared to comment, either confirming or refuting this information. In a bid to reduce the pressure on Saudi Arabia, a State Department spokesman said the nuclear reactors will not be very effective in the spread of nuclear arms in the Middle East. The State Department spokesman preferred to remain silent on Saudi Arabia's assistance to the Iraqi regime to gain access to a nuclear bomb and did not answer correspondents' questions on this.

Political analysts believe the reason for America's cool, calm reaction is that the leaders of Washington and Tel Aviv have concluded that Saudi Arabia's efforts to gain access to nuclear arms do not constitute a threat to the Zionist regime and that this issue can easily be ignored.

But many regional countries are placed under pressure by America and the target of false propaganda merely because the Zionist regime claims that these countries may use nuclear reactors in their military research. And although these allegations by the United States and the Zionist regime have oft been refuted by inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Washington continues to confront these countries' economic development plans and their use of nuclear research centers within the framework of its policy of double standards.

Does the control of nuclear arms mean anything but ensuring the security of the Zionist regime at the cost of robbing other countries of their security?

IRAQ

Baghdad Allegedly Plans To Use Lasers Against UN Air Crews

LD1108085294 Berlin DDP/ADN in German
0231 GMT 11 Aug 94

[Excerpts] Berlin (DDP/ADN)—Iraq is planning the use of blindness-inducing lasers [blend-laser] against aircraft and helicopter crews transporting UN inspection teams. The BERLINER MORGENPOST (today's edition) reports United Nations concerns to this effect, based on information from the British secret service. This would also pose a threat to Bundeswehr air crews, which have been stationed in Baghdad for over two years. They use CH-53 large-capacity helicopters to fly UN experts charged with the monitoring of UN-ordered disarmament measures to their place of deployment.

A paper made available to the newspaper says that the German Defense Ministry had reached the conclusion that the use of the lasers by Iraq is certainly a possibility. Equipment of this nature is freely available on the world market. Even developing countries now have experience with such equipment. [passage omitted]

The BERLINER MORGENPOST says that a problem in Bonn's eyes is that there are a large number of laser types that can be used for blinding purposes on the market. This means that protection with spectacles and filters in optical equipment is becoming increasingly difficult.

ISRAEL

North Korea Approached on Middle East Weapons Freeze

TA1508101794 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 15 Aug 94 p 9

[Editorial: "North Korea's Missiles"]

[Text] The agreement achieved in Geneva last weekend on reducing North Korean nuclear activity in exchange for normalization in its relations with the United States constitutes a significant achievement in the nuclear nonproliferation efforts. It appears that the death of the

tough Kim Il-song has brought about a certain moderation in North Korea—the last bastion of Stalinism and the Cold War—which has straddled dangerously close to a nuclear war.

Just as in other countries that used to belong to the communist camp, what is at stake here is North Korea's desire to extricate itself from international isolation and to reap the benefits of the economic opportunities being opened now to all the countries willing to abandon their militant policy and join the family of nations interested in regional and worldwide peaceful coexistence. It must be emphasized that this agreement in principle is only the first stage. It includes a hint of things to come, but without any unequivocal and irrevocable commitments. North Korea has indeed undertaken not to produce any more plutonium—a material necessary for the production of nuclear weapons—but it did not commit itself regarding the stores of plutonium it already possesses, according to reliable assessments.

The agreement is very important from Israel's point of view, because North Korea is at present the largest supplier of sophisticated weapons to the Middle East. It sells sophisticated missiles—Scuds and others—to our worst enemies. It provides Iran, Iraq, Libya, and even Syria with nonconventional capabilities. Iran's nuclear weapons program, one of whose declared targets is Israel, is being aided mainly by North Korea.

Israel's dialogue with North Korea commenced some time ago with a visit of Eytan Bentzur, the Foreign Ministry deputy director general, to the capital of that country. The purpose of the dialogue was, among other things, to freeze the supply of sophisticated North Korean weapons to the Middle East.

The Israeli Government, in a panic and with extreme shortsightedness, succumbed to U.S. pressure to stop these contacts. The United States is now doing itself what it forbade us to do, at the same time failing to ensure that the agreement achieved will guarantee the Middle East peace interests by putting an end to the sale of sophisticated North Korean weapons to extremist countries and elements in the Arab and Muslim world.

The lesson Israel must draw from this is that it must not subordinate its security and political interests to the whims of the U.S. Administration. We must make supreme efforts to coordinate our activities with this most friendly superpower, but without self-effacement. This holds true regarding every possibility of maintaining a dialogue with extremist elements that want to change their attitude by talking to us. It is indeed possible that so far there have been no appeals to Israel by serious Iraqi or Iranian elements. If such appeals are made, however, and if they seem serious and in tune with Israel's security needs, we must accept or examine them thoroughly, even if Washington does not like it.

PAKISTAN

Official Says Nuclear Program Will Not Be Curtailed

BK0308123294 Karachi DAWN in English 3 Aug 94 p 16

[Text] Islamabad, Aug. 2. The Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Professor N.D. Khan on Tuesday categorically reiterated that Pakistan would not toll back its peaceful nuclear programme.

Addressing a Press conference here at the Foreign office, Mr Khan said that Pakistan would not accept any unilateral decision from anybody on the nuclear issue.

Pakistan had repeatedly pronounced in the past that it is ready to accept any equitable, and nondiscriminatory approach for the solution to the nuclear problem in South Asia.

Mr Khan said Islamabad had also conveyed its policy on the nuclear issue to all US diplomats, who visited Pakistan in the recent past.

"We have a firm, categorical and clear-cut policy on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia," he said adding that Pakistan's programme was completely peaceful.

Referring to the on-going process of quiet diplomacy on the nuclear issue and other matters of regional security between the U.S. and Pakistan, he said this was not something new and unusual.

He denied any secret deal on the issue between Pakistan and United States in the garb of quiet diplomacy and said: "Quiet diplomacy means that every thing is moving in a right direction."

When asked that if the deal with the U.S. for supply of F-16 aircraft had been terminated, Mr Khan, who did not give a clear cut reply in this respect, said that it is Pakistan's right to ask the US to deliver the aircraft for which payment had already been made or otherwise return the money so that alternate options could be explored.

He said: "I personally feel that we should look into other options for the purchase of aircraft if the U.S. does not give us the F-16s."

Pakistan had signed a 4.1 billion dollars deal with the United States in 1989 for the supply of highly advanced seventy-one F-16 aircraft which could not be delivered to the PAF after application of the Pressler Amendment on Pakistan in October 1990.

Despite payment of 658 million dollars so far by Islamabad, Lockheed, manufacturers of F-16s, had not yet supplied even a single aircraft out of total seventeen already manufactured and waiting for delivery.

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, who visited Pakistan during second week of April this year had stated in a Press conference that "the issue of F-16s

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and nuclear non-proliferation are tied up together," a contention always rejected by Islamabad on the grounds that the F-16 deal had been signed commercially and that it had no link with the nuclear issue whatsoever.

Mr Khan also termed the Pressler law as unjust and said: "We have communicated our position on the amendment on several occasions in the past to the US officials."

To another question, he described the state of Pakistan-U.S. relations as satisfactory. He, however, did not offer further comments in this connection.

Responding to a question about the Afghan crisis, he said Afghanistan was a sovereign state and "we want to

promote a peaceful settlement of the problem in accordance to the wishes of the Afghan people without interfering in the internal affairs of that country."

"This is quite impossible if one expects from Pakistan that it should interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. We want to see a durable solution to the problem without any interference," he repeated.

About the present government's foreign policy, he said the PPP had steered the country out of the international isolation adding that it was because of the People's Party's far-sighted policy that Pakistan was not working as an active member of the UN Security Council.

He said the Prime Minister would be visiting Russia sometime later this year. Ms Bhutto's visit to Russia will be of great importance and help give a new impetus to relations between the two countries.

RUSSIA

Commission on Chemical Weapons Destruction Meets

MM1508104594 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 Aug 94 p 1

[Report by Russian Federation Defense Ministry Information and Press Directorate: "Session at the Defense Ministry"]

[Text] A session of the interdepartmental commission on problems of the destruction of chemical weapons was held on 11 August at the Russian Federation Defense Ministry with Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff in the chair. The commission was set up under the Russian Federation Defense Ministry by the Russian Government in the spring. Colonel General Stanislav Petrov, chief of the radiation, chemical, and biological protection forces, delivered a report.

During the session the directions of future cooperation between the Russian Defense Ministry and the U.S. military department on chemical disarmament matters were identified. There was support for the Russian Defense Ministry's proposals on developing joint Russian-American technologies to ensure safe and ecologically clean destruction of chemical weapons on the basis of existing studies in the two countries. The representatives of interested ministries participating in the commission's work also examined some other matters of practical interest.

Russian Federation Defense Ministry Information and Press Directorate.

Osmium-Smuggling Ring Broken Up

94P50175A Moscow TRUD in Russian 4 Aug 94 p 5

[Anatoliy Dzhapakov report under "Crime Chronicle" rubric: "The Crooks Hardly Risk Anything"]

[Text] One of the most horrible crimes committed in Sverdlovsk Oblast was the murder of an entire family—man, wife, and a child. Investigators believe that they all paid the price for the fact that unknown criminals had found out that the head of the family was a dishonest middleman trafficking in osmium.

The crux of the matter is that sellers of this rare earth metal as a rule try to pass off natural osmium (which is comparatively cheap—20 thousand rubles per gram) as the isotope osmium-187, which is now valued at \$100,000 per gram. There is only one laboratory in Russia that can distinguish one from the other—the Moscow State Institute of Rare Earth Metals. It was this laboratory which helped the officers of the administration for struggle with organized crime to catch A. Solomakhin, director of the Gornozavodchik firm, in an attempt to sell two grams of osmium-187. According to police officials, this is practically the only occurrence

when the buyer was sold the type of osmium he was seeking. One must note that this metal is one of those which, under law, is not allowed to be freely traded.

South Korea May Get Russian S-300 Anti-Aircraft Complexes

LD1008103094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0947 GMT 10 Aug 94

[Article by ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Vladimir Solntsev]

[Text] Moscow August 10 TASS—Russia may supply to South Korea anti-aircraft missile complexes of the S-300 type if Seoul wishes to buy them, ITAR-TASS was told by Gennadiy Yanpolskiy, vice-chairman of the Russian state committee for defence sectors of industry. "We could agree to supply S-300 complexes to South Korea given its desire to buy them," he stated.

At the same time, Yanpolskiy noted that South Korea was mainly relying on U.S. weapons. The United States has trained the South Korean Army and is supplying it with "Patriot" anti-aircraft systems which are similar to the S-300. However, in his opinion, the S-300, which has already been shown to South Korean representatives, is superior to the "Patriot" as regards its detection distance, number of targets it can destroy, general reliability, and several other parameters.

Yanpolskiy flatly denied South Korean press assertions that Moscow and Seoul had allegedly reached agreement in principle on the delivery of MiG-29 fighters to South Korea. In his opinion, these warplanes could hardly be bought by South Korea, because their delivery involves a number of other problems—technical services, training of pilots and ground crews, etc., at a time when Seoul is wholly oriented towards cooperation with the Americans. Sources within the state committee for defence sectors of industry have nevertheless confirmed to ITAR-TASS that South Korean representatives had familiarised themselves with the MiG-29 plane in 1993 and this year, as well as with other weapon systems, the export of which was permitted by the Russian president.

The representative of the committee leadership believes that deliveries of defensive anti-aircraft systems and anti-tank guns was quite possible to South Korea. He thinks that no large deals are foreseeable and it is apparently a matter of a few units being sold, which will not yield much profit. He noted that there were various rumours, but no official talks or final decisions. He also said that the Russian weapon systems evoked interest not only in South Korea, but in North Korea, too.

Yanpolskiy drew attention to the fact that deliveries of Russian arms, if they actually take place, would by no means upset the balance of forces on the Korean peninsula. He noted that "it is ridiculous" to expect arms deliveries to resolve the problem of the Soviet Union's debt to South Korea, inherited by Russia, incurred under credits, which, according to Seoul calculations, amount

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to 650 million U.S. dollars. He said that even if a part of the debt would be paid in this way Moscow would be faced with the problem of how to pay its plants for the produced weaponry.

The cooperation of the state committee for defence sectors of industry with South Korea is not limited, however, to potential arms deliveries. Yanpolskiy noted that a memorandum on mutual understanding in the sphere of the defence industry's conversion was signed between the Russian committee and the South Korean Ministry for Trade and Industry. ITAR-TASS has also learned from sources within the committee that the South Korean "Goldstar" corporation had bought several K-32T civilian transport helicopters during the February 1994 exhibition in Singapore. The delivery next year of four more similar helicopters and also of the same number of ship-borne K-32S choppers is now being negotiated.

Moscow May Grant Light-Water Nuclear Reactor to DPRK

LD1508121794 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1103 GMT 15 Aug 94

[By diplomatic correspondent Aleksandr Kopnov]

[Text] Moscow, 15 August—Russia could grant the DPRK a light-water nuclear reactor, taking account of the huge experience of cooperation accumulated between the two countries in the peaceful mastery of atomic energy. This point of view was expressed today in a conversation with the ITAR-TASS correspondent by Valentin Moiseyev, head of the Korea section of the Russian Foreign Ministry's First Asian Department, while commenting on the results of the third round of talks between the United States and DPRK held in Geneva on normalization of bilateral relations and nuclear security on the Korean peninsula.

"In Moscow," he pointed out, "the accords reached there have been received with satisfaction. They could become the basis for a comprehensive settlement on the peninsula which is in fact what is advocated by Russia too."

In the joint American-North Korean statement passed in Geneva, the DPRK inter alia expressed the readiness to exchange the currently operating nuclear reactor and the other two of the old type being built on its territory for new—light water—ones, and the United States in turn pledged to ensure their supply to Pyongyang.

"We know that in the course of the talks in the United States the North Korean side insisted on the supply of a reactor of precisely Russian manufacture," Valentin Moiseyev noted in this connection.

Washington and Pyongyang also announced their intention to exchange diplomatic representatives and move towards full normalization of political and economic

relations. In addition, the United States expressed readiness to give North Korea guarantees not to use nuclear weapons against it, and the DPRK pledged to fulfil the conditions of the joint declaration of North and South on the nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula. And finally, stress was laid on the DPRK's readiness to remain in the framework of the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

"Of course," Valentin Moiseyev noted, "much work still remains to be done on implementing the accords which have been reached, and Russia for its part is ready to actively join in this process."

Documents on Permission for Work on Hazardous Nuclear Products

Order and Statute

94WN0370A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 5 Aug 94 p 6

[Gosatomnadzor [Russian Federal Oversight of Nuclear and Radiation Security] statute, "On the Procedure for Issuing Temporary Permits for Planning (Designing) Nuclear-and Radiation-Hazardous Facilities and Productions (Technologies)," registered with the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice on 15 July 1994. Registration No 636; Followed by Gosatomnadzor Order No 42 ratifying said statute, dated 7 April 1994 and signed by Gosatomnadzor Chairman Yu. G. Vishnevskiy]

[Text]

Text of Statute

1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1.1. The issuance of temporary special permits for planning (designing) nuclear- and radiation-hazardous facilities and productions (technologies) is performed by the Gosatomnadzor of Russia in accordance with the Statute on the Federal Supervision of Russia on Nuclear and Radiation Safety, ratified by directive of the President of the Russian Federation dated 5 June 1992, No 283, with the amendments ratified by directive of the President of the Russian Federation dated 16 September 1993, No 636-rp.

1.2. The present Statute on the Procedure for Issuing Temporary Special Permits for Planning (Designing) Nuclear-and Radiation-Hazardous Facilities, Productions (Technologies) (henceforth referred to as the Statute) regulates the order and organizational procedures for issuance of temporary special permits for planning (designing) nuclear- and radiation-hazardous facilities and productions (technologies), and also defines the purposes, methods and organizational procedures accompanying them in the period prior to the implementation of the Statute on the Procedure for

Issuing Licenses for Activity in Production and Utilization of Nuclear Materials, Atomic Energy, Radioactive Substances and Products Based on Them in the Russian Federation.

1.3. The Statute is mandatory for fulfillment by all legal persons engaging or proposing to engage in planning (designing) facilities and productions (technologies), a list of which is presented in subpoints 1.3.1. and 1.3.2. of the present Statute.

1.3.1. Nuclear- and radiation-hazardous facilities (installations, systems) and productions (technologies) of the following types:

- research reactors, critical and subcritical test stands;
- atomic power plants of all types;
- industrial reactors;
- nuclear installations of civilian vessels, above-water and underwater vessels of the Military-Naval Fleet of Russia;
- nuclear installations of civilian facilities of other function (cosmic, transport, etc.);
- production of ore oxides of initial nuclear material;
- refining and production of nuclear-pure initial nuclear material;
- production of uranium hexafluoride;
- production of enriched uranium (division of uranium isotopes);
- production of nuclear fuel from nuclear materials;
- radiochemical processing of nuclear materials and radioactive substances (production of uranium, plutonium and other substances from irradiated fuel);
- production of radioactive substances, radionuclide sources of radiation and products of radiation technology;
- transporting non-irradiated and irradiated nuclear materials, radioactive substances and materials, and radiation-hazardous installations;
- processing radioactive waste;
- storage and burial facilities for non-irradiated and irradiated nuclear materials and radioactive substances.

1.3.2. Systems and elements of systems of nuclear- and radiation-hazardous facilities, productions (technologies) cited in subpoint 1.3.1. of the Statute, which influence the provision of nuclear and radiation safety, including equipment, pipelines, instruments, apparatus and hardware, as well as accessories and products for their repair (henceforth—systems and equipment), with the exception of equipment cited in subpoint 2.1.1. of the Statute.

1.4. The list of nuclear- and radiation-hazardous facilities and productions (technologies) (henceforth—facilities) may be specified and expanded by decision of the Gosatomnadzor of Russia at its initiative or upon request of the organs of state administration, operating organizations or owners of the facilities.

1.5. The Statute is mandatory also for fulfillment by legal persons engaging or proposing to engage in the development of technological, installation and repair documentation for atomic power plants.

1.6. Legal persons engaging or proposing to engage in planning (designing) the facilities, systems and equipment cited in point 1.3 of the Statute or in the development of documentation cited in point 1.5 of the Statute, are henceforth referred to as the enterprise.

2. ORDER AND ORGANIZATIONAL PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING TEMPORARY SPECIAL PERMITS FOR PLANNING (DESIGNING) NUCLEAR-AND RADIATION-HAZARDOUS FACILITIES, SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT FROM THE AGENCIES OF THE GOSATOMNADZOR OF RUSSIA

2.1. Temporary special permits for planning (designing) facilities, systems and equipment are issued to enterprises and the conditions of their validity are established by the Administrations of the Central, Urals, Siberian and Far Eastern Districts of Gosatomnadzor of Russia, with the exception of cases cited in subpoints 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3 and in point 2.2 of the Statute.

Distribution of the territories by districts to which one should apply for receipt of temporary special permits, with the exception of cases specified in point 2.1.3 of the Statutes, is presented in reference Appendix 8.

2.1.1. Temporary special permits for designing equipment for facilities of the fuel cycle are issued in accordance with the Statute on the Procedure for Issuing Temporary Special Permits and Supervisory Organizations for the Design and Manufacture of Equipment for Nuclear- and Radiation-Hazardous Facilities and Productions (RD-03-09-94), ratified by order of the Gosatomnadzor of Russia dated 11 February 1994, No 24.

2.1.2. Temporary special permits for designing radionuclide sources and products of radiation technology are issued only within the framework of temporary permits obtained in accordance with the Statute on the Procedure of Issuing Temporary Permits by Gosatomnadzor of Russia for Activity on Production, Management and Utilization of Radioactive Substances and Products on their Basis (RD-07-01-93), ratified by order of the Gosatomnadzor of Russia dated 25 May 1993, No 53.

The need for obtaining temporary special permits in accordance with the Statute in this case is determined by the conditions of validity of the temporary permit for activity.

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2.1.3. Temporary special permits for designing equipment by an enterprise which manufactures equipment and which has design bureaus, are issued by those District Administrations of the Gosatomnadzor of Russia on whose territories the enterprises are located.

The distribution of territories by districts of the Gosatomnadzor of Russia to which one should apply for receipt of temporary special permits in the given case is specified by the reference Appendix 6.

2.2. Temporary special permits for enterprises developing facilities cited in subpoint 1.3.1 of the Statute, and/or nuclear installations, active zones, transport-packaging complements for nuclear fissionable materials, are issued by the central apparatus of the Gosatomnadzor of Russia.

2.3. To receive temporary special permits, the enterprise submits an application, addressed to the manager of the regional agency of the Gosatomnadzor of Russia or the deputy chairman of the Gosatomnadzor of Russia, which includes the declaration and the complement of supporting documents.

A separate application must be filed for each of the types of facilities cited in subpoint 1.3.1 of the Statute.

2.4. The application is formulated on the standard letterhead of the enterprise, signed by its manager or first deputy manager, and certified with the seal.

The form of the application is presented in Appendix 1.

The application of the enterprise for receipt of a temporary special permit for planning (design) within the framework of temporary permits issued by Gosatomnadzor of Russia for construction, operation and removal from operation of facilities cited in subpoint 1.3.1 of the Statute, is filed together with a substantiation of the involvement of the enterprise by the operating organization or owner of the facility. The report specified in point 18 of Appendix 7 is filed.

The application of the enterprise for receipt of a temporary special permit for planning (designing) facilities on whose activity temporary permits have not been formulated (perspective developments, technical proposals, technical-economic substantiations, etc.) as well as systems and equipment cited in subpoint 1.3.2 of the Statute, is filed together with a substantiation of the involvement of the enterprise by the contractor of this work. The report specified in point 18, Appendix 7 is filed.

2.5. The set of supporting documents for the application must include materials whose list is presented in Appendix 7.

Enterprises planning facilities of several types (for example, atomic power plants, sources of radiation, etc.) submit, together with the application, one set of supporting documents, aside from those specified in points 7, 8, 9, 14, 17, 18 of Appendix 7, submitted separately for each type of facility.

The absence of any of the documents cited in Appendix 7 is substantiated by the enterprise. The decision on acceptability of the substantiation is made by the agency of Gosatomnadzor of Russia issuing the permit.

The documents must be submitted to the supervisory agencies in printed form on paper of format A4 and collated. The text is formulated in accordance with the requirements established for formulation of textual documents.

2.6. The application is subject to accounting at the appropriate District Administration or Administration on the Organization for Licensing Procedures and Coordination of Regional Agencies of the Gosatomnadzor of Russia (henceforth—Administration on Organization of Licensing Procedures).

The date of acceptance of the application on accounting is the date its review is undertaken.

2.7. The application is reviewed within 15 working days by the District Administration or the Administration on Organization of Licensing Procedures to determine correspondence of the set of documents supporting the application, the correctness and quality of their formulation, to the requirements of the Statute.

If it is determined that the application does not comply with requirements of the Statute on the volume of the set of documents supporting the application or the correctness and quality of their formulation, the appropriate Administration forwards to the enterprise a notification of the need to introduce changes into the application and/or the complement of documents, to submit additional documents, or a rejection of the application.

With a positive result of application review, it is registered by the District Administration or the Administration on Organization of Licensing Procedures, and a notification is sent to the enterprise within five days from the date of registration.

The form of the notification is presented in Appendix 2.

2.8. With a positive result of application review, and in the case where the temporary special permit is granted in the central apparatus of Gosatomnadzor of Russia, the Administration on Organization of Licensing Procedures forwards the application to the Administration on Organization of Expert Evaluation of Safety for the purpose of organizing an inspection and preparing the draft of the special temporary permit.

2.9. With a positive result of application review, the District Administration or the Administration on Organization of Expert Evaluation of Safety, within a period of up to two months from the date of registration of the application, reviews the set of supporting documents, organizes and conducts inspection of the enterprise for the purpose of evaluating the possibility of issuing it a temporary special permit.

The inspections of the District Administrations may involve the appropriate inspections, and the Administration on Organization of Expert Evaluation of Safety may involve the District Administrations and inspections—in the performance of inspections and preparation of the draft of the temporary special permit.

2.10. The agencies of Gosatomnadzor of Russia organizing the inspection give written notification to the enterprise on the time of performance of the inspection.

2.11. The following may serve as reasons for termination of review by Gosatomnadzor of Russia of an application for issuance of a temporary special permit:

- inadequacy or unreliability of information presented in the application;
- shortcomings established as a result of the inspection, particularly if they lead to an unacceptable level of safety provision of the planned (designed) facilities);
- failure to present corrected, supplemental or reference materials within the times required by the agencies of Gosatomnadzor of Russia.

2.12. If it is necessary to correct a set of documents supporting the application, and/or to receive additional documents, the times for implementing all subsequent procedures are changed depending on the time Gosatomnadzor of Russia receives the set of documents which meet the requirements of the Statute.

2.13. During review of the set of supporting documents and the inspection of the enterprise, an evaluation is performed of the accuracy and reliability of the information presented in the documents supporting the application, and the presence and effectiveness of systems of quality assurance, including an evaluation on questions of interaction with the contractors of the work and subcontracting organizations.

The results of the inspection are formulated by statute.

The form of the statute is presented in Appendix 3.

2.14. Based on the positive results of the review and inspection presented in the conclusions of the statute, the District Administration or the Administration on Organization of Expert Evaluations of Safety prepares a draft temporary special permit for planning (design) to be issued to the enterprise.

If the temporary special permit is issued at the central apparatus of Gosatomnadzor of Russia, the Administration on Organization of Expert Evaluation of Safety coordinates its draft with the appropriate sectorial administrations of Gosatomnadzor of Russia and coordinates the organization of the licensing procedures with the head of the Administration.

The formulated draft of the temporary special permit is submitted for approval to the Chairman of Gosatomnadzor of Russia or his deputy, or to the head (deputy head) of the District Administration, respectively.

2.15. The approved temporary special permit, issued in the central apparatus of Gosatomnadzor of Russia, is registered by the Administration on Organization of Licensing Procedures and forwarded to the appropriate District Administration, enterprise, and the appropriate operating organizations, owners of facilities or contractors of planning (design) work.

If the temporary special permit is issued by the District Administration, it is registered by this administration and forwarded to the Administration for Organization of Licensing Procedures, to the enterprise and operating organizations, owners of facilities or contractors.

The form of the temporary special permit is presented in Appendix 4.

2.16. Temporary special permits specify the conditions of their validity.

The conditions of validity of a temporary special permit are formulated in the form of an appendix to it, signed by the head of the Administration on Organization of Expert Evaluation of Safety or the head of the District Administration issuing this permit, and certified with a seal.

The conditions of validity of a temporary special permit are an integral part of it.

An exemplary list of basic requirements subject to inclusion in the conditions of validity of the temporary special permit is presented in Appendix 5.

2.17. The term of effectiveness of the temporary special permit must be established in each specific permit with consideration for the results of the inspections, but, as a rule, for no longer than five years.

2.18. Prior to expiration of the term of effectiveness of a temporary special permit, the enterprise which continues to perform the planning (design) work specified in the application, or which proposes to perform new work, must formulate a new permit in accordance with the procedure established by the Statute.

2.19. If comments are expressed in the conclusions of the statute regarding the capacity of the enterprise to engage in project (design) activity in developing facilities, systems and equipment cited in point 1.3 of the Statute, the commission performing the inspection of the enterprise shall prepare requirements which are mandatory for fulfillment, and include them in the statute.

If the enterprise fails to fulfill these requirements, the appropriate agency of Gosatomnadzor of Russia prepares notification of refusal to issue a temporary special permit, which it submits for approval to the chairman of Gosatomnadzor of Russia or his deputy, or to the head (deputy head) of the District Administration, and after approval forwards to the enterprise and its operating organizations, owners of facilities or contractors of planning (design) work.

The approved notifications:

—are registered by the Administration for Organization of Licensing Procedures and forwarded within a time of no more than five days from the date of their approval to the appropriate District Administration (for control), enterprise and its contractor, operating organizations or owners of the facilities, as well as to the appropriate inspections—for enterprises, to whom temporary special permits are issued in the central apparatus of Gosatomnadzor of Russia;

—are registered by the District Administration and forwarded within a term of no more than five days from the day of their approval to the Administration on Organization of Licensing Procedures, to the enterprise and its contractors, operating organizations or owners of facilities, as well as to the appropriate inspections—for enterprises who are issued temporary special permits by the District Administration.

2.20 Complaints regarding the agencies of Gosatomnadzor of Russia performing review of the application and implementing associated measures are submitted by the enterprise and addressed to the chairman of Gosatomnadzor of Russia.

Gosatomnadzor of Russia informs the enterprise about the results of review of the complaint, no later than 20 days from the moment of its receipt.

2.21. The actions of the agencies of Gosatomnadzor of Russia on issuance and accompaniment of temporary special permits may be appealed in judicial order.

Filing a complaint in court does not stop the effect of decisions of Gosatomnadzor of Russia.

2.22. An enterprise which receives a temporary special permit may, if necessary to perform a singular (one-time) project (design) work, involve another enterprise in the development of the documentation and performance of computations, regardless of its form of ownership, or purchase from another enterprise the documentation for an individual unit of equipment, including by import, if such commissioned enterprise does not have a temporary special permit. In this case, the enterprise assumes responsibility for correspondence of the documentation developed by the commissioned enterprise to the requirements and standards of safety, as well as for its accounting, storage and correction.

In this case, when the enterprise applies to Gosatomnadzor of Russia for receipt of a temporary special permit, the set of supporting documents should also include a List of Commissioned Enterprises and/or Selling Enterprises.

The project (design) documentation of commissioned enterprises which is used by the enterprise receiving the temporary special permit is viewed by Gosatomnadzor of Russia as being developed by the enterprise itself.

If the commission arrangement bears a repeated character, the commissioned enterprise, located on the territory of Russia, must obtain a temporary special permit in accordance with the requirements of the Statute.

2.23. The owner of a temporary special permit for planning (design) of facilities, systems and equipment cited in point 1.3 of the Statute is the enterprise to whom it was issued.

The owner of a temporary special permit does not have the right to transfer it to some other legal person.

2.24. In order to introduce changes and amendments into the temporary special permit, its owner must submit to the agency of Gosatomnadzor of Russia issuing the permit an application with indication of the essence of the changes and amendments, as well as the reason for their introduction. Supporting documents required in each specific case are appended to the application.

2.25. Changes and amendments are formulated by appropriate decision of the agency of Gosatomnadzor of Russia issuing the initial permit. It is signed in accordance with the procedure specified in point 2.14 of the Statute, and appended to the principle permit.

The procedure and terms of review of the application are analogous to the procedures and terms of review of the initial application.

2.26. The District Administration formulates the lists of enterprises receiving temporary special permits. It is appended by the District Administration to the annual report and taken into account by the Administration for Organization of Licensing Procedures.

3. ACCOMPANIMENT OF TEMPORARY SPECIAL PERMITS

3.1. Accompaniment (monitoring) of temporary special permits issued to an enterprise is performed for the purpose of evaluating their adherence to the requirements of legislation, regulations and standards of safety in planning (designing) nuclear- and radiation-hazardous facilities, productions (technologies), systems and equipment, the conditions of fulfillment of the temporary special permits issued to them, as well as the adoption of corrective measures and sanctions in case of a negative evaluation.

3.2. Accompaniment of temporary special permits is performed by the district project-design, project-design and plant inspections of the regional agencies of Gosatomnadzor of Russia in accordance with the requirements of the appropriate guideline documents of Gosatomnadzor of Russia.

3.3. The terms and periodicity of performing the accompanying inspections, as a rule, are determined by the plans of the District Administration, the district project-design inspections, project-design inspections and plant inspections.

The need for conducting inspections in accompaniment to an issued temporary permit is also established according to the results of an analysis of:

- statutes of periodic studies of enterprises (comprehensive inspections);
- materials of studies of accidents and incidents occurring at the facilities under the supervision of Gosatomnadzor of Russia;
- protests and reclamations received regarding the project (design) documentation.

It may also be determined by other reasons, including by directives and decisions of the management of Gosatomnadzor of Russia.

4. RIGHTS OF AGENCIES OF GOSATOMNADZOR OF RUSSIA PERFORMING ACCOMPANIMENT (MONITORING) OF TEMPORARY SPECIAL PERMITS

An agency of Gosatomnadzor of Russia performing monitoring in accompaniment to a temporary special permit issued to an enterprise has the right:

- to perform inspection of the enterprise at any time on questions relating to its competency;
- to issue instructions to the enterprise which are mandatory for fulfillment;
- in case of systematic failure to fulfill requirements of instructions, to submit proposals to the chairman of Gosatomnadzor of Russia or to his deputy on bringing the officials of the enterprise guilty of violating the conditions of operation of the temporary special permit to responsibility in accordance with the procedure established by law;
- in case of systematic failure to fulfill conditions of validity of a temporary special permit and requirements of instructions, to submit proposals to the chairman of Gosatomnadzor of Russia or his deputy on interrupting or terminating the validity of the temporary special permit prior to expiration of its term of effectiveness.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ENTERPRISE

The enterprise must:

- fulfill the conditions of the temporary special permit issued by Gosatomnadzor of Russia;
- organize and ensure control over adherence to the conditions of operation of the permit;
- submit annually, no later than 1 February, to the agency of Gosatomnadzor of Russia issuing the permit, a report on the results of the project (design) activity of the enterprise for the past year, with an indication of the work performed and in progress, protests and reclamations received in regard to the

developed documentation, results of author's accompaniment of developments and implemented measures for improving the quality of the developments;

- in case of change in volume and thematics of the project (design) work of the enterprise in the examined sphere, forward to the appropriate agency of Gosatomnadzor of Russia an application on introduction of changes and amendments into the conditions of operation of the permit;
- ensure unhindered access to the enterprise by agencies of Gosatomnadzor of Russia conducting the accompanying monitoring of the temporary special permit;
- provide agencies of Gosatomnadzor of Russia conducting the accompanying monitoring of the temporary special permit, plans of the work of the enterprise on questions of ensuring the safety of planned (designed) facilities and their changes, as well as information on the NTS [scientific-technical council] and other conferences concerning questions of safety provision for the planned (designed) facilities, regardless of the place where they are held and their participants.

Text of order

I DO HEREBY ORDER:

That the appended "Statute on the Procedure for Issuing Temporary Special Permits for Planning (Designing) Nuclear-and Radiation-Hazardous Facilities, Productions (Technologies) (RD-03-14-94) shall be ratified.

[Signed] Chairman of the Gosatomnadzor of Russia
Yu. G. Vishnevskiy
7 April 1994
Moscow, Order No 42.

Place List Where Permission May Be Granted

94WN0370B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 5 Aug 94 pp 6-7

[Appendices 6 and 8 to the "Statute on the Procedure for Issuing Temporary Special Permits for Planning (Designing) Nuclear-and Radiation-Hazardous Facilities, Productions (Technologies)]

[Text]

APPENDIX 6. Distribution of territories by districts of Gosatomnadzor of Russia where application should be made for receipt of temporary special permits, in cases specified in subpoint 2.1.3 of the Statute

NORTH EUROPEAN DISTRICT

City of St. Petersburg

Republic of Karelia
Republic of Komi

Nenets Autonomous Okrug

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Oblasts:
Arkhangelsk
Bryansk
Vologda
Kaliningrad
Kursk
Leningrad
Murmansk
Novgorod
Pskov
Smolensk

CENTRAL DISTRICT

City of Moscow

Oblasts:
Moscow
Kaluga
Vladimir

DON DISTRICT

Republic of Dagestan
Republic of Kalmykia-Khalm Tangch
Republic of Mordovia
Republic of North Osetia
Kabardino-Balkar Republic
Karachayeva-Cherkess Republic
Ingush Republic
Chechen Republic

Krays:
Krasnodar
Stavropol

Oblasts:
Belgorod
Voronezh
Lipetsk
Orlov
Penza
Rostov
Ryazan
Tambov
Tula

VOLGA DISTRICT

Republic of Komi
Republic of Mari El
Republic of Tatarstan
Chuvash Republic

Oblasts:
Astrakhan
Volgograd
Ivanovo
Kirov
Kostroma
Nizhegorodsk
Samara
Saratov
Tversk

Ulyanovsk
Yaroslav

URALS DISTRICT

City of Yekaterinburg

Republic of Bashkortostan
Udmurt Republic

Okrugs:
Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous

Oblasts:
Kurgansk
Orenburg
Perm
Sverdlovsk
Tyumen
Chelyabinsk

SIBERIAN DISTRICT

Republic of Tuva
Republic of Buryatiya

Krays:
Krasnodar
Altay

Oblasts:
Irkutsk
Kemerovo
Novosibirsk
Omsk
Tomsk
Chita

FAR EASTERN DISTRICT

Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)

Krays:
Primorskiy
Khabarovsk

Oblasts:
Amur
Kamchatka
Magadan
Sakhalin

APPENDIX 8. Distribution of territories by districts of Gosatomnadzor of Russia where application should be made for receipt of temporary special permits, with the exception of cases specified in subpoint 2.1.3 of the Statute.

CENTRAL DISTRICT

City of Moscow
City of St. Petersburg

Republic of Karelia
Republic of Komi
Republic of Dagestan

Republic of Kalmykia-Khalm-Tangch
 Republic of Mordovia
 Republic of North Osteia
 Kabardino-Balkar Republic
 Karachayevo-Cherkass Republic
 Ingush Republic
 Chechen Republic
 Republic of Mari El
 Republic of Tatarstan
 Chuvash Republic

Nenets Autonomous Okrug

Krays:
 Krasnodar
 Stavropol

Oblasts:
 Arkhangelsk
 Astrakhan
 Belgorod
 Bryansk
 Vladimir
 Volgograd
 Voronezh
 Ivanovo
 Kaliningrad
 Kaluga
 Kirov
 Kostroma
 Kursk
 Leningrad
 Lipetsk
 Moscow
 Murmansk
 Nizhegorodsk
 Novgorod
 Orlov
 Penza
 Pskov
 Rostov
 Ryazan
 Samara
 Saratov
 Smolensk
 Tambov
 Tversk
 Tula
 Ulyanovsk
 Yaroslav

URALS DISTRICT

City of Yekatinburg

Republic of Bashkortostan
 Udmurt Republic

Okrugs:
 Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous
 Khanty-Mansi Autonomous

Oblasts:
 Kurgansk
 Orenburg
 Perm
 Sverdlovsk
 Tyumen
 Chelyabinsk

SIBERIAN DISTRICT

Republic of Buryatia
 Republic of Tuva

Krays:
 Altay
 Krasnoyarsk

Oblasts:
 Irkutsk
 Kemerovo
 Novosibirsk
 Omsk
 Tomsk
 Chita

FAR EASTERN DISTRICT

Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya)

Krays:
 Primorskiy
 Khabarovsk

Oblasts:
 Amur
 Kamchatka
 Magadan
 Sakhalin

List of Necessary Documents To Submit

94WN0370C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
 in Russian 5 Aug 94 p 7

[Appendix 7 to the "Statute on the Procedure for Issuing Temporary Special Permits for Planning (Designing) Nuclear- and Radiation-Hazardous Facilities, Productions (Technologies)," citing list of supporting documents to be submitted with application for temporary special permit]

[Text]

List of documents supporting the application for receipt of a temporary special permit

1. Copy of the document certifying state registration of the enterprise.
2. Copy of the enterprise charter, ratified in accordance with the established procedure.
3. Copy of the document confirming the rights and appointment of the manager of the enterprise.

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4. Report on work previously performed by the enterprise, characterizing its experience in performing project-design work on facilities and productions (of those listed in p. 1.3 of the Statute) or in other spheres of technology.
5. Set of documents certifying the system of quality assurance of project-design work adopted at the enterprise (Enterprise policy on quality assurance, Handbook on quality assurance, list of effective programs for quality assurance on individual facilities and equipment, etc.).
6. Report on staffing of the enterprise with qualified cadres, with indication of the level of their education, qualifications or special training (in-service training).
7. List (or lists) of standard-technical documentation on safety, to whose requirements the developed project (design) documentation must correspond.
8. Report on provision of the enterprise with standard-technical documentation, whose requirements must be taken into consideration in performing proposed project planning (design) work.
9. Report on verification of knowledge of the requirements of regulations, standards and instructions associated with provision of nuclear and radiation safety conducted at the enterprise among associates of the enterprise engaged in project-design work on facilities or productions among those specified in point 1.3 of the Statute (if such verification was not performed, directive documentation on its performance prior to fulfillment of the project-design work on these facilities or productions is submitted).
10. Report on organization of standards control services at the enterprise.
11. Report on organization of subsections performing author's supervision of the project-design developments at the facilities during construction (including manufacture of equipment and installation), operational introduction and operation (including repair) and removal from operation (if applicable).
12. Report on technical and program equipment provision of the enterprises, allowing it to properly fulfill the planned volume of project-design work and to perform the necessary computational and experimental substantiations.
13. Report on organizational development, ratification, operational introduction, and introduction of changes into the project (design) documentation at all stages of development and control of its quality, including information on the system of accounting and reporting documentation, as well as on the timely correction of documentation at facilities for which temporary permits are issued.
14. Report on the organization and implementation of control over the activity of the enterprise in performing the planning (design) work, conducted by the operating organization, owner of the facility or contractor, as well as other state supervisory agencies (the latter if applicable).
15. Report on the system of information exchange with enterprises and organizations using its project-design documentation, including methods of identification, accounting, and analysis of the shortcomings of this documentation in manufacture of equipment, construction, installation, operational introduction and operation (including repair) of facilities, as well as adoption and implementation of measures for their correction.
- 16R. Report confirming that the enterprise has created conditions to exclude the unsanctioned dissemination of nuclear technologies.
17. Lists of enterprises and seller-enterprises commissioned by the enterprise which hopes to obtain the temporary special permit (in accordance with point 2.17 of the Statute).
18. Report substantiating the commission of the enterprise for fulfillment of the project (design) work—filled out by the contractor of the project (design) work, operating organization, or owner of the facility (in accordance with points 2.3 and 2.4 of the Statute).

FRANCE

Defense Expert Sees Plutonium Trafficking as 'Real Threat'*BR0308121094 Paris LIBERATION in French
3 Aug 94 p 2*

[Interview with nuclear proliferation expert Marie-Helene Labbe by Paul Loubiere; place and date not given: "This Plutonium Trafficking Is a Real Threat"—first paragraph is LIBERATION introduction]

[Text] Marie-Helene Labbe is a professor at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris, an official at the Foundation for Defense Studies on Nuclear Issues, and a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London. She has written a book entitled "Nuclear Proliferation in 50 Questions," published by Editions Jacques Bertoin.

Loubiere: Is the seizure [in Germany] of these six grams of plutonium worrying?

Labbe: Yes. This is the first time that we have seen a leak of military-grade plutonium. We had already discovered the transportation of nonmilitary fissile material. However, it is very difficult to convert this nonmilitary plutonium for military use. So the discovery of trafficking in military-grade material is a very real threat, especially since this is most likely just the tip of the iceberg. Of course, we must not dramatize the situation either. You cannot make a bomb with six grams!

Loubiere: Is it genuinely surprising that this type of trafficking exists?

Labbe: The military staff felt that it was not very plausible that there could be trafficking in military plutonium. We believed, in good faith, that the production centers were all subject to stringent checks.

Loubiere: Where could this plutonium come from?

Labbe: That is hard to say with any certainty. It probably comes from Russia, and not from another republic of the former USSR, since reprocessing centers for fissile material are only located in Russia. The chemical signature of this plutonium has led us to assume that it comes from the Kurtshatov Institute in Moscow.

Loubiere: Do the Russians not take precautions?

Labbe: Yes, Russian-style... We do not know how much fissile material has been distributed in the former Soviet Union. Nor do we know the number of arms or the exact quantity of plutonium in storage. Estimates vary wildly. Now, faced with the collapse of responsibilities, we do not even know who is really responsible for these matters in Russia. Consequently, official statements by the Russians must be taken cautiously. Lastly, there is no real control over exports. We are in a worryingly hazy situation.

Loubiere: Apart from the raw material, the Russians are also likely to provide skilled technicians.

Labbe: Yes and no. It is correct that the Russians have very highly qualified personnel who could be tempted to leave the country. However, the government has reintroduced the laws on emigration for those people who had access to military secrets. In theory, skilled technicians are not entitled to leave before five years.

Loubiere: Who wants to buy plutonium?

Labbe: Naturally, one might think that those countries which already have the bomb do not need any. The five countries which officially have it (China, United States, France, Great Britain, and Russia—LIBERATION editor's note) have therefore been ruled out. The same holds true for India, Israel, and Pakistan, which already have everything they need. In the former USSR, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus all have nuclear weapons on their territory, but this is more the result of history than a deliberate policy, and they seem to be undertaking a process of denuclearization. So that leaves countries which have a clandestine nuclear armaments program, such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and—to a lesser extent—Algeria. Lastly, it should be recalled that Argentina and Brazil do not have the bomb, but do have the capability of making one. Japan will be in the same position by the end of the century.

Loubiere: So your suspicions are aimed more at Iran, Iraq, and North Korea?

Labbe: I did not say that! Let us just say that this possibility cannot be ruled out, just as we cannot rule out "substate" entities, such as separatist groups.

Loubiere: Why is plutonium so crucial?

Labbe: Most countries opted to develop a uranium-based bomb. Indeed, the production of plutonium from enriched uranium requires highly complex technology, which very few countries have mastered. The actual production of the bomb itself requires rather simple technology, comparatively speaking.

GERMANY

Reporting on 'Weapons-Grade' Plutonium Impounded in Weichs**Bulgarian Connection, Russian Origin Alleged***AU0308093994 Hamburg WELT AM SONNTAG
in German 31 Jul 94 p 4*

["A.L."-signed report: "You Want Plutonium? No Problem"]

[Text] Hamburg/Sofia—The supplier of the weapons-grade plutonium that was impounded in Weichs, Baden-Wuerttemberg in May 1994 probably is a businessman from Bulgaria.

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According to information obtained by WELT AM SONNTAG, the suspected smuggler is 62-year-old Mitko M., who is working in Sofia as the representative of a German industrial company. He has long had business contacts with Adolf Jaekle, in whose garage six grams of plutonium 239 were found. Jaekle is in detention pending trial in Munich-Erding.

Upon inquiry, Mitko M. confirmed that he knows Jaekle himself and some of Jaekle's business partners. In addition, in telephone conversations with WELT AM SONNTAG, the Bulgarian promised the delivery of weapons-grade plutonium 239. M. said: "We can supply you with plutonium. This is no problem. But I cannot tell you whether it will take 14 or 30 days. This depends on my business partner. Fax us a request and we will report back."

A corresponding fax with a request for delivery was confirmed by telephone by one of Mitko M.'s employees from Sofia. When asked, she insisted "that Mr. M. can supply you with the goods."

The Bulgarian also said that he "can conduct the plutonium delivery legally with appropriate documents."

The German industrial company has confirmed to WELT AM SONNTAG that Mitko M. is one of their employees. "Mr. M. currently heads our office in Sofia. We have known him since the 1960's. At that time, M. was the Bulgarian trade counselor in Frankfurt. Of course, he also had to send reports to Sofia, which had nothing to do with trade. If your claims are correct, he will immediately lose his job."

Since the plutonium was found in Weichs, the Public Prosecutor's Office in Konstanz, the land offices of criminal investigations in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria, and the Federal Intelligence Office are looking for the wire pullers and suppliers of the explosive material.

Before the political upheaval in Bulgaria, Mitko M., a former professional soldier in the Bulgarian Army, was department head of the nationalized chemical importer Khimimport. He is considered to be an influential businessman in Bulgaria and has intensive contacts with Moscow and all the former East Bloc states. Reportedly, he also did business with North Korea. According to partners from Switzerland and Germany, in the 1980's he played a central role in conducting barter deals (goods in return for goods) between Bulgaria and Iran. He organized the delivery of military equipment. Other employees of Khimimport reportedly also delivered weapons to Iran and Jordan, as people from Hamburg, who know this branch, say.

According to himself, Mitko M. has friendly relations with the director of the Bulgarian state enterprise Kintex. In Sofia, Kintex is officially called an enterprise with so-called "special technical tasks." This means that the company is dealing with weapons. Western intelligence services also link the state company with drug smuggling and with the Bulgarian intelligence service.

A former Swiss business partner of Mitko M. and the imprisoned Jaekle told WELT AM SONNTAG "that, as a result of his many years at Khimimport, M. has excellent contacts with the heads of Bulgaria's military-technological sector." The delivery of weapons-grade plutonium 239 is certainly conceivable via these contacts, "not least because in Bulgaria's crisis situation, everyone is currently fighting to survive and wants to make big money." Out of fear of reprisals, the Swiss business partner does not want to be cited by name.

The search of the German security authorities for the suppliers of the plutonium found with Jaekle is being conducted with an unusually great effort. The reason: Shortly after his arrest, Jaekle told the Public Prosecutor's Office and officials of the Bavarian Land Office of Criminal Investigations that his suppliers are able to acquire another 150 kg of the material. Exactly six of the 60 grams of black powder, which was found in Jaekle's garage, were plutonium 239. If Jaekle's claim is correct, 15 kg of pure plutonium are circulating in an uncontrolled manner—an incredible amount, because just 600 grams of plutonium 239 make it possible to build small nuclear warheads.

Lothar Koch of the European Institute for Trans-Uraniums in Karlsruhe determined "a military research institution in the former Soviet Union" as the point of origin of the find in Weichs. He mentioned the Kurchatov research center in Moscow and the arms factory in Sverdlovsk/Yekaterinenburg. Koch told WELT AM SONNTAG that the material "is so pure that a theft from a nuclear power plant or a recycling plant is out of the question."

Furthermore, Koch added, the 60 grams from Weichs include "large amounts of quicksilver, gallium, and antimony—which are elements that are needed in the research sector for the production of nuclear bombs." At the same time, this mixture serves "as camouflage for the plutonium," Koch said.

IZVESTIYA Denies Russian Origin

*MM0208135394 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 Aug 94 p 3*

[Report by Yevgeniy Bovkun: "Upon Close Examination, Russian Nuclear Mafia Turned Out To Be Bulgarian"]

[Text] Bonn—The theory of the "Russian origins" of the "plutonium-239" discovered accidentally by German police in the possession of a local currency speculator continues to be embellished with improbable details in the mass media despite being refuted by the Chancellor's Office, investigative organs, and scientific experts in the FRG (see IZVESTIYA No. 136).

The latest suggestion is that a container of plutonium was "stolen from the Kurchatov Institute." Now this theory has burst like a soap bubble. The trail from the garage in the provincial city of Baden-Wuerttemberg, where the police discovered the "plutonium-239," led to Bulgaria.

Small trader Jaekle, from whom the "container" of plutonium was confiscated and who is languishing in a Munich detention center, admitted receiving the "item" from one M. Mitko, a citizen of Bulgaria. M. Mitko himself confirmed this. He is prepared to sell nuclear materials in great quantities to anybody who wants them via the Bulgarian firm "Inteks." Staffers at the newspaper WELT AM SONNTAG telephoned Sofia and got this answer: "We can supply you with plutonium. No problem. But I cannot say how much time this will take—two weeks or a month. Everything depends upon the suppliers. Send your order by fax, and we will be in touch."

A fictitious order was sent, and in response M. Mitko's employees confirmed that he "will supply the goods." The Bulgarian then added that he can export the "plutonium-239" using completely legal documentation.

There is no reason to doubt this. In the 1960's, M. Mitko worked as a trade adviser to Bulgaria in Frankfurt-am-Main and he had reliable high-level contacts in virtually all the then socialist countries. He enjoyed friendly relations with the director of the "Inteks" firm, set up with the assistance of the Bulgarian secret services for illegal trading in weapons. It is now known that "Inteks" supplied Western dealers and terrorists in the Near and Middle East with weapons.

In recent years "Inteks" has cooperated closely with Saddam Hussayn's regime, helping him to implement a military nuclear program. The Konstanz Prosecutor's Office and the criminal police departments of Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria suspect that the "plutonium-239" discovered in Jaekle's garage was in fact destined for Iraq.

In the documents confiscated from Jaekle, the names of Iraqi clients come up again and again. One of them was successfully identified by the German secret services. He is directly involved in Saddam Hussayn's efforts to build a nuclear bomb.

Incidentally, it is the same kind of plutonium which was confiscated in November 1992 during a search of the "Sheraton" Hotel in Sofia. It, too, was destined for Iraq. All this gives grounds to talk about a "Bulgarian-Iraqi" nuclear mafia.

In Bonn political circles, it is not ruled out that the furor over the "Russian nuclear mafia" was just a decoy.

Russian Counter-Intelligence's Denial

*LD0308155294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1216 GMT 3 Aug 94*

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Olga Semenova]

[Text] Moscow, August 3 (TASS)—The "Russian origin" of the six grams of plutonium-239 confiscated from German citizen Adolf Jaekle in May was categorically denied by a spokesman for the Russian Federal Counter-intelligence Service in an interview with ITAR-TASS today.

"These allegations by Western politicians and scientists, vastly spread and commented upon by the press, are absolutely groundless and cannot be proved," the spokesman, Vladimir Tomarovsky said. "We have not recorded even a single case of any leak of nuclear materials suitable for manufacturing weapons".

"We are not saying that the problem of leaks does not exist in principle. We have informed the public about all cases of thefts of radioactive elements and the measures which were taken to block their smuggling abroad, but in none of those cases we came across weapon-grade materials", Tomarovsky said. He added that an international atomic energy agency commission which worked in Russia found no violations in this sphere. As concerns "media ballyhoos" that occur from time to time in connection with Russia's alleged inability to ensure strict control over its nuclear materials arise due to political and economic reasons, the spokesman said.

Tomarovsky confirmed that the special services of federal services proposed interaction to prevent nuclear contraband and set up a joint expert group to work out necessary approaches and instruments. Nonetheless, these proposals are not more than "a statement of intent".

Germany has refused to let Russian specialists and counterintelligence officers participate in the investigation of the "six grams affair" relating to the weapon-grade plutonium of allegedly Russian origin or give Russia part of the substance for experts to study in this country, Tomarovsky said.

"We are not saying that the problem does not and cannot exist in principle. But we are decisively against publicizing statements of this kind before an objective investigation is made. They cause fear and anxiety in many countries, which is understandable. Similar campaigns in the past ended in nothing. Reason calls for clarifying the situation and for avoiding anything that stirs up public anxiety unnecessarily. Any act to the contrary is dictated by the desire to gain an economic or political capital. We are in favour of a reasonable, balanced approach," Tomarovsky said.

Russian Atomic Energy Ministry's Denial

94WP0128A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 4 Aug 94 p 3

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer under "Black Market" rubric: "Russian Plutonium in Europe: About the Fate of Nuclear Bombs, Warheads, Red Mercury, and Osmium-187"]

[Text] It is reported that the first sample of weapons-grade Russian plutonium was finally found in the West, in Germany. In the opinion of the Germans, the plutonium was produced at "Russian nuclear weapons enterprises." True, so far they have found only 6 grams, from which one cannot manufacture an atomic bomb. But is it possible that this is just the first experimental batch delivered to the West by a Russian "atomic" mafia? In any case, it is reported that 150 kg of weapons-grade plutonium has already been brought into Western

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Europe surreptitiously, from which, if desired, one can manufacture as many as 15 20-kiloton nuclear bombs.

Weapons-grade plutonium Pu-239 is a chemically pure metal in which, however, there may be up to five to seven percent of the plutonium isotope Pu-240. Weapons-grade plutonium is produced in special uranium-graphite reactors, which differ from conventional "power" reactors by a specific level of power production that is lower by a factor of 10. The spent fuel elements are dissolved in boiling nitric acid and then the uranium and plutonium are separated chemically without being divided into isotopes.

In conventional commercial reactors of nuclear power stations, the spent fuel elements also contain plutonium. In England, France, and several other countries, they separate the "power" plutonium but it contains as much as 18 percent of the isotope Pu-240 and is essentially unsuitable for the production of reliable atomic bombs (In the USSR, they planned to establish a large new center for the processing of nuclear fuel in Krasnoyarsk-26 but they froze construction in the 1980's).

Viktor Kelkh, a veteran of atomic production, who worked about 20 years on a conveyor in the closed city of Pensa-19 (another name is Zarechnyy) where they assembled atomic bombs, told the correspondent of SEGODNYA: "I never held 'live' plutonium in my hands. They were metallic spheres covered with a safe shell." It is obvious that if at some time weapons-grade plutonium appears in the West that was actually stolen from Russian weapons plants, where they previously assembled but now mostly dismantle warheads, this will be precisely the spheres of metallic plutonium—nuclear "fuses" of contemporary bombs and warheads.

In Germany, as they report, they found some kind of powder in a soldered cylinder. But plutonium power is capable of igniting spontaneously and is extremely toxic, whereas a metallic plutonium sphere is still needed for the building of a nuclear bomb. It is rather difficult and extremely dangerous to manufacture one in the underground from a powder of plutonium oxide or salt.

Yesterday Valeriy Bogdan, special assistant to Viktor Mikhaylov (head of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy), told the correspondent of SEGODNYA that "the Ministry of Atomic Energy has not yet received any official inquiry from Germany and that in principle without the results of isotopic and chemical analysis we cannot say what kind of substance they found and where it came from." "This is strange," said Mr. Bogdan, "for why was it necessary to establish special 'hotlines' with the FBI and BND [Federal German Intelligence Service]?" This is why in Moscow they decided to refrain from official commentary, especially since the latest checks show that all accountable stocks of weapons-grade nuclear materials in Russia are where they belong.

By the way, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy is prepared to sign a contract for the delivery of the famous

osmium-187 to any solvent client for a price that justifies the separation of this rather rare isotope. And although there have been many inquiries, none of the intermediaries has yet offered any real money.

In Moscow, they cannot imagine what osmium-187 could be needed for. It appears that the only hypothesis is that a group of large transnational banks has decided to replace gold with osmium-187 as the world's primary foreign-exchange metal, which to some degree is reasonable inasmuch as it is necessary to store grams rather than thousands of tons. Still, this hypothesis does not appear to be very realistic. Nevertheless osmium-187, in contrast to "red mercury," does at least really exist.

In private talks, high-placed officials of the Ministry of Atomic Energy say that numerous leaks of false information about Russian nuclear materials and a nuclear mafia are the result of a Western plot with the purpose of putting Russian nuclear weapons and the nuclear industry under "international" (American) control. However the officials, raised in the USSR, simply underestimate the possibilities of the free Western press "to seek and to find information."

It appears that right now the main buyers of nuclear materials in the black market are not the Libyans or the Koreans but precisely Western journalists and "investigators." Without them, possibly, this market would not exist at all. In a recent issue of ATLANTIC MONTHLY, the very well-known journalist and Pulitzer Prize winner Seymour Hersh writes that over the course of eight months the no less well-known investigator and "muck-raker" in nuclear matters Bill Arkin tried to bribe a young Russian lieutenant to sell him, as a representative of Greenpeace, a nuclear warhead from a tactical "Scud" missile. Arkin wanted to exhibit the stolen warhead in the center of Berlin so that the unreliability of the guarding of Russian nuclear bombs would be obvious to all. Only the attempted coup in August 1991 prevented Arkin from successfully concluding the talks—the missiles were unexpectedly removed to Russia.

In the Russian Ministry of Defense, however, they assured the SEGODNYA correspondent that all Soviet tactical nuclear warheads were urgently removed from the former GDR back in 1989 immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Soviet military people were too fearful that even one warhead might be stolen by Western agents to keep them in the territory of a NATO member country. The missiles themselves were removed substantially later.

It seems that the "Russian nuclear mafia" is still earning its money mainly by manipulating Western journalists and independent investigators. The antiquated Soviet system of protecting nuclear materials and secrets that was established back in the days of KGB counterintelligence is still in place. It may someday be ruptured but then no one will pay any special attention. If DER SPIEGEL writes that 150 kg of weapons-grade plutonium may already be found in the markets of Western

Europe, why worry if someone steals one more bomb? Why lock the barn when the horse has already run away?

Bulgarians Investigating Businessman

*AU0808153494 Hamburg WELT AM SONNTAG
in German 7 Aug 94 p 6*

["A.L."-initialed report: "Come to Moscow—Here You Will Get Everything"]

[Text] Moscow/Sofia—The network of the plutonium mafia reaches from Germany via Bulgaria to Moscow. This is the result of investigations by WELT AM SONNTAG.

After WELT AM SONNTAG reported in its issue of 31 July that Bulgarian businessman Mitko M. is involved in the plutonium trade as an agent, the trace now leads to Moscow. According to information obtained by WELT AM SONNTAG, it is there that Bulgarian Dina N., who belongs to the circle around Adolf Jaekle—who was arrested for trading in weapons-grade plutonium—is operating an office called "Ostoshenka Ltd." near the Kremlin.

The businesswoman is considered to be an "agent for radioactive materials and weapons of any kind." According to Swiss businessmen, she has "excellent relations with high-ranking military officers in Moscow" because of her "longstanding work in the Kremlin and in the KGB." In a telephone conversation with WELT AM SONNTAG, Mrs. N. confirmed that she could mediate the purchase of radioactive materials and weapons. She said: "If you come to Moscow, I can put you in contact with Soviet generals and scientific institutes. You can negotiate with them. You can get everything, including the appropriate documents."

Answering further questions about whether she could deliver plutonium, osmium, and scandium, the Bulgarian said that "I know only last year's price of plutonium," but she could "make new inquiries how much these metals cost now." Payment must be made in U.S. dollars, delivery time is "two to four weeks."

Upon inquiry, Mrs. N. confirmed business contacts with Bulgarian Mitko M., about whom WELT AM SONNTAG reported in its previous issue. The Moscow businesswoman also confirmed contacts with other known partners of M. and Jaekle.

Meanwhile, the Military Public Prosecutor's Office in Sofia is investigating whether investigations can be initiated against Bulgarian businessman Mitko M. According to information obtained by WELT AM SONNTAG, Mitko M., a former officer of the Bulgarian Army, was involved in the deal regarding the plutonium that was found with businessman Adolf Jaekle in Wiechs, Baden-Wuerttemberg, three months ago.

M., who is currently the representative of a German industrial company in Sofia, had promised WELT AM SONNTAG by telephone to deliver plutonium. Said M.: "I can deliver plutonium to you. That is no problem."

Now M. claims not to remember his statements to WELT AM SONNTAG. The arrangement of 100 kg of scandium, which is a by-product of uranium production, for a Swiss businessman reportedly did not take place, either. However, WELT AM SONNTAG has a written offer, signed by M., to mediate the purchase at a price of \$250,000 per kilo. The material is used for space flight and armament purposes and can hardly be obtained in such amounts on the free market.

In the meantime, the German authorities' investigations of the suppliers and customers of Jaekle's bomb material are not making progress. This week, Jaekle, who is in detention pending trial, told Konstanz Public Prosecutor Goetz Walter via his lawyer Gerhard Baetz that in order to "be able to squeal," he has to be permitted to look at his business documents, which have been impounded by the public prosecutor. This is the only way in which he can name the stringpullers behind the plutonium deal and further depots of enriched uranium. Then he can also provide details about "another plutonium deal, which is planned soon." However, Public Prosecutor Walter does not want to agree to this offer. He wrote "Not usual in a proceeding" in the answer to Jaekle's defense lawyer, and he rejected the unusual request.

However, lawyer Baetz, does not intend to accept "this rejection" and is now trying to "exert pressure on the public prosecutor in Konstanz via the Chancellor's Office. After all, national security is involved." Even though Eduard Ackermann in the Chancellor's Office shares this view, he has meanwhile passed on the matter to the Federal Office of Criminal Investigations. Jaekle's documents are still with the public prosecutor.

The documents also mention Mitko M. in Sofia and the nationalized arms trading company Kintex, whose boss is a friend of M.'s, as M. himself claims. From Sofia, one hears that the arms smuggling by Kintex to Iran and Iraq "is an open secret in Bulgaria." The company headquarters itself told WELT AM SONNTAG this week that "no concrete relations with Iraq are currently being cultivated." The Kintex management refused to comment on business with Iran and North Korea.

In the meantime, WELT AM SONNTAG has learned that a certain Viktor E. has offered the same lead container with the plutonium sample that was found with Jaekle to an employee of Rheinmetall AG for sale. The employee of the Duesseldorf company refused, however, and reported the incident to the Public Prosecutor's Office in Konstanz. The network of smugglers between Moscow, Sofia, and Germany seems to be denser than was previously assumed.

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New Seizure of Weapons-Grade Nuclear Material Reported

'Uranium 235' Smuggling Near Munich

*LD1108101294 Berlin DDP/ADN in German
0922 GMT 11 Aug 94*

[Excerpt] Munich/Landshut (DDP/ADN)—Another case of smuggling in weapons-grade nuclear material has been uncovered in Landshut [north-east of Munich]. A special investigation squad in Bavaria seized 0.8 grams of uranium 235 with an 87.8 percent degree of enrichment. The Bavarian CID announced in Munich today that the operation took place in mid-June. A 48-year-old property developer who was arrested in her Landshut home on Monday is seen as the leader of the gang dealing in nuclear material. The material seized most probably originated from the former Soviet Union. There was no danger of radiation to the public. [passage omitted]

'Plutonium 239' Seized at Munich Airport

*LD1308164494 Berlin DDP/ADN in German
1556 GMT 13 Aug 94*

[Excerpt] Munich (DDP/ADN)—The radioactive material seized at Munich airport last Wednesday [10 August] consisted of 100 to 300 grams of plutonium 239. This announcement by the Bavarian CID [Criminal Investigation Division] and the State Prosecutor's Office at Munich Regional Court tonight contradicts reports that mentioned 500 grams of this highly radioactive material. The material was kept in a steel container which in turn was encased in lead. The examination of the smuggled material is not yet complete and will continue for a few more days.

According to the Bavarian CID and the State Prosecutor's Office, the container with the plutonium was kept inside a suitcase. At no time was there any danger to the flight crew, ground staff, or passengers through contact with this suitcase. No increased radiation from the suitcase was noted, the Munich authorities stressed. [passage omitted]

Russians Deny Plutonium Came From Russia

*AU1308174594 Mainz ZDF Television Network
in German 1700 GMT 13 Aug 94*

[Text] Russia has rejected any responsibility in connection with the new case of smuggled nuclear material. The spokesman of the Ministry for Nuclear Energy, (Kaurov), told ZDF that no evidence whatsoever has been furnished that the plutonium comes from Russia. The smuggling of nuclear material is a German problem. Several such cases have occurred in Germany recently, he pointed out.

50 Grams Were of 'High Purity'

*LD1308091494 Berlin DDP/ADN in German
0601 GMT 13 Aug 94*

[Excerpts] Hamburg/Munich (DDP/ADN)—The smuggle of nuclear weapons-grade material in Germany

has evidently taken on new proportions. The news magazines DER SPIEGEL and FOCUS both report today that the largest quantity of highly enriched nuclear material so far was seized in Munich on Wednesday. According to DER SPIEGEL the material consists of at least 50 grams of high-purity plutonium 239, while FOCUS and Bayerischer Rundfunk [Bavarian Radio] refer to 500 grams, which had been on board a Lufthansa flight from Moscow. A spokeswoman for the Bavarian Regional Office of Criminal Investigations (LKA) has meanwhile confirmed the find but has not yet given any details.

The material, which was examined in a lightning analysis by the European Institute for Transuraniums in Karlsruhe, was found in luggage belonging to three Spaniards, according to DER SPIEGEL. The three men had not yet made any "useful statements" on who masterminded the smuggling. [passage omitted]

This is already the third case involving the smuggling of nuclear weapons-grade material in Germany within a short period of time. Samples of highly-enriched plutonium and uranium 235 were previously found in Tengen in Constance rural area and in Landshut, Lower Bavaria. [passage omitted]

Amount Seized Totaled 560 Grams

*LD1508150994 Berlin DDP/ADN in German
1327 GMT 15 Aug 94*

[Text] Munich (DDP/ADN)—In Munich today the Bavarian authorities released details about the confiscation of radioactive material at Munich airport last Wednesday [10 Aug]. According to the president of the Bavarian Criminal Investigations Office, Hermann Ziegenaus, a total of 560 grams of radioactive material was confiscated. It was transported in a hard-top case on a Lufthansa aircraft from Moscow to Munich. According to initial tests at the institute for transuranic elements in Karlsruhe, 300-350 grams are weapons-grade plutonium 239 with an enrichment level of 87 percent.

The Bavarian Interior Minister Guenther Beckstein (CSU) stressed that there was "not the slightest doubt" that the material came from the states of the former Soviet Union. However, there was no evidence that the deputy Russian minister of atomic energy also on the Lufthansa flight had anything to do with the plutonium smuggling. The three arrested smugglers, a Colombian and two Spaniards, said that they had known that the politician was on the flight. They had hoped that checks would be less stringent.

According to Beckstein, the security authorities had received the decisive clue about the plutonium business deal from the Federal Intelligence Service. A undercover investigator had then passed himself off as a prospective buyer. On 25 July a first conversation had taken place between the "buyer" and the culprits in a Munich hotel during which a sample was handed over. This consisted

of 0.24 grams of plutonium 239 and 200 grams of lithium 6. This non-radioactive material is a basic material in making neutron bombs.

The culprits had promised to supply four kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium and demanded \$250 million for it.

Bundestag Official Comments

LD1508123294 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 0515 GMT 15 Aug 94

[Telephone interview with Hans Stercken, chairman of the Bundestag's foreign affairs committee, by correspondent Dietmar Timm—live]

[Text] [Timm] The third serious case of nuclear smuggling—the smuggling of weapons-grade nuclear material—was discovered in Munich last week. It was made public on Saturday. It is not yet clear, but about 100-300 grams of plutonium 239 was found at Munich airport, having been transported by plane from Moscow to Munich. Bavarian CID [Criminal Investigation Department] officers have thus foiled an attempt to smuggle the largest amount of weapons-grade nuclear material from Russia to Germany to date. Chancellor Helmut Kohl now intends to address the matter personally and is, first of all, sending his representative, Chancellery Minister Schmidbauer, to Moscow to clear up the background to this case.

Correspondent Timm: Hans Stercken, chairman of the Bundestag's foreign affairs committee, is on the line. Good morning, Mr. Stercken.

Stercken: Good morning, Mr. Timm.

Correspondent Timm: Is this a problem that can be brought under control? Or, if we consider the frequency of cases in recent months, is it actually not a foreign policy issue because it involves criminal wheeling and dealing?

Stercken: Yes, but I would advise us from the outset not to view what are indeed worrying incidents too narrowly. Anyone who puts this problem into context can see that this is taking place against the background of an enormous arms trade throughout the world. The former Soviet Union was a powerful armory. In the present desperate situation—in Russia, in particular—the problem cannot be brought under control. That means that weapons are being constantly smuggled as part of the international arms trade. This is a worldwide problem.

The United Nations has been made sufficiently aware of this state of affairs. I am saying this because I fear that an isolated way of looking at things, directed solely at Germany, allows us to forget that exports of nuclear material are also taking place to many other countries, countries that are not so sensitive about these matters. Of course, I am not giving away secrets when I say that the European

Community is, with its open borders, a problem that these—and I will be blunt—criminals could exploit very quickly by taking the material to other countries. They could spend some time in Germany if they can find customers here, and then they can enter other European countries by crossing their open borders by bike. At the international level, the United Nations is called upon to act, as is the European Community. This must be recognized as a joint problem. Everyone is affected by this. Perhaps some countries are affected more than others, where high technology in this field could be of interest. However, other countries—such as the United States, where large parts of a reprocessing plant were recently discovered at a scrap dealer's—are all called upon to take action. Germany should set a good example in accordance with the chancellor's observations.

Correspondent Timm: Well, yes, but Germany now appears to be as it were the center for this smuggling, or the way leads via Germany. Mr. Stercken, is the problem not being played down somewhat by referring to the international arms trade? After all, smuggling with weapons-grade material is quite a different matter.

Stercken: Alright, but it is the same phenomenon basically, and my intention was to place it in an overall context that runs across frontiers wholesale. The present conflicts and wars in the world, be it in Africa, be it in Afghanistan, are all being serviced with arms from this direction. People are dying there, people who tomorrow are in jeopardy because of such machinations. You are quite right. However, to divorce this question from further exports of arms and sensitive material of this kind, this is a task that must be seen on an international scale. Therefore, I presented it as such.

Correspondent Timm: To what extent is this going to effect German-Russian relations? Are you under the impression that Moscow itself is taking this problem sufficiently seriously?

Stercken: Well, I am unable to confirm at present whether it is being taken seriously or not. I do know, however, that the government's means of control are quite insufficient in order to gain control over such dreadful actions. Here, help for the Russians—and not only for the Russians, by the way, because there are also other states of the former Soviet Union where the possibility of such exports exists—I believe we can help here. The point is not to sit in judgment but to say how can we help the Russians to stop such operations immediately, which are worrying for them and are extremely dangerous. I cannot imagine that any Russian politician would seriously be interested in seeing other parts of Europe messing around with such things.

Correspondent Timm: How far can we help? It is not just necessary to tighten up controls. The reasons for this smuggling of nuclear material must also be examined. It is often speculated that unemployed people who used to

work at nuclear plants are involved in the trade. We have to tackle the reasons behind it.

Stercken: Allright, but they are not storing these things at home in the fridge. They have access to institutes in which such material is still stored. Effective control on the part of the state is obviously no longer in place. Therefore, we have to ask how all these sensitive locations can be monitored and how we can help the Russians with experts who would ensure that things of this kind do not continue. I see no alternative here. We cannot try to put a stop to these things with idealistic proposals, but we have to go to the scene of the incident and ask the Russians whether they are interested in our help. Perhaps it would even be possible to achieve this at European level, so that not only German interest in this matter is clear. Others have monitored this process, but not with the same sensitivity that we have. Who can rule out that things of this kind have not taken place in other European countries in which basic knowledge exists of these areas? We have been very vigilant, fortunately, but I would advise that this German vigilance be turned into vigilance at European level. There are enough grounds for recommending this.

Correspondent Timm: However, any political initiative will certainly not influence those involved in organized crime who are responsible. We can speculate about what the nuclear material could have been intended for. Do you see this as a threat to world peace in the medium to long term?

Stercken: There can be no doubt about that, and the politicians who have spoken on behalf of the government have made this clear enough. However, this indignation cannot be confined to Germany. I have already alluded to the fact others have obviously not dealt with this matter very carefully. Therefore, I would like to add that we should not only ask what we Germans can do, but we must also consider how we can plug all the loopholes in our surroundings, because we are living in a Europe with freedom of movement. If we plug some of the loopholes, we must ensure that they cannot export to other countries without difficulties and then send things there and even possibly to Germany. German vigilance....[pauses] Yes, indeed, it can be clearly seen today that everyone is aware of the problem, but we must not forget that we live in a Europe with freedom of movement. We have to present this on a European basis immediately. Ultimately, this is part of a worldwide trade in warfare agents of all kinds, including chemical weapons. It is really up to the United Nations now to make an attempt to stop the enormous international arms trade that is leading us to the misery that the German helpers who flew off yesterday have to deal with in other countries as the result of arms imports of this kind.

Minister Kinkel Views Issue

LD1508124894 Berlin DDP/ADN in German
1231 GMT 15 Aug 94

[Text] Bonn (DDP/ADN)—Federal Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel believes that the illegal trade involving

nuclear material poses a "considerable danger to international security." Kinkel said in Bonn today concerning the latest three cases of nuclear smuggling uncovered in Germany that he would like to see an international plutonium control body, to which all the relevant states—including Russia—should be answerable.

Kinkel announced that he would discuss the latest cases with his colleagues from the successor states of the Soviet Union and also raise the subject with the EU states.

Article Profiles Suspected Arms Dealer

AU0408102894 Hamburg STERN in German
4 Aug 94 pp 102-104

[Report by Rudolf Lambrecht: "Mysteries Surrounding 'Sugar Factory'"]

[Text] She was there when Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel went to Saudi Arabia and Jordan in November 1993. She visited international arms dealer Adnan Kashoggi in his villa in Marbella, Spain. She is there when Bruno Schubert, Chile's consul for Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate, and the Saarland invites Hans-Dietrich Genscher and other celebrities from politics and industry to his villa in Frankfurt or his country estate in Berchtesgaden.

"I meet ministers and generals ...and I help them make profitable business. It does not make any difference who tears the world to pieces. I could not change it anyhow," Jutta Simon says about her profession. She is an international arms dealer.

Now the justice authorities have become aware of the woman who was born in Wiesbaden and lives in Munich and Paris. The Munich Public Prosecutor has initiated investigations against Jutta Simon on suspicions of violating Section 4a of the Military Weapons Control Act: This act prohibits mediating unapproved business deals, threatening prison sentences of up to five years.

A friend of the 52-year old blonde, Professor Karl Friedrich Triebold, head of the Atlas Elektronik company, is also under investigation. The renowned Bremen company specializes in high frequency technology, electronic location, control, and simulation equipment for navy and army use.

Jutta Simon and her friend Karl Friedrich Triebold are suspected of having illicitly sold warships, electronics for speedboats, ammunition for ships' cannons, and jet fighter machine guns to South America and the Far East. Investigators are still puzzled about a deal concluded via Brazil and involving a "sugar factory" that was to go to Iran. Experts do not rule out that this was a camouflage name for a chemical weapons plant.

A second Rabita case? The Imhausen chemical company in Lahr in 1989 supplied a poison gas factory to Libya, camouflaged as a "pharmaceutical factory" for Hong Kong. Investigators are checking whether the mysterious

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"sugar factory" is identical with the alleged pesticide factory in Iran's Ghaswin, in whose planning the Frankfurt-based company Lurgi played a major role.

Western intelligence services consider the project suitable for poison gas production. The project has been dormant since the Imhausen affair, because, under political pressure, Lurgi has withdrawn from it. Iran urges completion and maintains that Klaus Kinkel has promised a "positive examination," which is, of course, fiercely denied by his spokesman.

Atlas chief Triebold, who is being advised by former Social Democratic Party (SPD) defense expert Peter Wuertz, refused to let STERN have any comment on the allegations. Jutta Simon, who is currently in Paris, would not give any explanation either. She does not want to be bothered, said her Hamburg lawyer Jan de Haan, member of SPD politician Gerd Weiland's law firm.

Jutta Simon's rise to the world of arms dealers came about via the catwalk. She had initially tried her hand at modelling, then at acting—without success. But on her visits to the parties of the in-crowd in Berlin, Frankfurt, and Munich she established profitable contacts.

One man whom she owes a great deal is Luxembourg's consul in Munich, Dr. Hanns Maier. At his garden parties she played hostess for celebrities from industry, science, and politics. It was with him that she appeared at the Bayreuth Wagner Festival.

Jutta Simon, who very soon found her way into the jet set at St. Moritz, in 1989 moved her headquarters from Munich to the posh Neuilly suburb of Paris. Amongst other things, she arranged a 120-million [marks] deal involving long range torpedoes for Syria from there.

Jutta Simon sold her apartment in Munich in 1989. During her trips to Munich she now uses the rented apartment of her friend Gabriella Schaeffling, who is in charge of the society column in the newspaper BILD. Simon usually comes in her big Mercedes with a striking number plate. It reads "FL"—Principality of Liechtenstein.

It is in this tax haven that the "Textor" company has its headquarters (with a subsidiary in Panama). The head of the letter-box company founded in 1985 is Jutta Simon. According to the companies' register, the firm's purpose is "arranging business deals..., technology transfer, as well as the purchase, administration, and sale of assets of all kinds...."

Jutta Simon is not only dealing in arms. She also sells apartments, arranges deals on electronics systems for the safety of nuclear power plants, and occasionally she also sells shoes worth millions of marks to the former East Bloc. Textor is represented by the "Praesidial-Anstalt" [presidential organization] in Vaduz. The person authorized to sign for the company is Dr. Peter Ritter of the "Kyberna Verwaltungs-Aktiengesellschaft" [administration corporation].

These two trust companies already aroused suspicion in connection with other dubious deals: The "Praesidial-Anstalt" helped the Lahr poison gas producer Dr. Juergen Hippenstiel-Imhausen cover up the profit derived from the Rabita deal. "Kyberna" was involved in camouflaging Liechtenstein companies owned by SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] foreign currency procurer and Stasi general Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski.

Jutta Simon had been active in Schalck's surroundings even before the fall of the communist regime. On 23 September 1988 she went to East Berlin to meet with GDR [German Democratic Republic] functionaries in the International Trade Center. Ms. Simon wanted to sell U.S.-made shoes to the GDR. At the meeting, the lady all of a sudden changed the topic. She asked her East Berlin interlocutor to establish contacts with the company "Imes," a report by Section XVIII of the Ministry for State Security says. "Imes" was responsible for the GDR's international arms deals.

The businesswoman from the West "explained ... that her own company was in the arms business, concentrating on Latin American and Arab countries (Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Jordan)," the Stasi noted. Ms. Simon has extensive contacts with leading personalities in these countries and has just returned from Jordan, "where she visited the royal household and discussed armament updates for the Jordanian police force with the police chief." In this connection, automatic weapons of the type offered by the GDR were discussed.

In Munich, Jutta Simon became a member of the Christian Social Union [CSU] Industrial Advisory Committee, where all major Bavarian industrialists are represented. Very soon she won the confidence of Deputy Chairman Alfred Bayer, a versatile man who was also president of the "Hanns-Seidel Foundation", which is close to the CSU, and head of the Isar-Amper Works, a major Bavarian energy concern. Bayer helped Jutta Simon sell a machine simulating accidents in nuclear power plants, brand name "Atlas Electronic."

Jutta Simon also became a member of the German Society for Military Defense Technology (DWT) in Bonn. In this society Bundeswehr officers, officers of the Defense Ministry, and members of the Federal Government meet with representatives of the arms industry to discuss secret developments in arms technology.

Doors were also opened for Jutta Simon at the Vulkan shipyard in Bremen, at Siemens in Munich, and Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm in Ottobrunn. At the Atlas Elektronik company in Bremen she even met her future partner: Professor Triebold. The two Mozart enthusiasts visited the Salzburg Festival, went on holiday together. Jutta Simon later told a friend that she will marry Triebold.

But what the two did not know: The Munich Public Prosecutor had long become aware of them and had their

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telephone conversations tapped, in which, among other things, suggestions on how to circumvent the strict arms export regulations were discussed. In May, the justice authorities searched for evidence in apartments, offices, basements, garages, and cars in 17 different places all over Germany.

The investigations had been triggered by an anonymous tip-off. A friend of Simon's: "The two had considered everything, except for the revenge of a jealous woman."

NETHERLANDS

Company Suspected of Selling Strategic Products To Libya

BR1108142894 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT
in Dutch 10 Aug 94 p 7

[Jos Slats report: "Eurabic Again Suspected of Trading With Libya"]

[Text] The Public Prosecutor's Office in Haarlem has begun a legal preliminary investigation into Eurabic International BV in Hoofddorp. The company is suspected of involvement in the delivery of strategic products to Libya in 1992 and 1993. The Hoofddorp-based firm already attracted attention to itself before due to controversial sales to Libya. A legal investigation against the company is also under way in the United States.

According to the Economic Control Service (ECD), Eurabic International BV, which is owned by a Libyan, has violated the decree on financing transactions of strategic goods. This was confirmed Tuesday [9 August] by the Public Prosecutor's Office.

The justice officer ordered a legal investigation, and the examining magistrate has begun the first hearings. The company denies the accusations.

According to the ECD, Eurabic ordered parts in Japan for optical instrument tables. This was allegedly done at that behest of the rocket site of the Libyan Armed Forces. The parts were not delivered via the Netherlands, but through other channels.

Eurabic is liable to punishment because the financing of foreign arms transactions without a license from The Hague is prohibited. The company failed to ask for permission, perhaps because the required license would have been rejected given the destination of the goods.

Eurabic also ran into trouble in 1991 for delivering parts for measuring instruments to Libya. The goods, which were loaded into an airplane at Schiphol airport, were confiscated by the German authorities.

At that time, the Netherlands could still not do anything to counter the delivery because the parts did not figure on the list. In the meantime, they have come under the sway of the export provisions. This is why Eurabic could not send its most recent shipment via the Netherlands.

In the United States, Eurabic International is linked to the delivery of computer software to Libya in contravention of the economic embargo against the al-Qadhdhafi government. In that case too the company took a circuitous route. In order to conceal the actual purchaser of the software, Eurabic used a middleman, a firm of lawyers located on Curacao. Late last year, the U.S. Justice Department performed a search in Hoofddorp in connection with this case. Some administrative material was seized.

Founded six years ago by Bashir Rhuma, former Libyan Arab Airlines Manager in the Netherlands, Eurabic International has also sold airplane parts and chemicals to Libya in the past. DE VOLKSKRANT has documents showing that the company was leading suppliers up the garden path.

A German chemical company, which was asked to make an offer, was told that the order was destined for Algeria, while other documents make it clear that Eurabic was operating at the behest of the authorities in Tripoli. Some of the chemicals asked for included precursors used in the production of chemical weapons.

Last year, the Internal Security Service (BVD) dubbed Eurabic a cover company for the Libyan authorities, saying that it plays a "prominent role" in military purchases abroad. According to the BVD, the company is completely directed from Tripoli.

IAEA 'Alarmed' Over Nuclear Smuggling Incidents

AU1508121594 Paris AFP in English
1153 GMT 15 Aug 94

[Article by Sandra Lacut]

[Text] Vienna, Aug 15 (AFP)—The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said here Monday [15 August] it was "alarmed" about the increasingly high quality of radioactive materials being smuggled out of eastern Europe following a spate of seizures of radioactive substances.

The statement came after Russia's atomic energy ministry said Monday that, despite burgeoning security fears, it had no knowledge of any thefts from its installations of radioactive substances that could be used to make atomic bombs.

IAEA spokesman David Kyd said that "seized radioactive substances, notably last week in Bavaria, are of very high quality, which is alarming, even though their quantity is not enough to make atomic bombs."

About eight kilograms (18 pounds) of plutonium are needed for the manufacture of an atomic bomb but only 100 grams (3.5 ounces) of plutonium 239 were seized Wednesday at Munich airport in luggage on a Lufthansa flight from Moscow.

"Only a few months ago substances seized were of poor quality," Kyd said. But the seizures of highly enriched plutonium and uranium 235 earlier this month in the southern German city of Augsburg were "alarming as just about anybody appears to have access to these substances," he added.

Kyd said seizures of radioactive material had gone up considerably since trafficking of such substances was uncovered in late 1991 as the Soviet Union was collapsing.

"Traffickers are motivated by purely commercial reasons," according to the spokesman as the economies in the former Soviet republics slumped and Moscow's control of its nuclear arsenal eased dramatically.

Researchers, scientists, engineers and even ordinary citizens were all prepared to sell the highly poisonous substances for hard currencies, with traffickers often unaware of what they were carrying.

Kyd recalled the tragic death by irradiation of a Polish man who had carried highly radioactive cesium 137 strapped to his body.

Trafficking was not limited to Russia but involved peddlers from all former Soviet republics and their former east European allies, he said.

Centrally located Germany with its hard currency had become highly attractive for traffickers who often ferry their merchandise through Poland, Kyd added.

Radioactive substances have also been seized in Austria, Italy and Switzerland over the past three years, with seizures often made possible through closer cooperation between Russian investigators and western police including Interpol and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Commenting on the latest hauls in southern Germany, Russian atomic ministry spokesman Georgi Kaurov told AFP that Russian nuclear sites had been checked but no loss of materials such as plutonium 239 or uranium 235 had been reported.

The verification was carried out at the request of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, said Kaurov.

The only theft was of non-enriched uranium, used as fuel for nuclear reactors, but with no military use, the spokesman said.

Kaurov said there is no evidence of Russian nuclear negligence. He called such accusations "perhaps a campaign of provocation."

Kohl had written to President Boris Yeltsin to "ask him to reinforce security" in Russian nuclear installations.

Meanwhile, a top aide to Kohl said Monday he would go to Russia soon to find ways of combatting smuggling of radioactive materials.

Bernd Schmidbauer, the chief of staff of the German chancellery, told the daily newspaper HAMBURGER ABENDBLATT that Bonn would share its information about the traffic and on the substances recently seized in Germany. He said Russia was cooperating with his efforts.

Schmidbauer said Germany would also if necessary work with Ukraine and Kazakhstan, two other ex-Soviet republics with nuclear capabilities.

TV Report on Transfer of German Nuclear Technology to Pakistan

["Report" Television Magazine Program, Hamburg ARD
Television Network in German 1910 GMT 13 Jun 94]

[Transcript of TV program. Corresponds to Video Selection List ARD 94-003]

[Text]

Moderator Jochen Waldmann: In the Far East, a trouble spot has unexpectedly acquired new topicality because North Korea, contrary to all agreements, largely rejects controls on its nuclear production. It is feared that work on atomic weapons is being zealously pursued there, and exactly that is also happening elsewhere. We Germans have demonstrated an unfortunate continuity in the delivery of know-how and the necessary materials. Through the very recent past, German firms have played a role in supplying Third World countries in this regard.

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Even by circumventing valid laws. One of these countries is Pakistan, which is in a continuous quarrel with India. And German supplies for the production of nuclear weapons were also sent there. A contribution from Stefan Rocker and Thomas Scheuer.

Unidentified Reporter: Pakistan's flag in the Bonn wind. The Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, on a state visit over six weeks ago. She wants, above all, to convince representatives of commerce and industry to get more involved economically in the emergent Asian country. Although high military officials accompany her, there is no talk, at least officially, of arms deals. That has been taken care of by others for a long time.

Leonberg, near Stuttgart. Inconspicuous between apartment buildings stand the offices of the small company called Team Industries. But explosive deals [Bombengeschäfte] are made here, possibly in the truest sense of the word.

Autumn 1993. Stuttgart airport. A pending cargo shipment by the Swabian firm comes to the attention of the Customs Service. A shipment which is supposed to go to Pakistan via a circuitous route. Team Industries stated in the export documents that the packages contained 1,000 ball-point pen housings. But when the cargo is stopped and opened, it turns out not to be the harmless goods, but hot stuff [Brisantes]. It consists of precision parts for gas ultra-centrifuges, with which highly-enriched—that is, weapons grade uranium can be produced in Pakistan. A customs expert, who for security reasons did not want to be filmed, explains the planned use.

Customs Expert: They are important parts for the functioning of the principle of the centrifuge. With the help of these hooks, the depleted and enriched uranium 235 is withdrawn from the centrifuge.

Reporter: This means that, without these parts, this entire technology would not even function at all.

Customs Expert: No. The components are specially built for the centrifuge and have that exclusive purpose.

Reporter: Team Industries' business manager, who is at large only because of a bail payment in the millions, denies any illegal nuclear deals. However, this is not the first time that the firm's name has come up in connection with shady nuclear deals. As early as 1979, a Bonn Economics Ministry report cast suspicions that Team Industries had played a role in arming Pakistan with nuclear weapons.

Pakistan, classic area of tension. Entangled in continuous conflicts with its neighbor, India. Despite the poverty of the population, the Islamic regime pumps billions into a gigantic atomic weapons program. At the heart of this program are two facilities near the capital city, Islamabad. Allegedly, they have only civilian purposes. But photographs underline their military character. Anti-aircraft guns, here in the foreground, and

radar dishes secure the complex. Inside, in thousands of gas ultra-centrifuges like these, uranium is transformed into weapons-grade fissile material in a highly complicated process. Pakistan's nuclear program, mostly made in Germany [last three words in English].

For example. In 1985, the Freiburg businessman Albrecht Medula [name as heard] was sentenced to six months' probation for the delivery of a complete uranium processing facility. In the '70's and '80's, Duesseldorf's Alfred Hempel group of companies illegally sold [verschob] nuclear chemicals to Pakistan by the ton—no conviction. In '83 and '84, the Hessian merchant Aufmeyer [name as heard] smuggled nuclear technological facilities into the Asian threshold country—one year imprisonment. Even the state nuclear research center in Karlsruhe supported Pakistan's nuclear technicians with material and know-how in the '80s, with no judicial consequences. The fact that this assistance did not have to do with a civilian project, as consistently claimed by Pakistan, was already shown at that time by this brochure: next to the head of the nuclear program, an atomic mushroom cloud.

Harald Mueller, Hessian Foundation for Peace and Conflict Research: Without German supplies, there would be no Pakistani nuclear program. One can absolutely say it that concisely. German companies have in the past filled important gaps in Pakistan's procurement effort. Such a nuclear program is a complex sequence of facilities, and some facilities would not have come into being without German help. So one can say that the Pakistani bomb has grown on the solid ground of German industrial assistance.

Reporter: A tradition that continues into the most recent time. Erlangen, on the periphery of the city. In the basement of this house, the engineering office of Heinz Mebus [name as heard]. For years, an important nerve center in the Pakistani procurement network. According to investigators, Heinz Mebus delivered, until his death over one and one-half years ago, everything that was good and expensive. According to Bonn Government documents, the British secret service already described Mebus in 1981 as, quote, "one of the most important procurement agents." But Heinz Mebus remained unmolested for a long time. A possible reason: according to statements by an insider, he was a regular source of information for the Federal Intelligence Service. Striking, in any case: only his successor company—in which his son-in-law eventually continued to conduct the Pakistani deals—came under the scrutiny of the Public Prosecutor's Office. According to confiscated documents which fill over 280 binders, components for the nuclear program were delivered even in this most recent, topical case.

Ewald Behrschmidt, Nuremberg Public Prosecutor's Office: It concerns the export of ring magnets [Ringmagneten], in fact a very special kind of ring magnets which, you see, could be used for nuclear-technological purposes.

Reporter: A deal for millions. But at the Customs Service Criminal Investigation Department in Cologne, experts have noticed that, in recent years, Pakistan has increasingly tried to acquire rocket technology in addition to nuclear technology. Rockets which are capable of carrying atomic weapons.

Karl-Heinz Mattias, head of the Customs Service Criminal Investigation Department in Cologne: I believe there is a connection, because weapons, after all, also have to be transported to a place, and for that it is necessary, in this area, for one to have launcher systems—long-range launcher systems. That is why there is a close connection between these programs. In my estimation, all threshold countries—which are on the verge of producing atomic weapons—are therefore trying at the same time to acquire and use appropriate launcher systems.

Reporter: Presumably one of the most important accomplices: once again, the Team Industries company in Leonberg. Investigators are now looking into deliveries with an overall value of about DM30 million. This concerns a broad spectrum of the most modern weapons technologies. On the Pakistanis' list of orders: In the area of nuclear technology: precision parts for the processing of uranium. For the development and production of long-range rockets: navigation systems; acceleration meters; and test fuels for rockets. Delivery of items in the area of conventional weapons technology was also supposed to be made.

A report by the Stuttgart Public Prosecutor's Office shows what great criminal energy was to be applied to this purpose and to concealing illegal exports. Conversations of responsible persons in the company were monitored in which they, quote, "instructed business partners to destroy certain documents, like orders, or had orders for sensitive goods placed via the private address of a supplier."

According to investigators, the procurement activities were directed from the Pakistani Embassy in Bonn. According to information available to "Report," two high-ranking diplomats have thus far had to leave the Federal Republic after discreet pressure by the Bonn Foreign Office. It remains uncertain whether the German-Pakistani procurement ring has thus been smashed.

State visit. Undisturbed by such minor diplomatic troubles, Prime Minister Bhutto invokes the traditionally close economic cooperation between the two countries.

Germany To Prevent Nuclear Technology Sales to Pakistan

BK0308133694 Delhi All India Radio Network in English 0830 GMT 3 Aug 94

[Text] Germany has assured India that it would prevent its private firms from clandestinely supplying nuclear technology to Pakistan.

Official sources in New Delhi today said that the German foreign minister, Dr. Klaus Kinkel, told Indian leaders during his recent visit that Bonn strongly disapproved the sale of such materials to Pakistan for its nuclear program by some German firms early this year. Dr. Kinkel informed that strong action has been taken against the firms involved in the deal. Following this, two Pakistan diplomats were also expelled from Germany. The sources said there was no request from Germany during Dr. Kinkel's visit asking India to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Japanese Stance on Kurils Linked to Nuclear Ambitions

94WP0117A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian 15 Jul 94 pp 1, 7

[Article by Yuriy Buyanov: "The Kurils—Nuclear Test Range?"]

[Text] According to experts of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, Japan could even now make a primitive, "dirty" uranium bomb. It would be delivered to target by the two-stage Japanese H-2 missile. In addition, it is at the present time planned to build at the Tokai Village nuclear center a facility for reprocessing spent radioactive fuel into highly pure plutonium perfectly suitable for use for military purposes.

With the disintegration of the USSR the problem of the islands of the Kuril Chain has become particularly urgent. Russian historians and legal experts have shown that the islands rightly belong to Russia—the successor of the Soviet Union—the Japanese have attempted and continue thus far to attempt to prove the opposite.

Leaving aside the legal debate on this difficult matter, in whose connection mountains of paper have been written and a multitude of speeches made, it may be affirmed today that a solution of the problem has not advanced one step, although Russia has offered a number of compromise versions. They could suit both parties without detriment to the interests of either the Russians or the Japanese.

What interests are we talking about? It is known that gold, silver, complex ores, zinc, copper, and other minerals are mined on the four Kuril Islands. A sulfur deposit has been prepared for development on the island of Iturup. Hundreds of thousands of tonnes of whiting, pilchard, and other commercial fish are caught annually in proximity to the disputed shores. The game is worth the candle, it would seem?

But, it transpires, Japan could need the so-called "Northern Territories" not only by virtue of their economic attractiveness. An article published recently in an IAEA bulletin on an international conference in Seoul devoted to the nuclear potential of the Southeast Asian countries says, in particular, that Japan possesses an inordinate quantity of weapons-grade plutonium and enriched uranium. Noting Tokyo's growing military and economic

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might, a number of the conferees pointed to this country's attempts to become a full member of the UN Security Council and settle the territorial claims against Russia from new positions for the subsequent deployment on the Kuril Islands of nuclear facilities, including a test range.

This seemingly fantastic supposition could be brushed aside were it not for the recent revelation of the Japanese prime minister to the effect that Tokyo "has the potential to create nuclear weapons, but is not realizing it by virtue of its international commitments," namely, the three nonnuclear principles: "not to possess, not to manufacture, and not to import nuclear weapons." But they are not enshrined legislatively and have the form merely of a government decision. It could be abandoned just as easily as it was adopted, particularly in the event of a change of government. And these are not idle inventions on the subject of what could happen if....

As Britain's SUNDAY TIMES wrote on 30 January of this year, last December Britain's Ministry of Defense presented its government with a secret report on the prospects of Japan's nuclear arms. Tokyo, the document affirmed, today possesses practically all the components for assembling its own nuclear bomb, including the electronic triggers necessary for this.

Haruo Fujii, the authoritative Japanese military expert, who declared that Tokyo was adhering to a long-term strategy of the gradual creation of combat nuclear potential "bit by bit," dispersing this work around individual civilian sectors that arouse no particular suspicions, spoke even more definitely.

On the other hand, Tokyo already possesses potential nuclear weapon delivery systems. According to information of another Japanese military expert, Hisashi Maeda, his country's armed forces have 10 classes of missiles of American design on which nuclear warheads could be mounted. The 155- and 203-mm self-propelled howitzers available to Japan's Self-Defense Force may be used for firing nuclear munitions also.

But the two-stage H-2 missile, which is based fully on native, Japanese, technology, is, naturally, of the greatest interest from the viewpoint of the creation of delivery systems. Its lengthy development, accompanied by accidents and exasperating malfunctions, pursued the perfectly obvious goal of eliminating dependence on the United States in the sphere of rocket and space technology.

If we are speaking of the problem of self-provision of the "filling" for the nuclear weapons, then, according to estimates of experts of Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy, Japan could make a primitive, "dirty" uranium bomb even now. It would be delivered to target by the two-stage Japanese H-2 missile. But, naturally, the creation of more modern and unitized warheads will require possession of particularly pure weapons-grade plutonium.

Some experts believe that Tokyo already has such in a quantity necessary for several weapons. In addition, it is planned building at the present time at the Tokai Village nuclear center a facility for reprocessing spent radioactive fuel into highly pure plutonium perfectly suitable for use for military purposes.

As a press release of the permanent mission of the DPRK at the United Nations on 6 June of this year testifies, in April an IAEA inspector discovered 70 kg of "unaccounted plutonium" at a plant for the reprocessing of nuclear fuel in Tokai Village. The Japanese newspaper JAPAN TIMES cynically observed in this connection that, had it not been for a confidential report of the American Nuclear Control Institute, IAEA experts would never have learned that this "concealed material" had been prepared for nuclear bombs.

The press release pointed out that the 70 kg of discovered plutonium constitute 10 percent of the annual quantity that is reprocessed in Tokai Village. At the same time, on the other hand, so much clamor over the North Korean plutonium, which, in the opinion of Georgiy Kaurov, a high-ranking official of Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy, consists of just several tens of grams. Atsushi Tsuchida, an activist of the nature-conservation movement and a member of the staff of the Natural Sciences Institute in Saytama Prefecture, who is well known in Japan, declared in an interview with WEEKLY PLAYBOY that, in his opinion, the work at Tokai Village is at least potentially of a military nature. It is contemplated using this capacity for the enrichment of plutonium, which is formed at the time of the combustion of nuclear fuel in so-called breeder reactors. They are famed in Japan as the most economical source of energy, although practically all the developed Western countries are rejecting them as highly dangerous. And Japan alone is doggedly advancing along the path of the creation of breeders, intending to make them the basis of its nuclear power engineering. Behind this doggedness a "false bottom," about which Tokyo prefers to remain silent, shows through distinctly. The point being that the breeders produce mainly plutonium-239. And this, as we know, is the component of modern nuclear warheads.

There is much that is preventing as yet the adoption of such an important political decision in Japan. But the situation in the country is changing. For the first time in the past 38 years parliamentary elections were lost by the Liberal Democratic Party, which, on the whole, had pursued a policy of quite limited, purely defensive military preparations. The once-powerful Social Democratic Party, which was earlier a bastion of all mass antiwar movements, is simultaneously becoming extinct before our eyes also.

They are gradually coming to be replaced by the so-called new conservatives. They are calling the tune even now and believe that Japan should be a "normal country," as Ichiro Ozawa, general secretary of the Renewal Party and the acknowledged leader of this current, put it.

What is behind the words "normal country"? It could perfectly well be interpreted as follows: It is time for Tokyo to abandon all self-limitations, including the formal ban on the possession of armed forces and legislative obstacles in the way of participation in full-scale UN military operations, and also to fight for Security Council permanent membership status.

Thoughts concerning the abandonment of the nonnuclear principles fit perfectly well, you will agree, on the overall canvas of such arguments. And to extrapolate the remaining arguments and facts, the creation in the future of a Japanese nuclear test range on the Kurils would not at all seem to be the fruit of the author's wild imagination.

Kazakhstani-IAEA Safeguards Agreement

Hans Blix in Almaty

944K1931A Almaty SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA
in Russian 27 Jul 94 p 1

[KazTAG report: "Nuclear Energy Should Be Used Only for Peaceful Purposes"]

[Text] A meeting between Prime Minister Sergey Tereshchenko and Hans Blix, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], who had arrived in Almaty the day before, was held on 26 July.

Welcoming the important visitor, the head of the government conveyed to him good wishes from President Nursultan Nazarbayev. The agreement that is scheduled for signing at this time will serve, he said, the establishment of even closer cooperation between our republic and the IAEA.

New nuclear reactors will appear in Kazakhstan over time, Sergey Tereshchenko observed, for this energy is the way of the future, and the republic counts on IAEA assistance in ensuring that it be used only within the framework of the current standards and rules.

The production of clean drinking water with the aid of a nuclear reactor is being developed under the aegis of this authoritative international organization. Kazakhstan already has certain experience here, which it is prepared to share.

Having touched on problems of the former Semipalatinsk test site, where a large research base is preserved, the prime minister advocated the establishment of bilateral cooperation in its maintenance and also the elimination of the consequences of the nuclear testing at the site.

The rational use of atomic energy, in which the IAEA is involved, should be the norm for all states, and Kazakhstan fully supports this, the head of the government emphasized in conclusion.

Our specialists, who work in the republic, have a true understanding of the problems that exist here and will render the necessary assistance in resolving them, Hans

Blix said. Kazakhstan is a full member of the IAEA, and this, like the participation in other international organizations also, is of benefit to the republic. Since it gained independence, it has been converting the defense enterprises. It was one of the first in the CIS to accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which was an important contribution to the strengthening of world peace. For a number of countries, within the framework of the former USSR included, has yet to accede to the treaty.

Representatives of the IAEA know that nuclear energy is being used in Kazakhstan exclusively for peaceful purposes and are monitoring it most strictly. This is why the international agency will not only render all-around assistance but will also coordinate its cooperation with the United States on these matters.

Supporting Sergey Tereshchenko's opinion that the development of industry is inconceivable without nuclear energy, Hans Blix gave the assurance that IAEA specialists would hold consultations on the replacement of the nuclear reactor, which had been operating for a long time in the republic, and would assist in the elimination of the consequences of the dangerous tests near Semipalatinsk and in the solution of a number of other problems of no less importance for Kazakhstan in the development of atomic energy and its correct use.

In the afternoon Sergey Tereshchenko and Hans Blix signed in Friendship House an agreement-treaty between Kazakhstan and the IAEA on the recognition of safeguards. It contains the fundamental legal principles of mutual cooperation in the sphere of nuclear energy.

The director general of the IAEA told journalists of the purposes of the visit to the republic and the results of the work that had already been done and of the significance for both parties of the document that had just been signed.

The tasks and principles of the IAEA's activity were conveyed to those present by Boris Semenov, deputy director general of the agency. It monitors the use of nuclear resources only for peaceful purposes, but it is based on the particular facilities of each state. Boris Semenov reported also that a group of IAEA representatives from a number of countries was already working at the former Semipalatinsk test site. The preliminary results of an assessment of the radiation situation are reassuring. Contrary to certain statements, background radiation does not exceed the permissible level.

The same day the leader of the IAEA held a news conference in the National Academy of Sciences. Hans Blix met here with representatives of research organizations and interested ministries and departments of the republic.

On Wednesday and Thursday, Hans Blix and the persons accompanying him will be at the former Semipalatinsk test site.

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Further on Terms of Agreement

94P50175A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian 28 Jul 94 p 4

[Mekhman Gafarly "Document": "Alma-Ata Has Signed an Agreement on Nuclear Security. It Guarantees Peaceful Use of Kazakhstani Atomic Energy."]

[Text] On Tuesday [26 July] an agreement was signed in Alma-Ata [Alamaty] as a result of a three-day visit by Hans Blix, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. The agreement guarantees that nuclear energy produced in that country will be used only for peaceful purposes. IAEA Director General Hans Blix and Kazakhstani Prime Minister Sergey Tereshchenko signed the document.

The agreement envisages placing all five of Kazakhstan's nuclear reactors under IAEA monitoring. Of these, one is an industrial BN-350 [fast neutron] reactor located in Aktau on the Caspian coast. One is a research reactor in Alma-Ata. Three are experimental reactors on the territory of the former Semipalatinsk Test Site. Besides these reactors, the Ulbinskiy Metallurgical Plant, which produces fuel for atomic energy stations and is located in the eastern part of the republic, will also be placed under monitoring by IAEA experts.

At a briefing held after the treaty was signed, H. Blix said that the agreement in question will become a "control lever" in Alma-Ata's fulfillment of the commitments it has made in accordance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which was ratified by the Kazakhstani parliament in December 1993. Mr Blix also emphasized that "the document we have signed guarantees the use of nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes."

In accordance with the agreement Kazakhstan will receive all necessary materials to develop nuclear energy production. The IAEA will help solve the problem of replacing the working fast neutron reactor, located on the Mangyshlak Peninsula, and is also obligated to render help and offer consultations to Kazakhstan on questions of building atomic stations and using radionuclides. The IAEA will also cooperate with the republic in liquidating the consequences of nuclear testing at the Semipalatinsk Test Site.

Yesterday [27 July], IAEA experts arrived at the Semipalatinsk Test Site to visit the Kazakhstani National Nuclear Center, which is based there. The IAEA delegation's visit to Kazakhstan will end today.

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